

HISTORY AND KERYGMA: A STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF
REVELATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF WOLFGART PANNENBERG

by
Duane Allen Priebe

A Thesis Presented to the
FACULTY OF THE
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY AT CLAREMONT
In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY

June 1965

This dissertation, written by

DUANE A. PRIESE

*under the direction of his Faculty Committee,
and approved by its members, has been presented to
and accepted by the Faculty of the Southern California
School of Theology in partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for the degree of*

DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY

Faculty Committee

James M. Robinson
Chairman

John B. Cobb Jr.
Hans D. E. Bk

Date JUNE 1965

L. Thomas North

PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is a critical examination of the relation between word and history in Wolfhart Pannenberg's concept of the revelation of God. Pannenberg is one of a circle of young German theologians who have worked together since 1952. While the attention of this study will be primarily devoted to Pannenberg's work, the writings of the other men of the circle will also be considered in so far as they have a bearing on the theme of this dissertation. The discussion will be limited to the German theological scene, since this provides the basic context of Pannenberg's theology.

This dissertation presupposes that the primary task of such an examination is to understand Pannenberg's position, in order that the discussion may involve a material discussion of the subject matter rather than details and misunderstandings. It further presupposes that the discussion of a developing theological position cannot assume that that position has been worked out in its final form on all theological points. Understanding, however, is always critical understanding. The criticism will be oriented to two primary points. First, a theology centered in revelation as the self-disclosure of God in history must orient its understanding of revelation primarily to the character of God's revelatory work in history as his judgment and grace rather than to the demonstration of God's power or divinity, even though the latter should not be eliminated. Second, if this were done, the Pannenberg circle could understand the word of God more adequately as a historic event in which God encounters men and makes himself known

in history. This would be the most adequate understanding of the word of God within the structure of their understanding of history as the history of traditions.

Certain terms must also be defined. Since Pannenberg's theology is the primary object of interest in this study, the theological circle he is associated with will be referred to simply as "the Pannenberg circle" for convenience. The words "contingent" and "contingency" will always refer to that which is accidental or unpredictable in history, expressing its moment of discontinuity. The word "history" poses problems because it can be used in a wide variety of ways. A common definition of history identifies it with those events in which man is the acting subject. While Pannenberg thinks the human dimension of history must be taken seriously, he does not regard this definition as entirely adequate, since he essentially regards God as the subject of history. History can also be used in the sense of that which happened in the past or in the sense of an irreversible course of events. However, for Pannenberg, history is essentially constituted by the interaction of events and meaning, or between events and language, in the history of traditions. This is the basic sense in which the word "history" will be used in this dissertation. However, since this concept of history includes history as the work of man, events that happened in the past, and an irreversible course of events as moments in the meaningful interaction between events and language, it will not always be possible to avoid some ambiguity. The word "historical," like the German word historisch, will be used in reference to historical facts that

are determinable by an objectifying kind of historiography, although Pannenberg would use it in a broader sense. Thus, "historical event" will be used to refer to an event that actually happened in the past in the sense that the "objective" historian can determine that it happened. Similarly, while the term "historical Jesus" properly means what the historian as historian can say about Jesus, what this involves is a point at issue, and for clarity it will be used to refer to the positivistic historian's Jesus, namely, the objective facts about Jesus that can be determined by the historian independently of the question of the meaning of Jesus for faith. This includes a limited quantity of data about the activity and message of Jesus as well as the fact of the crucifixion. The exception to this use of the word "historical" will be its use in the expression "historical method" and related expressions, since in this case the content of the expression is derived from the particular understanding of the nature of history, which is the object of historical study. The word "historicity" will be used in the sense of that which actually happened. "Historic" will be used of significant or meaningful history, corresponding to the German word geschichtlich. "Historicness," correspondingly, will be used in the sense of Geschichtlichkeit. For the union of historicity and historicness, the word "historicality" will be used.¹ The expression "history of Jesus" will be used in the sense of Pannenberg's

¹ To the use of these terms, cf. James M. Robinson, "The Historicality of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, ed. Bernhard W. Anderson (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), p. 127, n. 8.

understanding of history. It will include the ministry and work of Jesus, his crucifixion and resurrection, and the meaning of these events in their history of traditions context. The term "Christ event" will be used to refer to the same history but in such a way as to emphasize the cross and resurrection as God's eschatological saving act for men.

I wish to express my special gratitude to Professor James M. Robinson and Professor John E. Cobb for their extensive comments, criticisms, and helpful discussions, as well as to Professor Loren Fisher and Professor Hans Dieter Betz. I am also very indebted to Professor Wolfhart Pannenberg for the extensive and helpful discussions with him. I also wish to thank Karl Peters and James Bresnahan for their help with proofreading and Carol Peters, Shirley Cunningham and my wife, Kathleen, for help with typing and proofreading.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PANNENBERG'S THEOLOGY	1
The Influences of the University of Heidelberg	4
Philosophy and Theology	15
The Theology of the Word of God	29
II. THE CONCEPT OF REVELATION	43
III. REALITY AS HISTORY	71
Reality and History	71
Historical Method and Hermeneutic	112
IV. REVELATION IN HISTORY	134
Revelation in the History of Israel	135
Revelation in Jesus Christ	155
V. THE REVELATION IN JESUS CHRIST AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY	173
VI. REVELATION AND PROCLAMATION	196
VII. CONCLUSIONS	220
BIBLIOGRAPHY	241
The Pannenberg Circle	242
Secondary Literature	255
Other Literature	260
APPENDIX. THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS	274

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF PANNENBERG'S THEOLOGY

An essay, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," published in 1959 by Wolfhart Pannenberg began with the programmatic statement, "Geschichte ist der umfassendste Horizont christlicher Theologie."¹ This essay marked the emergence of a new theological position representing the work of a theological circle originally associated with the University of Heidelberg. Pannenberg lists the group as including Martin Elze, Klaus Koch, Rolf Rendtorff, Dietrich Rössler, and Ulrich Wilckens.² Two years later this group became the object of extensive theological criticism with the publication of four programmatic essays devoted to the common theme of "revelation as history."³ This title characterizes their position as centered in the concept of history as the means by which God reveals himself to men. The range of interests of the men

¹W. Pannenberg, Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 218-237, 259-288; the quotation is from p. 218.

²Ibid., p. 218, n. 1; Trutz Rendtorff's name is added to the list with the publication of Offenbarung als Geschichte (see note 3 below).

³W. Pannenberg et al., Offenbarung als Geschichte (Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), which includes an introduction by W. Pannenberg (pp. 7-20); Rolf Rendtorff, "Die Offenbarungsvorstellungen im Alten Israel" (pp. 21-41); Ulrich Wilckens, "Das Offenbarungsverständnis in der Geschichte des Urchristentums" (pp. 42-90); W. Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Thesen zur Lehre von der Offenbarung" (pp. 91-114); and Trutz Rendtorff, "Das Offenbarungsproblem im Kirchenbegriff" (pp. 115-131). The second edition published in 1963 includes a "Nachwort" by Pannenberg (pp. 132-148) in which he replies to some of the criticisms of their position.

involved in this circle embraces all theological disciplines.⁴

The present study will deal with the relation between language and history in Wolfhart Pannenberg's understanding of the revelation of God. This means that certain other central aspects of Pannenberg's theology will only be touched on incidentally. One of these is the rejection of any kind of theological supernaturalism or of what he regards as a theology of authoritative assertion. This is one of the aspects of his rejection of the theology of the word of God as he sees

⁴This is reflected in the publication of their dissertations and Habilitationsschriften in the early days of their work: W. Pannenberg, Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Skotus im Zusammenhang der scholastischen Lehrentwicklung (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1954); R. Rendtorff, Die Gesetze in der Priesterschrift: Eine gattungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 44; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1954); T. Rendtorff, Die soziale Struktur der Gemeinde: Die kirchlichen Lebensformen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel der Gegenwart (Studien zur evangelischen Sozialtheologie und Sozialethik, 1; 2nd ed., 1959; Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1958); K. Koch, Die Priesterschrift von Exodus 25 bis Leviticus 16: Eine überlieferungsgeschichtliche und literarkritische Untersuchung (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 53; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959); U. Wilckens, Weisheit und Torheit: Eine exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu I Kor. 1 und 2 (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 26; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959); idem, Die Missionsrede der Apostelgeschichte: Form- und traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 5; 2nd ed., 1962; Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961); M. Elze, Tatian und seine Theologie (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960); D. Rössler, Gesetz und Geschichte: Untersuchungen zur Theologie der jüdischen Apokalyptik und der pharisäischen Orthodoxie (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 3; Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1960); Rössler's shift to practical theology is indicated by his Habilitationsschrift: Der "ganze" Mensch: Das Menschenbild der neueren Seelsorgelehre und des modernen medizinischen Denkens im Zusammenhang der allgemeinen Anthropologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962).

it reflected in both Barth and Bultmann. Closely related to this is the importance of the question of the existence of God, which cannot be presupposed but can only be dealt with in the context of the theme of God's revelation. Hence, both the theory of knowledge and the question of revelation have central roles for Pannenberg's theology. However, the problem of the relation between language and history is central for understanding Pannenberg's theological position as well as for the recent theological discussion in Germany, which is the context for Pannenberg's theology. After considering how Pannenberg sees some aspects of the historical context of his theology (Chapter I), the way he understands the concept of the revelation of God will be examined (Chapter II). Then, Pannenberg's understanding of reality as history and of historical method will be discussed (Chapter III). His understanding of revelation as history will be illustrated, especially by the particular history of Jesus as the full eschatological self-disclosure of God in its character as the prolepsis of the end of history (Chapter IV). This emphasis on the uniqueness of the Christ event as God's eschatological revelation poses the question of the relation between that event and God's self-disclosure in all of history (Chapter V). It will then be possible to discuss the relation of the kerygma and faith to the revelation of God in history (Chapter VI). Finally, the conclusions and criticisms will be summarized (Chapter VII).

It is necessary to begin by examining the way Pannenberg sees some aspects of the historical context within which the theological position of the Pannenberg circle emerged. The association of this

group with the University of Heidelberg in its beginning makes it necessary to examine the influences of the theological positions represented by that faculty. This can largely be characterized by an interest in the relation of faith or the kerygma to history. Second, some aspects of the relation of Pannenberg's theology to the history of thought, including scholasticism and the philosophy of history in particular, will be illustrated. Finally, the relation of Pannenberg's theology to the theology of the word of God will be discussed, especially in connection with the theology of Bultmann and Ebeling.

I. THE INFLUENCES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG

1. Shortly after World War II, Hans Freiherr von Campenhausen, as the rector of the University of Heidelberg, delivered a lecture dealing with Augustine and the fall of Rome.⁵ In this lecture he presented a picture of the destruction and chaos of the fall of Rome, marking the end of the old order of the world in which people lived and calling into question the meaningfulness of faith in God and the sense of existence in this world.⁶ The parallel to the chaos and destruction of the Second World War was clear. Augustine responded to this problem with "De civitate Dei," in which "Augustin will den Sinn

⁵H. von Campenhausen's essay, "Augustin und der Fall von Rom," first appeared in Weltgeschichte und Gottesgericht (Lebendige Wissenschaft, 1; Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1947), pp. 2-18, and it has been reprinted in H. von Campenhausen, Tradition und Leben: Kräfte der Kirchengeschichte: Aufsätze und Vorträge (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), pp. 253-272. The references are to the latter volume.

⁶Ibid., pp. 254-259.

des christlichen Glaubens an Gott gerade dort festhalten, wo er durch äussere Katastrophen scheinbar in seiner Sinnlosigkeit entlarvt wird."⁷ Augustine insisted that Christian faith, which hopes for the eschatological fulfillment of God's promise, means that history cannot be seen as simply senseless. Even though the righteousness of God is hidden in this world, the one who believes in Christ knows that it "dennoch besteht und alles Geschehene bestimmt."⁸ Augustine's work also aimed at a critical revision of the dominant historical consciousness of his day. For the state as well as the individual, the only source of righteousness and salvation is in God. However, in his pride, man exalts himself and misses the true ground of life and righteousness, thus robbing God, "der allein dem Demütigen Gnade schenkt und Völker bestrafen darf," of his honor.⁹ Augustine projected a theological conception of universal history embracing the old historical traditions and interpreting them in terms of the conflict between pride and humility, between "die selbstherrliche Gewalt der Stolzen und der auf Gott blickende Gehorsam der Glaubenden."¹⁰ This does not mean that he attempted to calculate the kind of decisions God makes in relation to world history or to provide theological and moral explanations for every situation in history.¹¹ However, the realization that nothing in this world is eternal, for eternity applies only to God and his kingdom, frees men to live and work in this world.¹²

⁷Ibid., p. 257.

⁸Ibid., p. 261.

⁹Ibid., p. 265.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 266.

¹¹Ibid., p. 263.

¹²Ibid., pp. 267-268.

The work of Augustine cannot be simply reproduced in our day, for it is conditioned both by the times and thought world in which Augustine lived and by his ascetic tendencies which manifest themselves in a devaluation of earthly things as such.¹³ Nevertheless, Hans von Campenhausen expressed the possibility that Augustine's answer to the problems of his day might help us to deal theologically with the disorder and disruption of history in our day.¹⁴ Therefore, he concluded his lecture with a call for renewing the task of a theological interpretation of history with the means that are at our disposal and in a way that embraces all theological disciplines. This would involve a theological understanding of the history of Israel and of the Near East as a movement toward Christ, the presentation of Jesus and the proclamation of the early church as the all embracing center of history, and the presentation of the relation between every period of church history to Jesus, measuring it by the original proclamation of Jesus.¹⁵ The theological circle with which Pannenberg is associated represents a response to this call for a theological conception of universal history. Pannenberg also derived the important insight from von Campenhausen that one cannot separate the history of thought from "external" history since the two are closely interrelated.

2. Such a theological conception of the history of Israel was already emerging in the work of Old Testament scholars and is best represented in Gerhard von Rad's presentation of the theology of the

¹³Ibid., pp. 269-271. ¹⁴Ibid., pp. 253-254. ¹⁵Ibid., p. 271.

Old Testament.¹⁶ The presupposition for von Rad's Old Testament theology is the understanding of the Old Testament as a history book.¹⁷ Hence, the first volume discusses the theology of the historical traditions of Israel. The second discusses the prophetic traditions in their relation to Israel's historical traditions as well as to the historical situation in which the prophets lived. This understanding of the Old Testament as a history book poses the problem of the divergence between the picture of the history of Israel which the Old Testament itself presents and that of modern historical research. The distinction between the kerygmatic and the historical-critical picture of Israel's history is especially apparent in the presentation of those events that were constitutive for Israel's existence, namely, the Exodus, Sinai, and the conquest of the land.¹⁸ However, for von Rad, the

¹⁶G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag): Band I: Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Überlieferungen (1957; 2nd ed., 1958); Band II: Die Theologie der prophetischen Überlieferungen (1960). Interestingly in von Rad's presentation the Old Testament itself has the kind of historical discontinuity that marks the end of the old order in terms of which life was meaningful in the destruction of the kingdoms and the exile. The prophets interpreted this history as judgment on the sins of Israel. The break with the past in the judgment of God was such that the prophets saw the saving acts of God that determined his relation with his people as lying in the future beyond God's judgment rather than in the past. In this eschatological conception of history in the prophets, the continuity with the old saving acts of God was expressed by describing his new saving acts in analogy with the old, but in such a way that they exceeded the old (Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 125-132, 186-198, esp. 284-285).

¹⁷Ibid., p. 370; G. von Rad, "Typologische Auslegung des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1952/1953), 17-33, esp. 23.

¹⁸G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, I, 111-120, esp. 113-114.

only object of an Old Testament theology is the kerygmatic picture of Israel's history, which understands this history in terms of God's work in history.¹⁹ Old Testament theology deals "mit dem, was Israel selbst als den eigentlichen Gegenstand seines Glaubens angesehen hat, nämlich die Offenbarung Jahwes in der Geschichte in Worten und Taten."²⁰ This position was very quickly criticized by Franz Hesse and Johannes Hempel, who insisted that the basis of such a theology of the Old Testament must be the historical-critical history of Israel.²¹ In the introduction to the second volume, von Rad replied that the modern picture of history is also interpreted history, but it is interpreted from presuppositions that do not allow a place for the work of God in history. Hence, at least theologically, this cannot be simply identified with the "real" history. For von Rad, both ways of viewing Israel's history have something to offer, so that Israel's theological picture of her history has its own value as the object of scholarly

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 117

²⁰ Ibid., p. 120.

²¹ Franz Hesse, "Die Erforschung der Geschichte Israels als theologische Aufgabe," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 1-19; idem, "Kerygma oder geschichtliche Wirklichkeit?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 17-26; Johannes Hempel, "Alttestamentliche Theologie in protestantischer Sicht heute," Bibliotheca Orientalis, XV (1958), 206-214; Victor Maag, "Historische oder ausserhistorische Begründung alttestamentliche Theologie," Schweizerische theologische Umschau, XXIX (1959), 6-18; cf. also the discussion by James M. Robinson, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, ed. Bernhard W. Anderson (New York: Harper and Row, publishers, 1963), pp. 124-158, esp. pp. 124-130 [German: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 113-141, esp. 113-117]; R. Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40, esp. 34-40.

theological study.²²

The Pannenberg circle thinks that the primary contribution of von Rad's Theologie des Alten Testaments does not lie in his programmatic formulations but in the execution of his method as he works out the history of the Old Testament traditions.²³ Von Rad does not isolate Israel's theological traditions from the form of Israel's history that is reconstructed by modern historical study. At every point, von Rad's discussion of the history of these traditions involves the modern historian's picture of the history of Israel and relates the traditions to this. Von Rad's starting point lies in the recognition

dass der Glaube Israels grundsätzlich geschichtstheologisch fundiert ist. Er weiss sich gegründet auf Geschichtstatsachen und weiss sich gestaltet und umgestaltet von Fakten, in denen er die Hand Jahwes wirksam sah.²⁴

Therefore, the task of presenting the theological traditions of Israel involves presenting this interaction between historical events and Israel's traditions which present this history as the work of God. This corresponds to the intention of the Old Testament texts themselves. "Diese Texte des Alten Testaments zielen auf Geschichte und sie kommen auch aus der Geschichte."²⁵ Pannenberg and the circle of

²²G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 8-11.

²³Esp., Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad, eds. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961), pp. 129-140, esp. pp. 134, 138.

²⁴G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, I, 112.

²⁵G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 11.

theologians associated with him embrace this procedure and identify history as essentially the history of traditions.²⁶ The traditions provide the linguistic context, with its concepts, hopes, and expectations, in relation to which new events in history are meaningfully experienced, but these traditions also bring the danger of obscuring the meaning of that which is new by fixing on the old.²⁷ In this way the Pannenberg circle seeks to overcome the cleft between the kerygmatic and the historical-critical conception of the history of Israel.²⁸ Pannenberg suggests that in the execution of his Theologie des Alten Testaments von Rad himself has in fact moved beyond this split.²⁹ Hence, with the concept of the history of Israel as a traditions-process, in which the saving events are constantly re-presented and actual-

²⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, p. 138; R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 81-94.

²⁷Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, p. 138.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 134-139; R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, esp. pp. 93-94. R. Rendtorff in particular has been involved in the methodological working out of the conception of history as the history of traditions in such a way as to overcome this distinction between the kerygmatic and the historical-critical history in his essays, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40, and "Geschichte und Überlieferung." Note also the similar discussion by James M. Robinson in his article, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith, esp. pp. 130-131 [German: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), esp. p. 118].

²⁹"Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 138-139.

ized for every new generation in their new historical situation, von Rad is seen as having overcome the distinction between "outer" and "inner" history or between historical-critical history and kerygmatic history, and as moving beyond the isolation of the kerygma from history that Pannenberg sees in the recent kerygmatic theology.³⁰ However, the understanding of history as the history of traditions does not entirely meet the problem that von Rad sees associated with the distinction between kerygmatic and historical-critical history. The distinction is not only between the historical-critical reconstruction and the way in which the Old Testament presents the course of events. It is a distinction between two ways of viewing history: one in which man is the creator of history, allowing no place for history as the work of God, and the other in which history is understood in relation to God. The historical method opens only the one aspect of history as the work of man. The kerygmatic interpretation of history as the work of God is not accessible in principle to the historical-critical method.³¹ The distinction can only be overcome if one can work out a new understanding of the historical method that has a place for history as the work of God but that does not at the same time fall back into a supernatural view of history. This is in fact what the Pannenberg circle attempts to do.³² To a large extent this orients the question of the

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 134-139.

³¹ G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, I, 114, and 473-474 in the Anhang; II, 9-10.

³² W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie

revelation of God in history to the question: how can one know that God is involved in this history?

3. The New Testament position of the Pannenberg circle is influenced in historical-critical questions primarily by Günther Bornkamm, who represents a fairly conservative Bultmannian or post-Bultmannian position. Pannenberg was influenced by Bornkamm's early criticism of Bultmann,³³ which emphasized that the person and history of Jesus could not be reduced to an understanding of existence. In posing the problem of the relation between significance and history, Bornkamm seemed to be moving in the same direction as von Rad and von Campenhausen.³⁴ Bornkamm's influence on the Pannenberg circle also involves the question of the historical Jesus. With his monograph on Jesus,³⁵ Bornkamm became closely associated with the new quest of the historical Jesus within the Bultmann school.³⁶ The Pannenberg circle

der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 139-140.

³³G. Bornkamm, "Mythos und Evangelium: Zur Diskussion des Problems der Entmythologisierung der neutestamentlichen Verkündigung," Mythos und Evangelium: Zum Programm R. Bultmanns, G. Bornkamm and Walter Klaas (Theologische Existenz Heute, N.F., 26; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1951), pp. 3-29.

³⁴Although he still regards the problem of the relation between Significat and Est as an essential one, Bornkamm himself has taken a more or less critical position in relation to this older article. G. Bornkamm, "Die Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns in der neueren Diskussion: Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung und Hermeneutik," Theologische Rundschau, XXIX (1963), 33-141, esp. 66, n. 1, 69, n. 1.

³⁵G. Bornkamm, Jesus von Nazareth (6th ed., 1963; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1956).

³⁶Cf. esp. the discussion in James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (London: SCM Press, 1959); Hans Conzelmann, "Jesus

shares this interest, and their basic position on the historical Jesus is that which is represented by Bornkamm. Furthermore, the new quest's basic concern for the relation between the kerygma and history is also shared by Pannenberg.³⁷ The question of the historical Jesus is necessary because the kerygma proclaims God's saving event as bound up with a particular historical person, and because the exalted Lord is identified with Jesus. Hence, while the pre-Easter Jesus cannot replace the exalted Lord for the church, the question of the historical Jesus is necessary if the church is to avoid docetism or the danger of having a mythological Lord.³⁸ This investigation presupposes the kerygma, and the question is whether the kerygma is possible as an interpretation of the historical Jesus. Pannenberg differs from this approach in two respects. First, the history of Jesus that is accessible to historical research is no longer understood as including only the pre-Easter Jesus, but this history also includes the resurrection. Second, the

Christus," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, III (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959), 619-653.

³⁷Cf. the discussion of the contribution of von Rad over against the kerygmatic theology, supra, pp. 9-12; cf. also J.M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus, pp. 85-92.

³⁸Cf. Ernst Käsemann, "Das Problem des historischen Jesus," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, I (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960), 187-214, esp. 195, 196, 202-203; James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus, pp. 12-13; also Günther Bornkamm, "Die Bedeutung des historischen Jesus für den Glauben," in Günther Bornkamm, Ferdinand Hahn, and Wenzel Lohff, Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus (Evangelisches Forum, 2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 57-71, esp. pp. 68-71; for a discussion of the relation between faith and history, also G. Bornkamm, "Geschichte und Glaube im Neuen Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 1-15.

history of Jesus, understood in its history of traditions context, also has a critical function in relation to the kerygma, even though the kerygma itself may be presupposed by the historian.³⁹ The correctness of the kerygma cannot be simply assumed, but the particular understanding of the kerygma is at stake in the question of the historical Jesus and his relation to the kerygma.

4. The Lutheran dogmatician Edmund Schlink, under whom Wolfhart Pannenberg did his work at Heidelberg, reflects the relatively conservative Lutheran confessional theology⁴⁰ represented by the journal Kerygma und Dogma, which is influenced very little by the work of Bultmann in a positive way. For present purposes, however, Schlink's primary importance for Pannenberg's theology lies in the concept of the doxological structure of language about God, which provides the starting point for Pannenberg's understanding of the use of words in relation to God.⁴¹ A doxological statement is a statement about the eter-

³⁹Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), esp. 89-99. Cf. also the criticism of the new quest for assuming the givenness of the kerygma which is made from quite a different standpoint by Van A. Harvey and Schubert M. Ogden, "Wie neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem historischen Jesus'?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 46-87, esp. 76.

⁴⁰This is, of course, something very different from the rigid confessionalism which one often associates with the concept of a confessional Lutheran theology in America, with its very conservative Biblicalism. Schlink understands the Lutheran confessions in their historical conditionedness, so that the question is raised as to the way and the extent to which they are relevant to the present theological situation. Cf. E. Schlink, Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften (3rd ed.; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1948).

⁴¹Edmund Schlink, "Die Struktur der dogmatischen Aussage als ökumenisches Problem," Kerygma und Dogma, III (1957), 251-306, reprint-

nal nature of God which is offered up in praise to God in view of his works in history. On the basis of the experience of God's work, men praise him as the one who is love, faithful, righteous, and so on. While such language has a point of contact in the ordinary use of words and in the experience of God's work, the use of a word in relation to God in praise means at the same time giving up the ordinary meaning of the word by using it in relation to God. Therefore, it is the character of such doxological statements about God that they cannot be used as the premise from which one proceeds to or derives other statements or concepts about God.⁴²

II. PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

For Pannenberg, theology is related to all aspects of human thought, since all thought is involved with the question of reality. Because theology is involved with God, and hence with the question of the understanding of reality as a whole, theology must relate itself in a critical way to all other ways of understanding reality. This relation involves two sides: first, in such discussion new dimensions of the meaning of God's revelation in Jesus Christ may be brought to

ed in Der kommende Christus und die kirchlichen Traditionen: Beiträge zum Gespräch zwischen den getrennten Kirchen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), pp. 24-79; cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 81-99; idem, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, eds. Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 96-115.

⁴²Cf. infra, pp. 184-185, 191-192.

light, and, second, these ways of understanding reality must be evaluated in a critical way in relation to the reality of God's revelation in Christ.⁴³ This relation between theology and human thought points in particular to three aspects of the background of Pannenberg's thought. First, his theology is carried out in the form of a discussion with the history of Christian thought. This will be illustrated in relation to scholastic theology. Second, the relation between Pannenberg's theology of history and Hegel's philosophy of history must be noted. Third, it is necessary to examine the way Pannenberg understands his relation to the modern philosophy of history, which is devoted primarily to the problem of historical knowledge or hermeneutic.

1. For Pannenberg, theology must be carried out in the form of a discussion with the history of Christian thought as well as with all other aspects of human thought both past and present.⁴⁴ This does not mean that theology simply transmits this tradition uncritically or adopts past statements of theology as adequate for our day. Theology is a historically conditioned task that relates the revelation of God in Christ, which is transmitted by the tradition and proclamation of the church to the present, to the changing conceptions of reality in

⁴³Cf. infra, pp. 192-195.

⁴⁴Cf. the discussion in J. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), esp. 91-94, 96-99. This procedure is well illustrated in Pannenberg's Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964).

terms of which men live and think.⁴⁵ The history of theology aids the theologian in this task in two ways. First, the problems of thought with which theology is involved are often given to us by the theological traditions in which we live, and these problems may have been given their sharpest formulations in the past. Second, even though past answers cannot simply be picked up and repeated in new times and situations, theological thought of the past may help point the way toward present answers to present theological problems.⁴⁶ In this respect the theological tradition must be critically evaluated both in its relation to the meaning of the history of Jesus as the revelation of God and to the possibilities and problems of present thought.⁴⁷

The period of the history of theology with which Pannenberg himself has been the most involved is that of scholastic theology.⁴⁸

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 93-94, 97-98.

⁴⁶Cf. esp. the methodological statements in W. Pannenberg, "Akt und Sein im Mittelalter," Kerygma und Dogma, VII (1961), 197-220, esp. 197, 218, 220. Cf. also the similar understanding of the function of historical study for theology in Hans von Campenhausen, "Augustin und der Fall von Rom," Tradition und Leben, pp. 253-254.

⁴⁷Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 96-98.

⁴⁸His continuing involvement with scholastic theology can be seen in a series of works dealing with aspects of this period: Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Skotus; Analogie und Offenbarung (Habilitationsschrift, Heidelberg, 1955); "Akt und Sein im Mittelalter," Kerygma und Dogma, VII (1961), 197-220; "Thomas von Aquino," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, VI (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1962), 856-863; "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, pp. 96-115; as well as a number of book reviews appearing primarily in Theologische Literaturzeitung.

The first problem posed by scholastic theology is that of the relation between predestination and human freedom, which he discussed in his dissertation in connection with the theology of Duns Scotus.⁴⁹ The intention of the concept of predestination in Duns Scotus, which is an "Ausdruck der dem Menschen gegenüber unverfügbar freien göttlichen Akzeption,"⁵⁰ is concerned with "das persönliche Gegenüber des frei akzeptierenden Gottes zum Menschen."⁵¹ However, this intention was inadequately realized because Duns Scotus shared scholasticism's starting point in the speculation about the nature of God and of his will rather than starting with the concrete encounter with the work of God in the history of Jesus Christ and in the proclamation of that event.⁵² The latter, as Luther correctly saw, is the only adequate starting point for the concept of predestination, which has its locus in the understanding of salvation as the work of God alone. In this respect,

⁴⁹W. Pannenberg, Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Scotus. Pannenberg's continuing involvement with this theme is reflected by the following articles: "Der Einfluss der Anfechtungserfahrung auf den Prädestinationsbegriff Luthers," Kerygma und Dogma, III (1957), 109-137; "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 251-280; "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), 614-621; "Prädestination IV. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961), 487-489.

⁵⁰W. Pannenberg, Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Scotus, p. 41.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 138.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 42-43; 138-139; also W. Pannenberg, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 614-615; idem, "Prädestination IV. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (3rd ed., 1961), 467-469.

statements about God's eternal predestination have a doxological structure in that they are the Christian's praise of God as the sole ground of his salvation. It cannot be used as the basis for speculation about the relation between God's eternal will and man's freedom and sin. The discussion of predestination has a twofold importance for Pannenberg's theology. First, it is one concrete form in which the soteriological aspect of Pannenberg's theology has been discussed. Second, the problem of predestination is related to the understanding of history. It involves the question of the relation between the work of God and the actions of men in history and of the relation between the unity and contingency of history.⁵³ Similarly, the problem and its difficulties in the scholastic discussion, which have continued as problems in the history of theology since then, indicate the difficulty of finding an answer by speculation that starts from the eternal attributes of God. These problems themselves point to the need of a new approach that takes its starting point in the Biblical concept of the concrete encounter of man by God in history. The same problem of the unity and contingency of history and the difficulties of solving it within the structure of the Greek concept of being are also reflected in the scholastic discussion of the relation between act and being in the concept of God. This discussion, however, poses the question from within the theological problem of the concept of God.⁵⁴

⁵³Cf. also Gerhard Ebeling, "Theologie und Philosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, VI (3rd ed., 1962), 801-802.

⁵⁴Cf. esp. W. Pannenberg, "Akt und Sein im Mittelalter," Kerygma

The second aspect of scholastic theology to which Pannenberg has devoted considerable attention is the question of the use of analogy in speaking of God.⁵⁵ This is again a problem that can find no adequate answer within the horizon of scholastic theology, because it uses the concept of analogy in the sense of an analogy of being between God and the world. Such an approach is grounded in the Greek concept of God as the origin of the structured order of the world in such a way that the world is an expression of the nature of God. Hence, analogies from this world to God are possible even though inadequate. This is not the case with the Biblical concept of God as Creator, who freely creates the world and who, in his freedom, continues to produce new things in history. The freedom of God and the contingency of his acts means that one cannot draw conclusions from the being of this world to the being of God. However, all human language about God is bound to analogy.⁵⁶ This can only be an analogy of language, which is based on the experi-

und Dogma, VII (1961), esp. 219-220.

⁵⁵This interest is again reflected in a continuing series of articles by Pannenberg: "Zur Bedeutung des Analogiegedankens bei Karl Barth," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVIII (1953), 17-24; "Review: Hans Wagner, Existenz, Analogie und Dialektik," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXIX (1954), 318-320; "Analogie und Offenbarung" (Habilitationsschrift, Heidelberg, 1955); "Analogie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, I (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1957), 350-353; "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Anwendung des Analogieprinzips in der evangelischen Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXV (1960), 225-228; "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 81-99; "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, pp. 96-115.

⁵⁶Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 96-97.

ence of the work of God in relation to men and on the normal use of words. However, when these words are applied to God, they acquire new content and meaning in the continued experience of God's work in history.⁵⁷ Again, the problem that is posed by the scholastic theology points to the necessity of a solution in terms of a conception of theology and history that begins with the concrete encounter between man and God in history.

A third problem posed in part by scholastic theology is that of a Christian philosophy.⁵⁸ Scholasticism brought the whole of philosophy and thought into a relation with Christian theology by distinguishing between natural and supernatural knowledge.⁵⁹ The former was accessible to all men, but it was supplemented by the supernatural knowledge that was given by the revelation of God. Pannenberg thinks that such a division endangers the universal character of theology, by giving it a special subject matter, namely, the study of the super-

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 99-102, 106-113; W. Pannenberg, "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Anwendung des Analogieprinzips in der Evangelischen Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXV (1960), 227-228.

⁵⁸ Pannenberg has not discussed this theme in relation to scholastic theology as such, nor should one see this theme as arising simply from his interest in scholastic theology. To the theme of a Christian philosophy, cf. W. Pannenberg, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 9; idem, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, N. 4, pp. 7-14.

⁵⁹ Cf. also G. Ebeling, "Philosophie und Theologie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, VI (3rd ed., 1962), 779. Since the early church did not make the distinction between natural and supernatural, Pannenberg himself is much more interested in that period for his own theology, as is reflected in the important article, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 1-45.

natural knowledge that is given by God's revelation.⁶⁰ Since the universality of theology corresponds to the universality of God, this division should be overcome in a theology of reason centered in the revelation of God in history. This raises the problem of a theory of knowledge appropriate to such a conception of theology and its relation to reason.

2. For Pannenberg, the questions of philosophy have their place in the context of the question of the reality of God and the truth of his revelation. His philosophical teachers were Nicolai Hartmann, Karl Jaspers, and Karl Löwith. The latter provided the starting point for Pannenberg's thought about history and its theological presuppositions.⁶¹ Jaspers' philosophy of history and concept of transcendence also had significance for Pannenberg. Although he studied Hegel only relatively late, his use of Hegel is an interesting example of his relation to philosophy since he is often closely associated with Hegel. Hegel attempted to bring together all of human thought into a unity by means of a concept of reality as history.⁶² Pannenberg thinks this aspect of Hegel's philosophy still opens possibilities for theology in our day and that theological or philosophical thought can adequately

⁶⁰ Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 13-14.

⁶¹ Esp. Karl Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschichte: Die theologische Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie (Urban Bücher, 2; 4th ed., 1961; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1953).

⁶² Cf. Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte (3rd ed., 1960; Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG, 1946), pp. 367-368.

move beyond Hegel only when it attempts to understand him and to take up the aspect of truth in his philosophy rather than evading the point of his thought through misunderstanding.⁶³ This does not mean a resuscitation of Hegel's philosophy or a repetition of his thought in our day,⁶⁴ but it means that one has to take seriously the accomplishments of Hegel's philosophy in the history of thought, evaluating the problems and the possibilities it poses for modern theological thought.

Pannenberg regards Hegel's basic contribution as his understanding of truth as history so that "die Wahrheit nicht irgendwo als fertiges Resultat bereitsteht, sondern selbst als Geschichte, als Prozess gedacht ist."⁶⁵ Hence, truth is the meaning of the whole of history, and that which makes history a meaningful whole can be seen only

⁶³Cf. Günter Rohrmoser, Subjektivität und Verdinglichung: Theologie und Gesellschaft im Denken des jungen Hegel (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1961), who attempts a revision of the existing pre-judgment, and the review of this book by W. Pannenberg in Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 294-296, esp. 294; cf. also Barth's discussion of the question of the validity of the reasons for Hegel's lack of continuing influence in philosophy and theology in Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert, pp. 343-373.

⁶⁴In this respect Lothar Steiger is correct in seeing that Pannenberg cannot simply take up the philosophy of Hegel, but he misses Pannenberg's point when he thinks that such an attempt is what Pannenberg intends in an unreflected way, "Offenbarungsgeschichte und theologische Vernunft: Zur Theologie W. Pannenburgs," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 88-113, esp. 93. Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage," Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 137, n. 14.

⁶⁵W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit: Festschrift für Heinrich Vogel, ed. Kurt Scharf (Berlin: Lettner Verlag, 1962), p. 233. For Pannenberg's discussion of Hegel, cf. esp. ibid., pp. 233-238; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), pp. 18-20, 137, n. 14.

from the end of history when all of the contradictions involved in the process of history are resolved. In this way Hegel developed "die Konzeption der Universalgeschichte als indirekter Offenbarung Gottes."⁶⁶

Pannenberg thinks that Hegel's conception of the nature of truth as history is related to the Biblical concept of truth in two respects:

Erstens dadurch, dass überhaupt die Wahrheit nicht als zeitlos unveränderlich, sondern als ein durch Veränderungen verlaufender, aber darin sich durchhaltender Prozess verstanden wird. Zweitens dadurch, dass erst vom Ende her die Einheit des Prozesses, der unterwegs voller Widersprüche ist, sichtbar wird, damit aber auch die wahre Bedeutung jedes einzelnen Momentes.⁶⁷

It is these two aspects of Hegel's philosophy of history which Pannenberg understands as essentially correct. However, Hegel's program cannot be simply repeated in our day because of our recognition of "die Endlichkeit als Standpunkt des Denkens und die Offenheit der Zukunft."⁶⁸ Hegel could understand history as a unity only by identifying his own standpoint as the end of history from which history could be viewed in a meaningful way. Because of this, he could not give an adequate place to the contingency of events and to the importance of the individual in history. Rather, the individual was subsumed under the general, and the understanding of reality was dominated by the

⁶⁶W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 18. Hegel was the first one to use the concept of the revelation of God in the strong sense as the self-disclosure of God (cf. ibid., pp. 7-11).

⁶⁷W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, p. 234. Cf. also infra, pp. 71-87.

⁶⁸W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 110.

logic of the concept.⁶⁹ However, the miscarriage of the Hegelian solution of the problem because of these limitations does not mean that the task of a theology or philosophy of history as such need be abandoned.⁷⁰ Pannenberg takes up the task of a theology of history in light of the problems which Hegel's solution poses, and he looks for the answer in a new conception of history centered in the resurrection of Jesus as the prolepsis of the end of history. He seeks to show that such a conception of history, in which the revelation of God in the history of Jesus provides the key to the meaning of history, makes possible an understanding of truth as history in such a way that one can give an adequate place to the openness of the future and to the contingency of events without sacrificing the unity of truth.⁷¹

3. The point of contact between Pannenberg's theology and the modern philosophy of history lies especially in the problem of historical knowledge. Partly due to the failure to attain an adequate concept of the unity of history and to the modern criticism of any philosophy of history as metaphysics, the modern philosophy of history has turned its attention primarily to methodology and the theory of histor-

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 120; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 19-20; idem, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 234-235.

⁷⁰W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 120-121.

⁷¹Ibid.; W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 106; idem, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 235-238.

ical knowledge.⁷² This is reflected in the two men whom Pannenberg particularly indicates as the basis of the formulation of his theory of knowledge: R.G. Collingwood and Hans-Georg Gadamer.⁷³ Collingwood's importance for Pannenberg lies in his concept of historical imagination and the role it plays in the process of historical study.⁷⁴ Using the illustration of the way in which a detective reconstructs the picture of a crime and uses that reconstruction as the basis of his investigation, Collingwood describes the process of historical investigation as beginning with a picture or theory, projected by historical imagination, of the way history happened. This picture provides the historian with the questions with which he then does his detailed research, questioning the sources. The source material becomes significant as historical data in relation to this theory. Through this detailed research, the imaginatively projected theory is either confirmed, modified, or eliminated as inadequate. In this way the object of histor-

⁷²Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Geschichte und Geschichtsauffassung III. Geschichtsphilosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 1488-1496, esp. 1489; also Wolfgang Müller-Lauter's criticism of Heidegger's attempt to overcome historical relativism through a concept of "das Geschick der Wahrheit des Seins" in "Konsequenzen des Historismus in der Philosophie der Gegenwart," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), esp. 234-251, also 254-255.

⁷³R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960).

⁷⁴Collingwood develops this concept in The Idea of History, pp. 231-282, esp. 266-282; cf. also W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 281-283; idem, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, p. 21.

ical research is not the individual events as such but the relation between these individual events. Pannenberg agrees with this, but he also thinks that so far as the imaginatively projected theory is verified by the accessible particular results, it has the value of presenting the historical context which belongs to the events themselves. Hence, this theory is binding on the historian until concrete evidence requires its change.⁷⁵ This understanding of the relation between an imaginatively created theory of the way things are and the subsequent concrete research done in terms of this theory is, for Pannenberg, basic to the theory of knowledge in any field.⁷⁶

A difficulty with Collingwood's understanding of historical method lies in the assumption that historical study consists of the repetition of thoughts of the past. The possibility of such a repetition of past thoughts is itself open to question.⁷⁷ In this respect

⁷⁵Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 282-283: "Will der Historiker seine eigene Zugehörigkeit zu dem Geschehen, das er beschreibt, nicht aus den Augen verlieren, andererseits aber auch den Erkenntnisanspruch seines historischen Entwurfs nicht preisgeben, so kann er diesen nur als spontane Reproduktion einer vorgegebenen Geschichtseinheit meinen, die freilich erst in diesem reproduzierenden Akt zum Bewusstsein ihrer selbst kommt."

⁷⁶Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrngeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 227-228; cf. also Pannenberg's discussion of "Daseinsbewältigung mit Phantasie" in Was ist der Mensch: Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe 139/140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 13-22, esp. p. 20, for its relation to the theory of knowledge.

⁷⁷Pannenberg only discusses the structure of Collingwood's theory of historical knowledge, which he sees as Collingwood's contribution, rather than Collingwood's understanding of the basis of the

Hans-Georg Gadamer's concept of historical understanding as the merging of horizons, which makes the historical difference between the past and the present a constitutive element in the process of understanding, is more adequate.⁷⁸ This conception of the process of understanding involves three aspects. First, the interpreter must show the difference or strangeness of the text's horizon of thought in relation to his

possibility of historical knowledge. If, as in Pannenberg, history is understood as involving essentially that which is unique and individual, then one must ask whether Collingwood's concept of history is basically unhistorical. For Collingwood, the goal of historical study is the re-enactment of human thoughts of the past. Only that which is universal in character in a thought, rather than the unique, can be the object of historical knowledge, since only this universal aspect can be repeated. In this he reflects more of a Greek concept of knowledge in which the unique and individual, i.e., the changing and unrepeatable, cannot be the object of knowledge. Hence, for Collingwood, the object of historical knowledge can only be that which involves conscious thoughts of men, which are then repeatable in the present. However, in spite of his argumentation, it is questionable whether there can ever be such a simple repetition of a past thought. His emphasis on the constantly critical character of historical thinking already seems to point in this direction. However, basically he fails to adequately take into account the extent to which human thought is historically conditioned and thus largely bound in time and place rather than being more or less timeless and universal. Cf. his discussion in The Idea of History, esp. p. 303, also pp. 215, 224, 282-315. Cf., e.g., the complete rejection of any historically constant or unchanging element as a basis for understanding in Heinz Kimmerle, "Hermeneutische Theorie oder ontologische Hermeneutik," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 114-130.

⁷⁸Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 275-283, for his discussion of "Die hermeneutische Bedeutung des Zeitabstandes," and pp. 284-290, for the development of the concept of "horizon" and its significance for hermeneutic. Pannenberg's article "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 90-121, is largely devoted to a discussion with Gadamer; cf. pp. 105-109 for his discussion of the significance of the concept of hermeneutic as the merging of horizons; also W. Pannenberg, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, No. 4, p. 13.

own horizon, which he brings with him to the task of interpretation. Second, in the process of understanding, a new horizon is projected that embraces the initially strange horizons of the text and the interpreter. Third, the horizon that the interpreter brings to the task of understanding is thus not a fixed presupposition, but it itself changes in its involvement in the process of understanding. In this way the historical conditionedness of the thought of the text as well as of the interpreter is given a constitutive place in the process of understanding so that an unchanging aspect of history or of human existence is no longer a presupposition for historical knowledge or understanding.⁷⁹

III. THE THEOLOGY OF THE WORD OF GOD

Pannenberg sets his theological program over against a theology of the word of God that places the kerygma into the center of theological consideration. In addition to a criticism of Barthianism, this involves criticism of Rudolf Bultmann as well as a continuing discussion with the systematic theology of Gerhard Ebeling. It is necessary both to see the way in which Pannenberg understands the opposing position and to try to define the issues more precisely.

1. Part of the difficulty of understanding Pannenberg's theology in relation to that of Rudolf Bultmann lies in the fact that it is not always clear to what extent he understands Bultmann correctly.

⁷⁹Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1960), 107-110.

Pannenberg understands Bultmann's kerygmatic theology as isolating the kerygma from its ground in history. This means that the historical ground for the biblical proclamation is lost from sight, for faith cannot seek false security by going behind the kerygma. On the other hand, the kerygma and its claim are given independent value as the revelation of God. However, for Pannenberg, "das Wort allein mit seinem blossen Anspruch auf Wahrheit, abstrakt für sich genommen, kann eben noch nicht zureichender Grund für den Glauben sein."³⁰ Pannenberg sees this as making theology too subjective in that the kerygma becomes the disclosure of an eschatological understanding of existence in relation to which one must decide how he will understand his existence on the basis of the claim of the proclamation. Pannenberg thinks that such an understanding of the kerygma, which appeals to an ungrounded decision, reduces faith to a human work.³¹ In order to clarify the relation between Pannenberg's theology and a theology of the word of God, it is necessary to begin, then, by an examination of Bultmann's understanding of eschatology and history, of the relation between the kerygma and history, and of the relation between revelation, word of

³⁰ W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad, p. 132; for the discussion of the isolation of the kerygma from history, pp. 129-134.

³¹ Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, p. 18; idem, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960, No. 4, p. 9; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 101; cf. the criticism of the latter by Lothar Steiger, "Offenbarungsgeschichte und theologische Vernunft," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 112.

God, and faith.

Bultmann understands history as human history so that the subject of history is man.⁸² Hence, the history of religion is essentially the history of man's striving for the kingdom of God. In this way Bultmann can interpret the history of Israel as parallel with the law. The history of Israel is prophecy in that it miscarries, and by showing the failure of man's way to God it prepares the way for the encounter with the grace of God in Jesus Christ.⁸³ In this way history can pose the question of God and his grace, or man can hope for God's salvation in view of the failure of his way in history. However, the answer to this question or hope cannot arise from within history but only as the eschatological event of God's forgiveness and grace in the cross and resurrection of Christ and, hence, in the kerygma.⁸⁴ It is in this sense as the end of man's way to God that Bultmann understands Christ as the end of history just as he is the end of the law, for one

⁸²Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, Geschichte und Eschatologie (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), pp. 165-167, 171: "Aber von Geschichte im eigentlichen Sinn reden wir nur, wo das Subjekt des Geschehens die Menschen sind, die sich als bewusste und wollende Wesen von der Natur unterscheiden. Die Geschichte wird konstituiert durch menschliche Handlungen" (p. 165).

⁸³Cf. Rudolf Bultmann, "Weissagung und Erfüllung," Glauben und Verstehen, II (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1952), 162-168, esp. 183-186.

⁸⁴Cf. R. Bultmann, "Die Frage nach der natürlichen Offenbarung," Glauben und Verstehen, II, 79-104. Hence, it is meaningful to speak of revelation in nature or history only in that "sie uns ständig verweist auf die Offenbarung der vergebenden Gnade Gottes in Christus. Nur indem sie das tut, ist sie aber für uns Offenbarung; das heisst aber ausser Christus ist sie für uns nicht" (pp. 103-104). Cf. also Glauben und Verstehen, II, 10-11, 15, 74-75.

no longer looks to his experience in history or to his own accomplishments for his relation to God. This relation is determined only by God's grace in Jesus Christ.⁸⁵ Given Bultmann's definition of history, it becomes clear why he speaks of God's revelation as an eschatological event rather than as a historical event, even though it is dialectically related to historical events. This can be made clear with regard to the resurrection of Jesus. By definition, the resurrection of Jesus cannot be a historical event, in distinction from the crucifixion, which is an event in history. Therefore, it is not accessible to the historian. Only the thought and proclamation of the early church is a historical event.⁸⁶ The resurrection has to do with the significance of the cross as the eschatological act of God in which his grace and forgiveness are present to men.⁸⁷ This means that the resurrection and the meaning of the cross cannot be objects of historical research, but only objects of faith. Therefore, one has access to the resurrection only in the kerygma, in which God encounters human existence with his salvation and calls forth faith. God's encounter with man in the cross

⁸⁵E.g., R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, I (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1933), 292-293, 329-333.

⁸⁶Cf. R. Bultmann, "Neues Testament und Mythologie: Das Problem der Entmythologisierung der neutestamentlichen Verkündigung," in Kerygma und Mythos: Ein theologisches Gespräch, ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch (4th ed., 1960; Hamburg-Bergstedt: Herbert Reich, Evangelischer Verlag G.m.b.H., 1948), pp. 15-48, esp. pp. 46-47. This also makes it clear that Bultmann does not simply identify the resurrection with the thought and proclamation of the early church, since the latter is the historical side of the eschatological event.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 44-46.

and resurrection of Jesus and in the kerygma cannot be isolated from each other as independent events.

Hence, somewhat schematically, one difference between Pannenberg and Bultmann lies in the question as to whether history is to be understood basically as the work of God or as the work of man. This then involves the question of the scope of historical research. Bultmann thinks that the historian cannot go behind the kerygma to history as the ground of the kerygma, because the kerygma proclaims the cross and resurrection of Christ as God's eschatological saving act for man. However, Bultmann does not intend to isolate the kerygma from history. He understands the relation between the kerygma and history as a dialectical one, just as he understands the relation between the revelation of God and history in a dialectical way. The kerygma arises from the historical event of the cross of Christ in which God reveals himself by acting for men's salvation, and it is a part of that event. However, the cross of Christ is God's eschatological saving act only as it is mediated to men through the kerygma.⁸⁸ Hence, for Bultmann, the kerygma and history cannot be isolated from one another, but they belong essentially together.

This can be seen more clearly in the way in which Bultmann understands the concept of the revelation of God. The revelation of

⁸⁸Cf. R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, I, 180: the kerygma "als die durch das Heilsfaktum autorisierte Predigt" itself belongs "zum Heilsfaktum und umgekehrt ist auch das Heilsfaktum nicht ohne die Predigt, was es ist." Cf. also ibid., pp. 208, 238; idem, Glauben und Verstehen, II, 10-11; idem, Glauben und Verstehen, III (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), 21-22, 31.

God is understood as God's eschatological act in which he encounters man with his grace and forgives man's sins, thus freeing man for historic existence under God's grace. "Der christliche Glaube weiss, dass als Gottes Offenbarung nur bezeichnet werden kann die Gnade Gottes, die die Sünde vergibt."⁸⁹ This revelation of God does not take place independently of events in history, but the New Testament

kennt nur eine im geschichtlichen Geschehen als dem Handeln Gottes sich vollziehende Beziehung zwischen Gott und Mensch. Das Kreuz Christi ist ihn deshalb gerade als historisches Faktum in all seiner Zweideutigkeit Handeln Gottes, nicht als gedeutete Geschichte, also nicht als Symbol für das Verhältnis von Gott und Mensch, sondern als Tat Gottes, in der sich dies Verhältnis vollzieht. Als zeitliche Ereignisse kennt das Neue Testament Sünde und Vergebung.⁹⁰

It is this occurrence in history of God's revelation or grace which makes the kerygma gospel.⁹¹ However, Bultmann's understanding of revelation as the occurrence of God's grace and forgiveness in human existence means that it cannot only be a past event but consists in that past event having something to say to men now. The kerygma itself is God's revelation in which he is present to men, claiming them and granting them life and forgiveness.⁹² In this sense the kerygma is the word of God. If revelation is the occurrence of God's grace in human existence, this also means that God's revelation does not occur apart

⁸⁹R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, II, 100.

⁹⁰R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, I, 83.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 202-203.

⁹²Cf. R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, III, 19-23; also Glauben und Verstehen, I, 147, 260, 271.

from faith through which God's grace and forgiveness become effectively present in human existence. Faith arises on the basis of God's revelation and is experienced as a gift, but also faith is itself revelation.⁹³ The revelation of God, then, involves three interrelated aspects: the historic event of God's revelation in Christ, the proclamation of this event as God's salvation in the kerygma, and faith in Christ. Does this mean that faith is understood as a human work? For Bultmann it does not. Faith is not produced by man; it is called forth in man by God by means of the kerygma. Hence, faith is experienced as a gift from God through the Holy Spirit rather than as a human possibility. Only as a gift can faith be our free act.⁹⁴ For Bultmann the kerygma is not simply a claim to truth, but it is the means by which God is present to man and at work in man to call forth faith from him.

In this way, Bultmann understands God's revelation as essentially related to human existence and as involving a new understanding of existence as life from God under God's grace. Correspondingly, to speak of God means to speak of God as he determines man's existence in his judgment or grace.⁹⁵ Hence, theology in all its aspects is essentially related in one way or another to the understanding of human

⁹³Cf. R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, I, 101-102, 212; idem, Glauben und Verstehen, II, 10; idem, Glauben und Verstehen, III, 23, 31.

⁹⁴R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, II, 10.

⁹⁵R. Bultmann, "Welchen Sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?" Glauben und Verstehen, I, 26-37.

existence. History itself does not have its meaning as a whole, for no one stands at the end of history where he can see it as a whole. The meaning of history lies in the historicness of one's existence in the present, namely, in the way in which one is determined by one's part or set free by the grace and forgiveness of God and in the way in which one lives responsibly in relation to the past and the future.⁹⁶ For Bultmann, this avoids an anthropomorphic concept of God and reflects the fact that the only adequate way of speaking of God is by speaking of the way in which he qualifies human existence. However, Pannenberg thinks that this represents an unsatisfactory reduction of history to the historicness of human existence and narrows theology to anthropology.⁹⁷ Put differently, while Bultmann regards the kerygma basically as address, in which God encounters human existence with his claim,⁹⁸ Pannenberg regards the kerygma basically as statement about the revelation of God in Christ, so that as such it is the way in which God encounters men. This distinction and what it involves can be seen more clearly in relation to Gerhard Ebeling's development of a theology of the word of God.

2. The distinction between Ebeling and Pannenberg can be seen

⁹⁶R. Bultmann, Geschichte und Eschatologie, pp. 164-184.

⁹⁷Of. W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 223-225, also 231-237; idem, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 99-104.

⁹⁸Of. R. Bultmann, "Der Begriff des Wortes Gottes im Neuen Testament," Glauben und Verstehen, I, 268-293.

most clearly in relation to the concept of the word of God. For Ebeling, the primary character of word is communication (Mitteilung)-- "gewiss nicht in dem abgeblassten Sinne von Information, sondern in dem gefüllten Sinn von Partizipation und Kommunikation"⁹⁹--, which corresponds to Bultmann's emphasis on the word of God as address. However, this shift from word as address to word as communication brings to expression the fact that Ebeling wants to understand word as imparting something to men. This corresponds to the Lutheran concept of the word of God as law and gospel, in which the law is understood as the word that spoils and kills, and the gospel is understood as the word that creates salvation and gives life.¹⁰⁰ In this sense, the gospel is the word that is promise, opening the future and awakening faith. God, word, faith, and the future belong essentially together.¹⁰¹ The word of God is then

das Wort, das den Menschen menschlich macht, indem es ihn zum Glaubenden macht, d.h. zu dem, der Gott als seine Zukunft bekennt und darum dem Mitmenschen das schlechthin Notwendige und Heilsame, nämlich wahres Wort, nicht schuldig bleibt.¹⁰²

Thus, word is basically an event in relation to human existence in history; that is, it is an occurring word. The essence of word is that which it produces, so that its content and power are identical.¹⁰³

The same basic understanding of language is reflected also in

⁹⁹Cf. Gerhard Ebeling, "Wort Gottes und Hermeneutik," Wort und Glaube (2nd ed., 1962; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), p. 342.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 341.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 343.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 344.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 342.

Ernst Fuchs, although he would make the correlation primarily between language and love rather than between word and faith.

Language presses in upon us before or behind objects, in everything that affirms or rejects us. Hence it is precisely language that belongs to our human nature. And since only man has the capacity to be himself by giving himself to another, the language of man belongs in the sphere of love.¹⁰⁴

The power of language is then its power to make love present or to deny love, and that which is an event of love is also a language event, even when it occurs without words. Language and love belong together, and Fuchs's theology of language is intended to serve what is essentially a theology of love.¹⁰⁵

Ebeling's shift from Bultmann's interest in word as address to word as communication reflects a shift in interest from the word of God as his address to men, in which his claim over against human existence is presented, to an interest in that which the word of God produces in human existence. However, both Ebeling and Bultmann are similar in

¹⁰⁴ Ernst Fuchs, "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem," The New Hermeneutic, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New Frontiers in Theology, II; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 144; for Fuchs's discussion of language and love, cf. pp. 130-145; also the discussion of Fuchs by James M. Robinson in the introductory essay, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," pp. 51-63. Cf. also esp. the Ergänzungsheft (1958) to Ernst Fuchs, Hermeneutik (2nd ed., 1958; Bad Cannstatt: R. Möllerschön Verlag, 1954), pp. 7-13; idem, "Logos," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, IV (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), 434-440; idem, "Was ist ein Sprachereignis? Ein Brief," Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), pp. 424-430.

¹⁰⁵ The extent to which Fuchs's theology is in its basic intention a theology of love is well illustrated, for example, by his essay "Existenziale Interpretation von Römer 7:7-12 und 21-23," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 285-314.

wanting to understand the word of God primarily in terms of what it does in relation to human existence in contrast to Pannenberg's concern to understand language primarily as statement about the history of Jesus, so that only in its character as statement does it mediate or communicate something to men. These distinctions do not merely represent changes in accent but involve quite different orientations for theological thought. For Bultmann, the understanding of the kerygma as making God and his claim present to men means that any attempt to go behind the kerygma to ground it in any way would be an expression of unbelief and disobedience over against God, for it would be an expression of man's attempt to find security and his relation to God in something that is at his disposal rather than in God and his grace alone. For Ebeling, however, the fact that the word of God is primarily understood in terms of what it produces in relation to human existence means that the relation between the kerygma and Jesus is understood in terms of the word that was event in the past becoming event in the present.¹⁰⁶ The word of the kerygma is essentially the same word event as that which took place in Jesus, and, therefore, it is both possible and necessary to ask about the word that took place in Jesus and what it imparted to men. The correlation between word and faith, for Ebeling, corresponds to a correlation between Jesus and faith or between Christology and faith.¹⁰⁷ This continuity is essentially a continuity in

¹⁰⁶E.g., Gerhard Ebeling, Wort und Glaube, pp. 345, 347.

¹⁰⁷Cf. esp. ibid.: "Jesus und Glaube," pp. 203-254; "Die Frage

that which the word produces in changing human situations. It is as the witness of faith whose word produces faith in men that Jesus is the ground of faith. Pannenberg, on the other hand, basically understands the kerygma in terms of its content, namely, the history of Jesus, particularly the cross and resurrection, as the eschatological act of God for man's salvation. Hence, for Pannenberg, faith must ask the question of the kerygma's ground in the history of Jesus, with its inherent meaning in its history of traditions context. Only in the kerygma's relation to this historical ground, in its character as statement, does the kerygma communicate or impart something to men.¹⁰³ This divergence in understanding the relation between language as statement and language as communication poses the problem of the relation between these two aspects of language. If Bultmann and Ebeling can be criticized for bypassing the question of the content of the kerygma by focusing attention on its character as address or as communication, it is also a question as to whether Pannenberg's emphasis on language as statement does justice to the character of language as address or communication. Put in other words, can theology and Christology be subsumed under anthropology and soteriology (Bultmann and

nach dem historischen Jesus und das Problem der Christologie," pp. 300-316; also idem, Theologie und Verkündigung: Ein Gespräch mit Rudolf Bultmann (Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 1; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1962), esp. pp. 26-32.

¹⁰³Cf. Pannenberg's criticism of Ebeling in "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 112-113. However, it is a question whether the character of language as communication comes to adequate expression in Pannenberg.

Ebeling)?¹⁰⁹ Or can anthropology and soteriology be subordinated to theology and Christology (Pannenberg)?¹¹⁰ Are not both one-sided?

This distinction in the understanding of the kerygma also has implications for the question of the legitimacy of the kerygma. If the kerygma is understood primarily as statement, its legitimacy lies in the history that it proclaims. The primary problem for theology is then the correspondence between the kerygma and the meaning of the history that it proclaims. However, if the kerygma is understood primarily as communication, its legitimization lies in the fact that it encounters one's existence and imparts something to him, namely, that it brings him faith, opens the future, and gives him life in relation to God. In the latter case, the primary problem is that of hermeneutic. How can the kerygma be proclaimed in such a way that it encounters the reality in which men live and accomplishes that which it intends with man? How can it be heard as that which is absolutely necessary to the existence of man as man?¹¹¹ This corresponds to the Lutheran conception

¹⁰⁹Cf. R. Bultmann, "Neues Testament und Mythologie," Kerygma und Mythos, p. 46: "Man kann also nicht zuerst an Christus glauben und daraufhin an sein Kreuz; sondern an Christus glauben heisst, an das Kreuz als das Kreuz Christi glauben. Nicht weil es das Kreuz Christi ist, ist es das Heilsereignis, sondern weil es das Heilsereignis ist, ist es das Kreuz Christi."

¹¹⁰Cf. the structuring of the relation between Christology and soteriology in Grundzüge der Christologie; cf. p. 42: "Die Soteriologie muss aus der Christologie folgen, nicht umgekehrt. Sonst verliert gerade der Heilsglaube selbst jede Grundlage."

¹¹¹This emphasis on the word of God in relation to the reality in which men live as being that which is absolutely necessary for the existence of man as man, bringing healing and life to his existence,

of the relation between law and gospel, in which the law is the hermeneutical presupposition for the understanding of the gospel. Hence, Ebeling can interpret the law in terms of the various aspects of the reality in which men live, including ethics, as the hermeneutical presupposition for hearing the gospel in such a way that it encounters their existence as that which is absolutely necessary for their life.¹¹² Ebeling's most embracing expression for this is that the place of the word-occurrence is man as conscience.¹¹³ In this case, conscience cannot be understood as a primarily moral concept, but man himself is conscience as a self-consciously acting being, who is therefore responsible.¹¹⁴ Hence, man as conscience is the place where man, God, and the world come together¹¹⁵ so that it is the most embracing expression for the reality in which men live and in which the word of God encounters their existence in a meaningful way.

runs throughout Ebeling's work; cf., e.g., Wort und Glaube, pp. 344, 393, 411, 429. This orientation to that which the proclamation imparts is also the basis for the possibility of orienting theology to an interpretation of faith; cf. G. Ebeling, Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959).

¹¹²E.g., Gerhard Ebeling, "Die Evidenz des Ethischen und die Theologie," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 318-356, esp. 328, 352-355. In his critical discussion, Pannenberg does not take the primarily hermeneutical character of the evidence of the ethical in Ebeling sufficiently into account; W. Pannenberg, "Die Krise des Ethischen und die Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 7-16.

¹¹³Cf. esp. G. Ebeling, "Theologische Erwägungen über das Gewissen," Wort und Glaube, pp. 429-446.

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 439-444.

¹¹⁵Ibid., pp. 432-436.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF REVELATION

As is the case with Protestant theology in recent years, the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg is very self-consciously a theology of revelation.¹ Hence, "der einzige legitime Ausgangspunkt theologischer Erkenntnis liegt in der geschichtlichen Situation, in der der Mensch vom Offenbarungshandeln Gottes getroffen wird."² The knowledge of God can come only from God and his initiative. It cannot arise from man and his capacities. The latter can only pose the question of God, thus providing the context in which God's revelation occurs in a meaningful way.³ This revelation of God is not to be understood in the sense of

¹For Pannenberg's discussion of this situation and his understanding of his own relation to it, cf. the "Einführung" to Offenbarung als Geschichte, W. Pannenberg et al. (Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft 1; 2nd ed., 1963; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), pp. 7-20, esp. pp. 7-11.

²W. Pannenberg, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 274-275.

³Cf. Pannenberg's discussion of "Weltoffenheit und Gottoffenheit" in Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe 139/140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 5-13, esp. pp. 11-13; also, idem, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 1-45, for an illustration of this relationship involving the question of God in Greek philosophy. Pannenberg shows that the question of God arises in man's radical openness in relation to the world, i.e., in the strength and accomplishments of men rather than primarily in relation to his sin and weakness. The existence of the question of God is, of course, to be distinguished from a proof for the existence of God (p. 11). It is interesting to compare this with the intention of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who wants to see God in the center of man's

the mediation of information about God that can be abstracted from his acts in history. The knowledge of God consists in man being known by God, and "die in diesem Erkenntwerden beschlossene erwählende Zuwendung Gottes" is "die Bedingung unverfälschter Gotteserkenntnis."⁴ To speak of the attributes of God, such as his might, love, and faithfulness, has its place as praise of God on the basis of the experience of his works in history. These attributes are not objective, timeless, statements about God that can be abstracted from his acting in history. For example, what it means to speak of God as love can only be understood in terms of the continuing experience of God's work in history.⁵

life rather than at its limits, or in relation to man's strength rather than his weakness. Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Widerstand und Ergebung: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft, ed. Eberhard Bethge (8th ed., 1958; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1951), pp. 182, 211, 216, 230-236. Cf. Gerhard Ebeling's interpretation of Bonhoeffer in terms of the Lutheran categories of law and gospel, "Die 'nicht-religiöse Interpretation biblischer Begriffe'," Wort und Glaube (2nd ed., 1962; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), pp. 90-160, esp. pp. 140-145. The question is whether Bonhoeffer's intention does not rather aim at a criticism of the category of law as the presupposition for hearing the gospel (cf. Widerstand und Ergebung, esp. pp. 182, 211, 216). For the relation between the question of God arising in the human situation and the revelation of God, cf. also Rudolf Bultmann, "Die Frage nach der natürlichen Offenbarung," Glauben und Verstehen, II (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1952), pp. 79-104.

⁴Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 15. He does not understand this primarily in an individualistic sense. God is also known to man in a different way in his wrath and judgment (e.g., Ezek. 39:22, in relation to Israel; 25:7, 11, 17, in relation to other nations). Within the context of the revelation of the grace of God in Jesus Christ, Lutheran theology has distinguished between the wrath and judgment of God as his strange or alien work and his salvation as his proper work on the basis of Is. 28:21, for God's act for man's salvation reveals the way that he wants to be God for man.

⁵Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denk-

Since Pannenberg's theology is in its intention a theology of revelation, it is necessary to begin with an examination of the meaning of his concept of revelation. This involves three aspects: first, revelation as the self-disclosure of God; second, revelation as history, which poses the question of the historicity of revelation and of the essence of God as historic; third, revelation as the disclosure of the divinity of God and of the way in which he is God.

1. Pannenberg understands revelation essentially as the self-disclosure of God.⁶ It is not the disclosure of supernatural truths or the supernatural disclosure of some subject matter apart from God. Revelation in the strict sense means Selbsterschliessung in the sense of Wesenserschliessung.⁷ This means in turn that what God is in his essence cannot be separated from what he is in his revelation.⁸ What God becomes in relation to others belongs to the nature of God. For example, that God brings forth something other than himself in creation means that what God is becomes what he is in relation to that which he

strukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, eds. Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 96-115.

⁶Cf. esp. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 7-11.

⁷Ibid., p. 12; cf. also idem, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960, No. 4, p. 4.

⁸Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between the nature of God and his revelation is basically taken over from Karl Barth, with the result that Pannenberg fails to discuss it with adequate clarity. Cf. Karl Barth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, I/1 (6th ed.; Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG., 1952), pp. 121, 321, 329, 333-334, 413, 435, 437, 450, 489.

created. "Durch die Hervorbringung eines andern und durch dessen Gestaltung ändert sich auch, was der Hervorbringende selbst ist."⁹

This also involves the relation between the nature of God and his acts in history. The essence of God cannot be separated from what he does in history¹⁰ and, hence, from what he is in relation to man. God's revelation in his acts in history defines his essence as God. This does not mean that the works of God are necessarily grounded in his essence in such a way that one can work back to the essence of God by means of analogy from his works. The works of God are contingent acts of his freedom, in which he chooses his attributes by choosing how he will act in relation to his creation and thus how he will be God in relation to men. In this way God is "personally" present to men in his works in history rather than distant from man behind the structures of this world.¹¹

Der kontingent Handelnde aber erwirbt sich eine Eigenschaft, indem er "dieses" bestimmte Tun in seiner Besonderheit wählt, es sich zueignet, so dass es nun wirklich Eigenschaft seines ewigen Wesens ist. So erweist sich der kontingent handelnde Gott der Bibel in seinem Tun sein Wesen, und daher ist sein Wesen nicht als eigenschaftslos hinter seinem Tun zu suchen.¹²

This relation between the essence of God and his revelation is clearly seen in Pannenberg's discussions of the relation between Christology

⁹Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), p. 331; cf. also pp. 328-333.

¹⁰Cf. also W. Pannenberg, "Akt und Sein im Mittelalter," Kerygma und Dogma, VII (1961), 197-220; cf. also idem, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), esp. 37-38.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 37-38.

¹²Ibid., p. 38.

and the self-revelation of God. In agreement with Barth, he argues that the concept of revelation as God's self-disclosure includes the fact that there is only one revelation, for, when God discloses himself fully in a particular event, other events different from the first cannot also be his self-disclosure.¹³ If the act of God in Jesus Christ is the full self-disclosure of God, then this includes the uniqueness of that event as his revelation. If the revelation of God defines what God is, then the act of God in Christ belongs to the definition of God or to his essence as God.¹⁴ Pannenberg understands this as the ground for the Christological statements of the unity of Christ with God.

In view of his understanding of revelation as self-disclosure, Pannenberg distinguishes two ways in which the revelation of God can take place: direct revelation or indirect revelation. The distinction is independent of the way in which the revelation might be mediated to men. A direct revelation of God would have "unmittelbar Gott selbst zum Inhalt, . . . mit dem Sinn vollständiger Selbsterschliessung."¹⁵

¹³Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 9-11; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 127-128.

¹⁴Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 8-11; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 124-131, esp. p. 128: "Wenn Gott durch Jesus Christus offenbart ist, dann wird überhaupt erst durch das Christusgeschehen definiert, wer oder was Gott ist. Dann gehört Jesus Christus schon zur Definition Gottes und also zu seiner Gottheit, zu seinem Wesen. Das Wesen Gottes ist dann, abgesehen von Jesus Christus gar nicht zugänglich." Cf. also Karl Barth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, I/1, p. 329: "Haben wir es mit seiner Offenbarung zu tun, so haben wir es mit ihm selbst und nicht, wie die Modalisten aller Zeiten meinten, mit einer von ihm selbst verschiedenen Entität zu tun."

¹⁵W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 17.

Pannenberg points out that the Biblical materials do not terminologically speak of revelation as self-disclosure. This leads him to ask whether anything in the Bible materially corresponds to the concept of the direct self-revelation of God. As important as the disclosure of the name of God may be for the relation between Israel and God, it is not a direct revelation of God in the sense of the disclosure of his essence. The same is true of the word of God, for that which the Bible speaks of as the word of God or the kerygma does not directly have the essence of God himself as its content. For example, when the Old Testament prophet speaks the word of God, its content is the impending destruction of the nation as the judgment of God or the promise of its restoration. The content is distinct from God himself so that the prophetic word cannot be understood as the direct self-revelation of God. The same is true of the concept of law and gospel. None of these constitute a direct self-disclosure of God.¹⁶ The self-disclosure of God can also be understood as indirect revelation:

Indirekte Offenbarung ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie nicht unmittelbar Gott zum Inhalt hat. Jedes Handeln Gottes, jedes seiner Werke, kann indirekt etwas von Gott aussagen. Es kann besagen, dass Gott ein solcher ist, der das und das tut.¹⁷

Pannenberg thinks that this concept of revelation as the indirect revelation of God in his acts in history corresponds to the Biblical materials better than the concept of a direct revelation of God.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 12-16.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁸It is important to recognize the chain of thought that Pannenberg follows in the "Einführung" to Offenbarung als Geschichte.

This does not mean that the disclosure of the name of God, that the word of God, or that law and gospel have nothing to do with the revelation of God. These things have their place within the concept of revelation as the indirect revelation of God in his acts in history. A word, for example, can also be a historic event in which God acts in relation to men.

pp. 12-20 as being the contrast between a conception of a direct revelation of God and an indirect revelation rather than between history as revelation and the disclosure of the name of God, the word of God, or law and gospel as such. Such a misunderstanding is reflected in the criticisms of Günter Klein, "Offenbarung als Geschichte? Marginalien zu einem theologischen Program," Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), 321-334, in which he traces the inconsistency of the attempt to eliminate word from the concept of revelation. Cf. also G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Wolfhart Pannenberg (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 37; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), pp. 12-21, esp. pp. 12-13; also Lothar Steiger, "Offenbarungsgeschichte und theologische Vernunft: Zur Theologie W. Pannenburgs," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), esp. 94, 108. Cf. Pannenberg's response in the "Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage," Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 132-148, esp. pp. 135-139. Pannenberg grants that he should be understood in contrast to the common theology of the word of God, but he insists that the position represented by the theological circle with which he is associated is concerned essentially with the unity of event and word in the concept of history as the history of traditions. It must be pointed out, however, that the impulse for Klein's misunderstanding arises from Pannenberg's discussion itself. Pannenberg discusses the question of the word of God in relation to revelation only in connection with the rejected concept of a direct revelation of God, and he only speaks of history in relation to the concept of the indirect revelation of God. The impression is that of a contrast between word and history as mutually exclusive ways of understanding the revelation of God, since Pannenberg makes no real effort to show what place the word of God has in the concept of the indirect revelation of God in his acts in history. Given this initial misunderstanding, his later discussion of the relation between word and revelation ("Das Wort bezieht sich auf Offenbarung als Vorhersage, als Weisung und als Bericht," ibid., p. 112, together with the discussion on pp. 112-114) only increases the misunderstanding because of the way in which he formulates the relation.

2. The concept of revelation as history is intended to bring to expression the historicity of God's revelation as well as the incomprehensibility and hiddenness of God. Revelation could be understood as the disclosure or unveiling of that which is always true, so that it becomes known to men. This understanding is reflected, for example, in the Greek concept of truth (a-lētheia) as the unveiling of that which is.¹⁹ This more or less timeless concept of the content of revelation is difficult to fit in with the radical freedom of the Biblical God, who works in history encountering man in judgment and grace, and who can and does create new and unheard of things, especially in Jesus Christ. Pannenberg, however, understands the revelation of God as radically historic in character so that it involves a "becoming" on the part of God in relation to man rather than the disclosure of a timeless reality. It is an act of God that brings something new into existence, creating a new relationship between God and man. This change cannot simply be subsumed under the category of a change on man's side in relation to a changeless God. The concept of changelessness is inappropriate for the God of Christian faith, who in

¹⁹Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit: Festschrift für Heinrich Vogel, ed., Kurt Scharf (Berlin: Lettner-Verlag, 1962), pp. 216-217; also pp. 215-223, for his discussion of the relation between the Greek concept of truth and the Biblical concept. Cf. infra, pp. 71-87. Cf. also Gerhard Gloege's negative evaluation of the concept of revelation as neither a specifically Christian nor theological concept. He regards it as arising out of late Greek philosophy or Jewish apocalyptic and thinks that its prominence in theology has a basically negative effect. G. Gloege, "Offenbarung VI. Christliche Offenbarung, dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, IV (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), 1609.

his freedom acts contingently in history. The revelation of God also involves a change on God's side of the God-man relationship. His revelation is his saving act in Jesus Christ in which he turns to men and elects them to community with himself.²⁰ Since the revelation of God belongs to his essence, God himself has a history in relation to man. The contingency of God's acts in history in his freedom means that continuity in history is possible only in terms of his faithfulness. The continuity of history does not consist in the continuous development of history. Rather, it consists in the fact that God does not abandon his previous acts in relation to men, but takes them up and preserves them in that which is new.²¹ This faithfulness of God is not always apparent to men, for the contingency of God's work in history often makes it appear that he is untrue to his promise:

So ist die Identität Gottes mit sich selbst, seine Treue zu seiner E[rwählung], in der geschichtlichen Situation regelmässig verborgen. Gewiss ist sie nur dem das Sichtbare hinter sich lassenden Vertrauen auf Gottes Treue.²²

This poses the question of the hiddenness of God in relation

²⁰ Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 29-30, esp. 31. Note also the relation that he sees between attempts to maintain the concept of a changeless God and the rise of certain heresies in the history of the church.

²¹ Ibid., p. 31.

²² W. Pannenberg, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), 617. Cf. also idem, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 257-258, for a discussion of the hiddenness of Christian freedom in this world. The relation between revelation and hiddenness in Pannenberg's theology is not

to his revelation. Pannenberg understands the revelation of God in Christ as the revelation of the incomprehensible, hidden God. "Für den Glauben Israels ist Gott wesentlich der Verborgene."²³ This incomprehensibility or hiddenness of God is associated with the historicity of God and his revelation and with the fact that in history the future is always open and unpredictable. "Die Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes gerade in seiner Offenbarung bedeutet, dass auch für den Christen die Zukunft noch offen und voller Möglichkeiten ist."²⁴ God remains the living and active God who is free to do new things in history so that the future and its possibilities remain incalculable. The revelation of God in Jesus Christ cannot be used as a device for any kind of an attempt to get an overview of history from the standpoint of God.²⁵ The fact that God is not at our disposal, which comes to expression in the openness of the future, is, for Pannenberg, the ground for the concept of God as a person.²⁶ Only that which is in principle impercep-

understood simply by noting the rejection of the dialectic between hidden and revealed within the concept of revelation itself (cf. Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 11). This problem of understanding the meaning of revelation and hiddenness will be dealt with in the following discussion.

²³W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 25; idem, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960, No. 4, p. 3.

²⁴W. Pannenberg, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960, No. 4, p. 7.

²⁵Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 234-237; idem, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 275.

²⁶W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? p. 26: "Und darum, weil

tible to us, as other men, is regarded as a person. Whatever one understands as being at his disposal and manipulable ceases to be a person and becomes an object. The freedom of God to produce new, unforeseeable things in the future, so that he is not perceptible to us or at our disposal, means that man's relation to God can only be that of unconditional trust. That God and faith belong essentially together is related to the concept of God as a person.²⁷ The attempt to replace trust by control is sin.²⁸

The revelation of God in Jesus Christ does not, then, eliminate the incomprehensibility or hiddenness of God. The new element in the Christian knowledge of God, which consists in our being known by God, lies in the fact "dass nur im Blick auf Gottes Gegenwart im Geschick Jesu Christi der Mensch die Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes aushalten kann, um so im Angesicht der Wahrheit Gottes auch wahrhaft Mensch zu sein."²⁹

er seinem Wesen nach unverfügbar ist, können wir ihn im Unterschied zu den Dingen unserer Welt nur als Person, als persönlichen Gott denken." Also idem, "Person," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (2nd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961), 230-235, esp. 231: "Gott ist P[erson] und nicht Sache, weil er als unbekannte Macht über das Dasein wesenhaft undurchschaubar ist. . . . Der biblische Gott ist wesenhaft P[erson], weil er immer neues, kontingentes Geschehen hervorbringt, stets unvorhersehbar handelt und darin die Unendlichkeit seiner Freiheit erweist." This also means that the end of history does not make him perceptible to man so that he becomes an object at man's disposal, against Walther Zimmerli's criticism in "'Offenbarung' im Alten Testament: Ein Gespräch mit R. Rendtorff," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 28.

²⁷W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? p. 26. Cf. also p. 25 for the relation of the concept of person and the relationship of trust.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 27-29.

²⁹W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottes-

The revelation of God and his love in Jesus Christ makes existence in trust in the uncomprehensible, hidden God possible³⁰ so that in his life man is bound only to God and thus is free from bondage to this world or its norms and programs.³¹ It enables man to stand in openness to the unknown future in trust in God and his promise.³² But this revelation of God in Christ does not place the future at man's disposal or give him insight into the future course of history. The full significance of the Christ event is itself not completely at our disposal. The essence of an event or its significance is decided only by the future of that event,³³ for its future is part of the historic context in which an event has its meaning. The openness of the future means that not all that is involved in the meaning of the Christ event

begriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 26-27.

³⁰W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 29-31. In spite of the incomprehensibility of God and the openness of the future, "die mit Jesus Verbundenen" have "die Gewissheit, dass der durch die Auferweckung Jesu in seiner Gottheit offenbare Gott Israels über alles Geschehen Gewalt hat, dass nichts von seiner in Jesu Verhalten und Geschick offenbaren Liebe trennen kann und dass sein letztes Wort, wie immer dessen Erfüllung an uns auch aussehen mag, nicht Tod, sondern Leben heisst" (W. Pannenberg, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960, No. 4, p. 7).

³¹Cf. W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 28-29; idem, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 276-280; also 257-258, for the hiddenness of this freedom in this world.

³²Cf. also Gerhard Ebeling's emphasis on God as giving man a future through word and faith, esp. Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959), pp. 91, 158, 169, 227-242; Wort und Glaube, pp. 343-344.

³³Cf. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 134-135, 169.

is known.

However, if God is essentially hidden and unknown, what, then, does it mean when Pannenberg rejects the idea that the medium of the revelation of God also involves a veiling of God?³⁴ It means that God is not to be sought behind his work in history or behind his revelation in Christ, as though the act of God in Christ were an inadequate representation of what God is, or as though the essence of God could be separated from his revelation. If the medium of God's revelation reveals and conceals, then a second revelation would be necessary to uncover the meaning of the revelation of God in the Christ event.³⁵ That the medium of revelation discloses rather than conceals God does not mean that God ceases to be the hidden, incomprehensible God and becomes an object at our disposal.

Solche Unverhülltheit besteht dann, wenn Gott auch von sich aus nicht anders Gott ist als von dem Geschehen bzw. der Person her, die ihn "verherrlicht." . . . Der Bezug zu diesem Geschehen oder zu dieser Person müsste zur Gottheit Gottes selbst gehören.³⁶

3. The understanding of the revelation of God as his indirect self-disclosure in his acts in history, then, means that man can know

³⁴W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 11; cf. the criticism of this point as being contradictory with the concept of the indirectness of God's revelation in G. Klein, "Offenbarung als Geschichte?" Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), 67-68.

³⁵It is for this reason that Pannenberg regards the idea that the medium of revelation both reveals and conceals God as inconsistent with Barth's emphasis on revelation as self-revelation and, hence, as unique. Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 11; also the discussion above, p. 47

³⁶W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), p. 142, n. 25.

God or speak of God only in terms of what he has done in history. Man cannot speak about God in abstraction from what God does, and at the same time what he does in history belongs to his essence as God. This indirect self-disclosure of God in history involves both the disclosure of his divinity, or of the fact that the God of Israel is God of the whole creation, and the disclosure of his love, or of the way in which he uses his power in relation to men. These two aspects of God's self-revelation are not independent of each other. The disclosure of God's divinity and power in history is at the same time the revelation of how he uses his power in relation to men, and God's disclosure of how he would be God for man is at the same time the revelation of his divinity and power.

The Pannenberg circle has tended to place greater emphasis on the first aspect of God's self-disclosure, namely, the revelation "dass nur er Gott ist und Macht hat."³⁷ This aspect corresponds closely with the question emerging from the interest in overcoming the split that von Rad sees between the Biblical understanding of history and that of historical-critical research. This split lies both in the difference between the way the Old Testament presents the course of history and the reconstruction of historical-critical method, and the difference

³⁷Rolf Rendtorff, "Die Offenbarungsvorstellung im Alten Israel," Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 36. The emphasis on the power of God is especially central in this volume. Hence, for R. Rendtorff, the name of Yahweh, which carries with it the associations of his past revelation, becomes a pregnant expression for this claim of power (ibid., p. 34).

between history understood as the work of God and as the work of man.³⁸ Correspondingly, the attempt to overcome this split involves both the question of a new understanding of history as the history of traditions and the question of how one can see the work of God in history. An initially attempted answer to the latter question lay in the structure of promise and fulfillment. The promise of God, as, for example, in the word of the prophets, gives history a forward movement from promise to fulfillment. That God fulfills his promises shows that he has the power to accomplish what he wills in history.³⁹ The difficulty with this concept of the structure of history, in addition to the fact that the promises of the Old Testament are seldom fulfilled in a literal sense, is that this tends to become a rigid structure imposed on history, thus tending to give an inadequate place to the openness of history, which corresponds to the freedom of God, even when one grants

³⁸Cf. Gerhard von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag), I (1957; 2nd ed., 1958), 111-120; II (1960), 8-11. Cf. supra, pp. 9-12.

³⁹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 220-221; Rolf Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), esp. 33-34; also the emphasis on the relation between word and history as word becoming event in R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII, (1962), 622, 626-627, 629, 631, 649. Cf., e.g., Is. 41:21-29; 44:6-8; 46:8-11; 48:3-8. For the relation between promise and fulfillment, cf. also Gerhard von Rad, "Typologische Auslegung des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 17-33, partially reprinted in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments, ed. Claus Westermann (Theologische Bücherei, 11; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960), pp. 11-17; Walther Zimmerli, "Verheissung und Erfüllung," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 34-59, reprinted in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik, pp. 69-101.

that the fulfillment outdoes the promise.⁴⁰ Only faith, which trusts in the faithfulness of God, can see the continuity between promise and fulfillment by understanding the fulfillment as going beyond the promise.⁴¹ For this reason, the Pannenberg circle is seeking to move toward a more adequate concept of history as the work of God by means of an understanding of history as the history of traditions.⁴²

The question of how one can know that God is God, and has power

⁴⁰ Cf. the criticism by James M. Robinson, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, ed. Bernhard Anderson (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), esp. pp. 128-129 [German: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), esp. 116-117]. The difficulty of maintaining this structure without an abstraction in the content of the promise is already reflected in W. Zimmerli, "Verheissung und Erfüllung," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1952/1953), 44-49, where he can maintain the promise and fulfillment structure only by understanding the essential content of the promise as the coming of God to his people. To maintain that the fulfillment of the promise breaks and transcends the promise (cf. W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V, 1959, 227-228, 229; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, 2nd ed., pp. 132-133) reflects the problem more than it solves it.

⁴¹ E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 617.

⁴² Jürgen Moltmann's criticism of Pannenberg for giving up the structure of promise and fulfillment seems to misunderstand what is involved, just as he completely reverses the point of J.M. Robinson's criticism (*supra*, n. 40). J. Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung: Untersuchungen zur Begründung und zu den Konsequenzen einer christlichen Eschatologie (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 38; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), p. 69. Pannenberg does not give up the importance of promise or hope for Christian faith (e.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, 2nd ed., p. 147), but he does abandon an inadequate understanding of the structure of history. It is not entirely clear that Moltmann's emphasis on the role of historical study as uncovering the future possibilities of an event (e.g., pp. 173-179, 247-248, 256) takes the openness of history with sufficient seriousness, for it is precisely these future possibilities of an event that are unknown and unpredictable.

encountering men in his work in history, has some striking points of contact in the Old Testament. The first of these is the concept of the revelation of the glory or honor (kabod) of God.⁴³ For Rolf Rendtorff, in the older Old Testament texts, the glory of God is "die dem Menschen erkennbare Seite des Wirkens Jahwes, in dem er selbst in seiner Macht offenbar wird."⁴⁴ Thus, the concept of the disclosure of the glory of God is related to his indirect self-revelation in history, demonstrating his power. In later texts, the manifestation of God's glory becomes the object of eschatological hope, in which it is "der endgültigen Verwirklichung seines Herrschaftsanspruches an die Welt."⁴⁵ The decisive revelation of his glory becomes an eschatological event associated with the end of history and the eschatological judgment of God.

The other point of contact with the Old Testament is with the Selbstvorstellungsformel, "I am Yahweh," and the Erkenntnisformel, "they shall know that I am Yahweh," which were investigated by Walther Zimmerli.⁴⁶ Rolf Rendtorff and Pannenberg regard the use of these

⁴³Cf. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard von Rad, "Doxa," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, II (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1935), 236-258, esp. von Rad's discussion of "kabod im AT," pp. 240-245; R. Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 28-32; Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 92-95.

⁴⁴R. Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 31; for the somewhat different tradition in P, cf. pp. 29-32.

⁴⁵G. von Rad, "Doxa C. Kabod im AT," Theologisches Wörterbuch, II, 245; cf. R. Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 31; W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 93; also the discussion of "doxa" by Gerhard Kittel, Theologisches Wörterbuch, II, 245-258, esp. 250.

⁴⁶The series of articles in which Zimmerli investigated these

formulae as closely related to the modern concept of revelation as the self-disclosure of God.⁴⁷ Rolf Rendtorff maintains that in the older texts, the Selbstvorstellungsformel, "I am Yahweh," occurs with additions that relate it to the past experiences of the power of God in history. The use of the formula is often coupled with a promise, and it has the function of bringing the promised event into the context of the previous history of God's work in relation to his people.⁴⁸ He thinks that the shorter form without additions represents a later development of the use of the formula in Israel. The formula then becomes a "prägnante Zusammenfassung des Machtanspruchs Jahwes," who alone directs the course of history.⁴⁹ Similarly, the Erkenntnis-

formulae has been reprinted in Walther Zimmerli, Gottes Offenbarung: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum Alten Testament (Theologische Bücherei, 19; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963): "Ich bin Yahweh," pp. 11-40 [originally: Geschichte und Altes Testament, Albrecht Alt zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 16; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1953), pp. 179-209]; "Erkenntnis Gottes nach dem Buche Ezechiel," pp. 41-119 [original: Erkenntnis Gottes nach dem Buche Ezechiel: Eine theologische Studie (Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments, 27; Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1954)]; "Das Wort des göttlichen Selbsterweises (Erweiswort), eine prophetische Gattung," pp. 120-132 [originally in Mélanges Bibliques rédigés en l'honneur de André Robert (Travaux de l'institut catholique de Paris, 4; Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1957), pp. 154-164]. Cf. also Karl Elliger, "Ich bin der Herr--euer Gott," Theologie als Glaubenswagnis: Festschrift für Karl Heim zum 80. Geburtstag (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1954), pp. 9-34. Zimmerli himself had already related these formulae to the concept of the revelation of God in his acts in history (e.g., Gottes Offenbarung, pp. 20-24, 79-80, 87-88).

⁴⁷Rolf Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 32-38; also, W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), p. 132, n. 1; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 125-126.

⁴⁸R. Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 32-34.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 34. Cf. W. Zimmerli's criticism of R. Rendtorff in

formel, "they shall know that I am Yahweh," is used in relation to the work of God in history so that the object of knowledge is not the name of God as such but "der in ihm enthaltene Machtanspruch."⁵⁰ The Erkenntnisformel is usually associated with a prediction of an event in the future as God's work, and the knowledge of God is produced by

"'Offenbarung' im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 15-31, esp. 18-23. Zimmerli argues that the use of the short form in early texts in the Selbstvorstellungsformel supports his contention that the short form is earlier (e.g., I Ki. 20:13, 18; Ex. 7:17). He further argues that R. Rendtorff fails to recognize the importance of the disclosure of the name of God in the Old Testament and that making the name "Yahweh" a pregnant expression for the power of God, which is manifested in his acts in history, reduces the name "Yahweh" to a predicate about God in contrast to the results of the modern investigation of the meaning of the name of God (*ibid.*, pp. 21-23). Zimmerli wants to speak of the "Ich-Geheimnis" that is contained in the disclosure of the name of God, which makes the relation between man and God possible (*ibid.*, pp. 21-23). What is at stake for Zimmerli is the freedom of God so that God alone remains the acting subject in his revelation. His criticisms of Rendtorff represent the fear that the emphasis on God's revelation in history makes revelation independent of God's initiative and leaves it at the disposal of man (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 27-31, esp. pp. 28-29; *idem*, Gottes Offenbarung, pp. 102-107). In distinction from the attributes of God, which are manifested in history, only God can reveal his name, and this disclosure is a once for all act of his freedom in which he presents himself in his uniqueness--only he is Yahweh. The combination of the Selbstvorstellungsformel with the Erkenntnisformel brings to expression the fact that "im ganzen Erkenntnisvorgang . . . Jahwe das alleinige Subjekt bleibt" (*ibid.*, p. 104). Cf. also Ernst Fuchs, "Theologie oder Ideologie? Bemerkungen zu einem heilsgeschichtlichen Program," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 257-260, esp. 257, where he agrees with Zimmerli. Cf. the answer by R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), n. 16, pp. 627-629; also Wolfhart Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 126, n. 29. If in fact the name "Yahweh" is not a predicate, then what he is as God can be seen only in his acts in relation to men. In this case, precisely the fact that the name is not a predicate means that its content comes from what God does, as R. Rendtorff maintains. The only question is whether this should be associated primarily with the claim of power for God.

⁵⁰R. Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 36.

seeing and experiencing the deeds of God in history.⁵¹ Rolf Rendtorff associates this knowledge of God with the revelation of his power and divinity. "Diese ganze Geschichte zielt also darauf ab, Erkenntnis Jahwes zu wirken, Erkenntnis dessen, dass nur er Gott ist und Macht hat."⁵² The question is whether this demonstration of the power of God is the primary aspect of the Erkenntnisformel in the Old Testament. The acts of God in history through which men know that he is Yahweh are usually events that are presented in terms of his judgment or salvation. In most cases, those in whom this knowledge is produced are the ones experiencing the wrath or salvation of God so that the expression "they shall know that I am Yahweh" becomes equivalent to the experience of the judgment or salvation of God in history, rather than primarily the demonstration of the power and divinity of God.⁵³ At other times, however, the accent is primarily on the demonstration of the divinity and power of God. This is especially clear when the knowledge of Yahweh is produced in all those throughout the world who see the

⁵¹R. Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 36; cf. Zimmerli, Gottes Offenbarung, pp. 48-49.

⁵²R. Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 36. This makes clear the close association which is made between revelation, or the knowledge of God, and the demonstration of the divinity and power of God.

⁵³Cf., e.g., Ezek. 7:2-4; 25:3-5; 37:5-6; for the complete list of the texts in which the Erkenntnisformel can be found, see Zimmerli, Gottes Offenbarung, pp. 43-44 (for Ezekiel), 54-78 (for the rest of the Old Testament). Cf., e.g., *ibid.*, p. 59: in connection with Ex. 16:6-7, Zimmerli says, "Jahwe erkennen heisst auch hier nicht ein jenseitiges Wesen Jahwes zu Gesicht zu bekommen, sondern heisst seine Wohltat an Israel erkennen."

events, whether they are participants or only observers.⁵⁴ While the knowledge of God cannot only be associated with the demonstration of his power in these formulae, this demonstrative aspect, which is emphasized by Pannenberg and Rolf Rendtorff, is also present.

This tendency to focus on the demonstrative element of the Erkenntnisformel and of revelation reflects the question with which the Pannenberg circle approaches the concept of the self-revelation of God; namely, how can one know that God has revealed himself in these events?⁵⁵ There is a corresponding emphasis on the demonstrability of God's revelation throughout Pannenberg's theology. This means, first, that the revelation of God should encounter man and be perceptible to man as man rather than by first granting him supernatural faculties. An event that reveals God must be his self-disclosure in the reality in which man lives. The question of how one knows the revelation of God can only be answered within the ordinary structures of human reason⁵⁶

⁵⁴E.g., Is. 40:5; 45:3, 6; 49:23; Ps. 98:2-3; this demonstrative character is also prominent in the use of the Erkenntnisformel in the story of the plagues against Egypt in connection with the Exodus, e.g., Ex. 7:5, 17; 11:7; 14:4, 18. Cf. Rolf Rendtorff, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 38-39; W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 98-99.

⁵⁵Cf. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 129-130, where Pannenberg associates the significance of the concept of revelation for contemporary theology with the present situation in the history of thought in which the existence of God is no longer self-evident. Perhaps the emphasis on the demonstrative aspect of revelation in Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah could be associated with a similar crisis concerning the concept of God at the time of the exile.

⁵⁶The experience that knowledge is given, or comes from outside

rather than by appealing to supernaturally given knowledge in distinction from natural knowledge.⁵⁷ This question cannot be answered by an appeal to a supernatural supplementation of man's knowledge.⁵⁸ The work of God in history, as his self-revelation, is the means by which he encounters man and discloses himself to man. This revelation of God and its proclamation is the means by which the Holy Spirit works to call men to faith.⁵⁹ Second, this moment of demonstrability means

oneself, is a common one and does not only involve knowledge of God. Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 100; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 21-22.

⁵⁷W. Pannenberg, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 13-14; idem, "Review: Gilson, Etienne und Philotheus Böhner, Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIII (1958), 535-536; idem, "Einsicht und Glaube: Antwort an Paul Althaus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 85.

⁵⁸W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 98-100, esp. p. 100; also his discussion of the place of the Holy Spirit in "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 81-92, esp. 85-86, 88-90.

⁵⁹Cf. the criticism of Pannenberg by Paul Althaus for eliminating any place for the Holy Spirit by Pannenberg's emphasis on the relation between knowledge and revelation, "Offenbarung als Geschichte und Glaube: Bemerkungen zu Wolfhart Pannenberg's Begriff der Offenbarung," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 321-330; also Günter Klein, "Offenbarung als Geschichte?" Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), 80-84, esp. 83; idem, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 66-68. Cf. Pannenberg's answer in Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), pp. 144-145; idem, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 81-92. Pannenberg insists that the revelation of God is the means by which the Holy Spirit works so that the work of the Holy Spirit cannot be simply set over against the knowledge of the revelation of God as mutually exclusive ways in which God encounters man to bring him to faith. Elsewhere, Pannenberg argues that his emphasis on the knowledge of the revelation of God as accessible to man's reason is in continuity with Luther's intention in his emphasis on the external clarity of

that the revelation of God occurring in historical events cannot in principle be excluded from access by historical research.⁶⁰ Christian faith normally arises in relation to the kerygma, which proclaims the cross and resurrection of Jesus as the eschatological saving act of God. This means that the kerygma can call a man to faith only as it encounters his existence meaningfully within the context of the reality and thought world in terms of which he lives. It also means that faith cannot avoid the question of the historical ground of the kerygma in the history that it proclaims as God's decisive saving act.⁶¹

While the understanding of the self-disclosure of God as the demonstration of his power and divinity is certainly present in the

Scripture. E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 275-278; idem, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 83-91; "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 7-14, esp. pp. 8-10.

⁶⁰E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 259, 275.

⁶¹For this double criterion of the kerygma, cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 81-99. Pannenberg distinguishes between the logical priority of the knowledge of God's revelation to faith, which is necessary to maintain the character of faith as grounded in the revelation of God, and the psychology of faith, in which faith and knowledge may occur at the same time or in which faith normally lives from a provisional knowledge of God's revelation. He sees this logical priority of knowledge as necessary to avoid faith becoming a work of man rather than something produced by God through his revelation. Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), pp. 144-145; idem, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 81-92. Cf. G. Klein's criticism of Pannenberg for making faith a work, which reflects the problem of applying critical categories too quickly in an uncritical way, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 65-66.

Biblical materials, one must ask if the accenting of this aspect does not give a one-sided orientation to theology in a way that is not intended by Pannenberg himself. Does it not tend to overemphasize the work of God in history as the open demonstration of his power and glory? Does it give an adequate place to the human experience that the power of God, as well as his love, is often hidden in this world under the forms of weakness and suffering? While it is true that Jesus' cross has its meaning as God's salvation only in relation to the resurrection, one cannot move to the resurrection too quickly in such a way that the cross is not seen in all of its seriousness.⁶² By human standards the power of God appears as weakness and his wisdom as foolishness.⁶³ To be sure, the resurrection means that the cross is the

⁶²This problem is reflected in Ulrich Wilckens, "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen: Zur traditions-geschichtlichen Analyse von 1. Kor. 15:1-11," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, pp. 56-95, esp. pp. 73-74, where he makes the resurrection the center of the Pauline kerygma. Certainly, I Cor. 15 makes it clear that the resurrection of Jesus was central for Paul, but what is the relation of this to Paul's insistence in I Cor. 1:18-2:5 that the cross is the central element in his proclamation? The relation between these two must be worked out in a more adequate way if one is to speak of the centrality of the resurrection in such a way that the centrality of the cross is not eliminated.

⁶³Pannenberg himself recognizes that by our normal human standards the revelation of God in Christ may be hidden so that man must be brought to reason before he recognizes the truth of God's revelation, but he correctly rejects Althaus's contention that both faith and unbelief are grounded in the manner of God's revelation itself. However, the power of God, which brings men to faith, or the illumination of the Holy Spirit, which eliminates man's pre-judgments, works through the means of the word of the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's eschatological revelation. W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 88-90; cf. P. Althaus, "Offenbarung als Geschichte und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 328.

power and wisdom of God for those who are being saved so that the Christian can speak of the wisdom and power of God in his revelation. However, the relation between these two aspects of God's revelation needs to be worked out more clearly.

This tendency to emphasize the demonstrative character of God's revelation is also reflected in a certain ambiguity in the understanding of the role of the word of God in relation to his revelation. The tendency is to understand the word as revelation primarily in its relation to some other event in history. For example, the prophetic word is related to revelation as promise, but only the way that God fulfills this word is his self-disclosure.⁶⁴ The accent is on the word becoming event in history rather than on the word as an event in history.⁶⁵ This accent stands in a certain tension with Pannenberg's understanding of history as the history of traditions, in which event and word, which brings to expression the meaning of the event and which is the historic form of the event, cannot be separated. In this case, understanding or a change of understanding, which takes place only in language, is itself an event in history.⁶⁶ The prophetic word or the kerygma should

⁶⁴W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 112. Cf. also his discussion of the proleptic moment in Jesus' claim to authority prior to Easter in Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 47-61, where he emphasizes that Jesus' proclamation aims at a future confirmation by God.

⁶⁵Cf. the discussion in R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 621-650.

⁶⁶Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 112; also R. Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der

then also be understood as an act of God in which he discloses himself to men if one is to be consistent with the intention of the Pannenberg circle in their understanding of history.⁶⁷

The concept of history as the means of the self-disclosure of God could be more adequately worked out if more attention were given to the understanding of God's revelation as his judgment or salvation. Pannenberg himself insists that revelation and salvation are closely related to each other. First, God's revelation means salvation for men, for only the revelation of the reality of God can accomplish man's salvation. Community with God, which alone makes man what he is intended to be, exists only in faith⁶⁸ and is possible only if man knows who God is and how God wants to be God in relation to man.⁶⁹ Second,

Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40; idem, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad, eds. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961), pp. 81-94.

⁶⁷G. Klein has correctly noticed this tension in the understanding of the relation between word and history, although he fails to recognize the intention of the Pannenberg circle. Cf. G. Klein, "Offenbarung als Geschichte?" Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), esp. 63-71; idem, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 12-21.

⁶⁸W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 22-31, esp. pp. 26-27.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 29-31; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 101, n. 14: "Offenbarung Gottes bedeutet für den Menschen, der ja zur Offenheit auf Gott hin bestimmt ist, zutiefst Heil, Erfüllung seiner Bestimmung und so seines Wesens. Alle konkreten Heilsgüter gewähren nur insofern Heil, als sie indirekt an der Nähe Gottes teilgeben, Gemeinschaft mit dem nicht Endenden vermitteln." Cf. Was ist der Mensch? pp. 5-13. That man is what he is only in community with God is one of the central themes of the latter book.

the revelation of God is his giving of this community with himself to man, thus making man what he is intended to be as man. The revelation of God is, then, his turning to man in grace and electing man to community with himself, giving man the power of life in openness for God:

Die Offenbarung Gottes eröffnet dem Sünder freilich nur solange die Möglichkeit zu neuer Gemeinschaft mit Gott, wie sie ihm die Kraft mitteilt, aus seiner Verslossenheit in sich selbst zur Offenheit für Gott noch umzukehren. Insofern hängt die Heilsbedeutung der Offenbarung Gottes wesentlich mit ihrem proleptischen Charakter zusammen. Offenbarung Gottes am Ende alles Geschehens, im Gericht über Lebende und Tote, wird für den Sünder, der dann nicht mehr umkehren kann, nur noch Verdammnis bedeuten, Ausschluss von seiner menschlichen Bestimmung. Proleptische Kundgabe der eschatologischen Offenbarung Gottes hat hingegen wesentlich den Charakter erwählender Zuwendung, den Charakter der Eröffnung noch möglicher Teilhabe am Heil in der Gemeinschaft mit Gott.⁷⁰

However, while revelation and salvation are closely related in this way, the relative priority given to the concept of revelation makes it possible to discuss the structure of revelation independently of the concept of salvation, which results in the impression of an intellectual conception of faith.⁷¹ The problem is whether such a relative priority for the concept of revelation is adequate. If God's revelation takes place in his acts in history in relation to men, does this

⁷⁰W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 101, n. 14; cf. also idem, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 14-15; idem, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 614-621; idem, "Prädestination IV. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (3rd ed., 1961), 487-489.

⁷¹W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 101, n. 14; cf. the criticisms by G. Klein, "Offenbarung als Geschichte?" Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), 83; L. Steiger, "Offenbarungsgeschichte und theologische Vernunft," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 111-113; and Pannenberg's response, Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), p. 145.

not mean that the question of the concept of revelation must be oriented to the relation between God and man from the beginning? Does it not mean that God is known only as he acts in judgment or grace in relation to man? This would seem to correspond more adequately to the basic orientation of the Biblical material. At this point it seems that the question of the demonstration of the divinity of God with which Pannenberg approaches the concept of revelation could be called into question more critically by the examination of the Biblical texts. While theology cannot be subsumed under soteriology, neither can soteriology be subsumed under theology.

CHAPTER III

REALITY AS HISTORY

If the revelation of God is to encounter man in a meaningful way, it must encounter him in the reality in which he lives. Differences in the understanding of the concept of revelation arise in part from differences in the understanding of reality. Pannenberg understands reality as history, and, therefore, he understands history as the means by which God encounters man. However, history itself can be understood in many ways, so it is necessary to examine what Pannenberg means by history as the reality in which and by means of which God encounters men. First, Pannenberg's concept of history, which includes the understanding of truth as historic, the understanding of the nature of history, and the understanding of the relation between language and history, will be discussed. Second, the understanding of historical knowledge that is associated with this concept of history, including the question of historical method and the understanding of hermeneutic, will be examined.

I. REALITY AND HISTORY

1. Pannenberg thinks that Hegel's basic contribution to the history of thought is the understanding of truth as historic rather than as essentially timeless and changeless. Historic change and transformation itself, then, belong to the essence of truth. This corresponds to the understanding of the Bible as a history book, which

speaks of God by speaking of his works in history in relation to men.¹
 This concept of truth as historic was summarized and distinguished from the Greek concept of truth, which was oriented to that which is changeless or to ordered change, by Hans von Soden in a lecture which he delivered as rector of the University of Marburg.² This lecture pro-

¹ Gerhard von Rad, "Typologische Auslegung des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1952/1953), 23; idem, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960), 11, 370; cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 218.

² Hans von Soden, "Was ist Wahrheit? Vom geschichtlichen Begriff der Wahrheit," Urchristentum und Geschichte, I (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1951), 1-24. The address was delivered in 1927. This article provides an interesting point of contact for diverging positions. It appears in a volume of von Soden's essays edited by Hans Freiherr von Campenhausen. In the introduction Rudolf Bultmann notes the importance of this article. Gerhard Ebeling uses it in relation to his concept of the word of God; e.g., Wort und Glaube (2nd ed., 1962; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), pp. 211-212. Pannenberg uses it as the starting point for his understanding of truth as history. This reflects the close relation between language and history. This same close relation between word and history is also reflected in a different way by Karl Barth's discussion of Hegel when Barth points to one of Hegel's contributions as reminding theology "dass die Wahrheit Geschichte, Ereignis, sein könnte," and thus reminding theology "dass die Erkenntnisquelle der reformatorischen Theologie jedenfalls das Wort gewesen war, das Wort Gottes, das Wort der Wahrheit--d.h. aber jedenfalls auch: das Ereignis Gottes, das Ereignis der Wahrheit. Ein Ereignis, das kommt und geht, . . . ein Ereignis, das durch Wiederholung und durch neues Dabeisein immer neu Ereignis werden muss." Karl Barth, Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Vorgesichte und ihre Geschichte (3rd ed., 1960; Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG., 1946), pp. 372-373. Cf. also, Rudolf Bultmann, Gerhard Kittel, and Gottfried Quell, "Alētheia, alēthēs, alēthinos, alētheuō," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, I (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1933), 233-251. For the distinction between the Hebrew and Greek concept of truth, cf. esp. H. von Soden, Urchristentum und Geschichte, I, 5-15. Cf. also the negative criticisms of this distinction in James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 187-205.

vides the starting point for Pannenberg's discussion of the concept of truth.³ The Hebrew word for truth, emet, is related to the faithfulness of a person or the reliability of a statement. Hence, truth is related to the future. It is characteristic of the Hebrew concept of truth "dass sie getan wird, dass sie geschieht."⁴ The distinctive aspect of the Hebrew concept of truth is its historic character:

Es handelt sich immer um etwas, das sich ereignet hat oder ereignen wird, nicht um etwas, das von Natur ist, so ist und so sein muss. . . . Wahrheit ist die als Geschichte gesehene Wirklichkeit. Wahrheit ist nicht etwas, was irgendwie unter oder hinter den Dingen liegt und durch Eindringen in ihre Tiefe, ihr inneres gefunden würde; sondern Wahrheit ist das, was sich in der Zukunft herausstellen wird. Der Gegensatz zur Wahrheit wäre sozusagen nicht eigentlich die Täuschung, sondern wesentlich die Enttäuschung . . . Was Dauer, Bestand, Zukunft hat, ist wahr, somit insbesondere das Ewige als das Unvergängliche, Bleibende, Endgültige, Endzeitliche. . . . Über sie [the question of the certainty of truth] entscheidet nicht irgendein induktiver oder deduktiver Beweisgang, sondern nur der Fortgang des Geschehens.⁵

In distinction from this, the Greek concept of truth (a-lētheia) essentially has the meaning of unveiledness, of that which is no longer hidden. Truth involves two aspects: the subject matter, namely, that which is, and knowledge. While there is a certain sense in which one can speak of truth as having a history in relation to its becoming

³W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit: Festschrift für Heinrich Vogel, ed. Kurt Scharf (Berlin: Lettner-Verlag, 1962), pp. 214-239.

⁴H. von Soden, Urchristentum und Geschichte, I, 3; cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, p. 216: "Emet meint die Verlässlichkeit, die unverbrüchliche Tragfähigkeit einer Sache oder eines Wortes, und so auch die Treue von Personen. . . . Emet muss immer wieder Geschehen."

⁵H. von Soden, Urchristentum und Geschichte, I, 10-11.

known, the subject matter designated by the word "truth" must be "immer schon vorhanden . . . ehe er erkannt wird; nur seine Erkenntnis, nicht aber sein Bestand kann zukünftig sein."⁶ Thus, truth is basically understood as timeless, corresponding to the rational structure of the world, in contrast to the changeable appearance of things and also in contrast with error.⁷

This difference between the Greek and Hebrew understanding of the nature of truth should not be understood only as a relation of contrast. Rather, the difference is to be understood in the sense that the Biblical understanding of truth as historic is a broader concept, in which the Greek understanding of truth is not simply excluded but is taken up and grounded in a more adequate way. Thus, the Greek dualism between true "being" and changing appearance is overcome in an understanding of truth as historic. The latter is also interested in that which endures and remains in the sense of that which has a future. This durability is related to the faithfulness of God who does not abandon what he has done in the past but takes these acts up and gives

⁶Ibid., p. 12.

⁷In distinction from this timeless concept of truth, one should also note Heidegger's concept of truth as historic. He begins with the Greek concept of truth as unveiling, but he hears this more verbally so that truth as the occurrence of unveiling also has a history. This means that not only thought, which is called forth by the occurrence of unveiling of that which is, has a history, but that "being," or that which is, also has a history. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1957); also James M. Robinson, "The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger," The Later Heidegger and Theology, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New Frontiers in Theology, I; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 22-28.

them new meaning in his new acts in history. Hence, the truth of God is not at man's disposal, but it rests in God's hands and lies in the future over which man has no control. This truth of God is accessible to man only through faith, which trusts that God is true. In this way the Greek concept of truth is embraced by the broader understanding of truth as historic, which includes both the moments of change and of duration.⁸

This relation between the two ways of understanding truth is also reflected in a common interest in the unity of truth, which is understood in different ways corresponding to the difference in the understanding of the nature of truth. The understanding of truth as historic means that the unity of truth does not lie in the coherence of an abstract, timeless structure. The unity of truth can only be understood in relation to the history of truth in such a way "dass die Wahrheit selbst eine Geschichte hat und dass ihr Wesen der Prozess dieser Geschichte ist."⁹ Since historic change belongs to the essence of truth, the unity of truth can only be understood as the unity of history. This in turn is apparent only from the end of history in relation to which each particular event has its significance.¹⁰ This

⁸W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, p. 222: "Die griechische Wahrheit ist also in der biblischen Wahrheit im Prinzip aufgehoben, sofern die letztere diejenigen Züge der Wirklichkeit miteinschliesst, die der griechische Wahrheitsgedanke von sich ausschliesst, ohne doch das Interesse am Bleibenden und Dauernden etwa weniger entschieden festzuhalten."

⁹Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁰E.g., Ibid., pp. 233-238; W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als

does not mean that everything in history stands in the same relation to the truth, for much of history brings to expression the falseness and unfaithfulness of men. However, God, who remains true even though every man be faithless (Ro. 3:3-4), can also use the falsehood of men to accomplish his purposes. Also, that particular events have their ultimate significance in their relation to the end of history means that they have their significance and unity in their relation to the judgment or grace of God.¹¹ That the history of Jesus is the prolepsis of the end of history means that all other events in history have their ultimate meaning and importance in their relation to this particular event in history. History has its unity in the relation of the particular events in history to the history of Jesus.¹²

A difference in the understanding of the relation between word and truth also corresponds to the difference in the understanding of the nature of truth. For Greek thought, word is related to truth in its correspondence to the rational structure of reality so that the opposite of truth is error. While the Bible can also speak of a word as true or false in this sense, basically a word is true when that word

Geschichte, pp. 16-20, 95-98, 103-106; idem, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 120-121.

¹¹Cf. W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 139/140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 49-58.

¹²E.g., Ibid., pp. 57-58; also, W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 103-106, 109-111; idem, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 235-238. Thus, what men do is true only in its agreement with God's truth (ibid., p. 230).

has a future.¹³ Thus, a word is true in relation to the faithfulness of a person to his word and in relation to that person's ability to execute that which he says. The truth of God's word is grounded in his faithfulness to his word in which he establishes his word, granting men life. The truth of God's word is always future for men so that they have access to that truth only in faith, which trusts God's word by trusting in God and his faithfulness.¹⁴ How is such trust in God possible? One cannot trust in a person who is simply unknown. The ground of faith, or the means by which God calls forth this trust from men, is God's revelation in which he encounters men and makes himself known to them. Corresponding to the Biblical concept of truth, Pannenberg understands the revelation of God as including two aspects: the promise of God and the proleptic disclosure of the reliability of his word in the sense both of the disclosure of his faithfulness and of his power to execute that which he promises. Therefore, the experience of God's faithfulness and power in history is the ground for trust in God

¹³This is not yet intended in the sense of the word that opens the future or grants a future to men, i.e., it is not meant in the sense of gospel in distinction to law. Both the law, as the word which judges and kills, and the gospel, as the word which heals and gives life, thus opening the future, can be true words in the sense that they have a future. On the other hand, a false word can encounter one existentially in such a way that it spoils life and closes the future or in such a way that it creates hope and expectations that are ultimately doomed to disappointment. The gospel is a true word not simply because of what it communicates to human existence existentially at present, but it is a true word because it is God's word of promise. As God's word it is reliable and gives man a future so that it is gospel.

¹⁴W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, p. 219.

and his promises for the future.¹⁵ For this reason, God calls forth faith in men through the kerygma on the basis of its content, namely, the history of Jesus as the eschatological act of God by which he gives men community with himself. The proleptic demonstration of the reliability of God's word in his self-disclosure, as well as the disclosure of his promise or his love, plays an important role as the basis for trust in God for the future.

This understanding of a word as true in its relation to its future is the basis for Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between word and revelation. For example, the question of the truth of a prophetic word, then, lies with the question of the future of that word. This relation may be expressed in terms of the structure of promise and fulfillment so that the way in which God fulfills that word is his self-disclosure.¹⁶ In a similar way, Pannenberg argues that the truth of Jesus' proclamation and of his claim to authority does not rest with that proclamation itself but with its confirmation or establishment by God in the future.¹⁷ Jesus' proclamation of the presence

¹⁵Ibid.; also W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 29-31.

¹⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Thesen zur Lehre von der Offenbarung," Offenbarung als Geschichte, W. Pannenberg et al. (Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1; 2nd ed., 1963; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), p. 112; cf. the relation between word and history as word becoming event in Rolf Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 621-649. That this structure of promise and fulfillment tends to be understood in a way that is too mechanical is the reason that the Pannenberg circle is moving away from this category to the more flexible category of the history of traditions which includes promise, hope, and expectation.

¹⁷W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh:

of God's salvation in his work and his word is, then, a proleptic anticipation of the eschatological judgment of God. As such, it is held out to its future confirmation by God in the eschatological judgment and the resurrection of the dead. The resurrection of Jesus is, however, an anticipation of this future confirmation. Therefore, the resurrection of Jesus is the promise of God that one's relation to Jesus is decisive for one's relation to God and his salvation, and it provides the ground for trust in the promise of God in Jesus Christ.¹⁸

While Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between word and revelation is quite consistent with the understanding of the truth of a statement as being determined by the future of that statement, one must ask whether this understanding of the truth of a word is entirely adequate. For example, is it adequate for the distinction between a true and a false prophet? Certainly, the understanding of the fulfillment of a prophecy as the criterion of its truth can be found in the

Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), pp. 47-61, where he discusses the proleptic moment in Jesus' proclamation. This makes it clear that Pannenberg can accept Hans-Georg Geyer's statement that the only possible and thinkable verification of the promise of God is its fulfillment in the future, which is intended as an alternative to Pannenberg's theology, as corresponding with his own intention. Cf. H.-G. Geyer, "Geschichte als theologisches Problem: Bemerkungen zu W. Pannenberg's Geschichtstheologie," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 103-104; and W. Pannenberg's reply, "Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage," Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 147. However, Pannenberg emphasizes the eschatological character of the Christ event as the prolepsis of the end of history and, therefore, as the proleptic verification of the promise of God in the history of Jesus.

¹⁸W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 47-61; also pp. 61-69, where he discusses the significance of the resurrection of Jesus.

Old Testament.¹⁹ However, one is then faced with the fact that a large number of the prophecies of the Old Testament prophets remained unfulfilled.²⁰ This can hardly be taken to mean that only those prophecies that were fulfilled were the true word of God. Precisely the historic character of God's encounter with men means that a prophetic word cannot simply retain its validity beyond the concrete situation to which it was addressed. Is there not also some material criterion for the truth of a prophetic word independently of the question of a future fulfillment? Attempts at such a criterion are at hand in the Old Testament. A prophetic word is not a true word when it is proclaimed in the name of another god, even if it is fulfilled (Deut. 13:1-5). More important for present purposes, Jeremiah regards a word of judgment as self-validating because it stands in a tradition of such prophecies, and only a prophecy of peace requires validation through its fulfillment (Jer. 28:8-9). What can this mean? It cannot mean that prophecies of hope are excluded as such, for Jeremiah himself can speak of hope for the future. Does it not mean that the self-validation of the

¹⁹ Cf. Deut. 18:21-22; I Ki. 22:28; Jer. 28:9; also the discussion of the prophetic "word theology," in R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 642-643.

²⁰ Cf. ibid., pp. 643-646. R. Rendtorff handles the problem of unfulfilled prophetic words by seeing the particular events proclaimed by the prophets within the context of a broader historical horizon in relation to which they are true or false. He finds this confirmed in the fact that the concrete events proclaimed by the prophetic word gradually recede into the background in favor of the proclamation of the broader, more embracing work of God in relation to Israel and the nations, i.e., in the fact that the prophetic movement gives way to apocalyptic.

proclamation of judgment rests on the fact that it denounces the attempts of men to find security in things they have at their disposal or in their possession rather than in God and his grace alone? Are not the false prophets those that call men to hope when they should be confronted by the God who judges them for their sins and for their attempts to use God for their own purposes? Is not the true prophet the one who denounces this security that is based on what one has by announcing the judgment of God in relation to the sins of men so that he can speak of salvation only in terms of the grace of the God who judges men for their sins?²¹ In this case, the truth or falseness of a prophetic word is not primarily related to the question of the future fulfillment of that word but to the question of the adequacy with which that word brings to expression the relation of God to his people in that concrete historical situation. The truth of the prophetic word is then related to its adequacy as an interpretation of Israel's traditions in the present situation in such a way that God remains God, who freely encounters men in judgment and grace.²²

²¹While this does not come explicitly to expression as a criterion in Jeremiah, note the general character of his extensive debates with the false prophets: Jer. 6:14; 23:9-32; 27:8-29:32; cf. also Jer. 7:1-26.

²²Cf. the criticism of Pannenberg's understanding of the prophetic word by Günter Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Wolfhart Pannenberg (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 37; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), pp. 13-15; also cf. A. Jepsen's discussion of the prophetic message in "Propheten II. In Israel C. Die Theologie der Propheten," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961), 627-633.

In this way, the prophetic word itself would be understood as an event in history by means of which God encounters men, making his judgment and grace present to them. Such an understanding of the prophetic word would correspond to the understanding of truth as historic in distinction from an understanding of truth as essentially timeless and changeless. This does not mean that the relation of a prophetic word to the future is eliminated. However, this relation can be understood more adequately in terms of Pannenberg's understanding of history as the history of traditions²³ than in terms of the structure of prophecy and fulfillment. The understanding of truth as historic means that the ultimate significance of an event or of a word, in distinction from the question of whether that word is a true word of God in which he encounters men, is related to the future of that event or word. For example, the real significance of the Exodus as a historic event does not simply lie in what really happened when a few people escaped from Egypt. Its real significance involves the traditions that arose from it and the continuing history of God's work with the people of Israel. The importance of an event involves the future of that event, namely, what it becomes and how God takes it up and uses it in his continuing

²³For the concept of history as the history of traditions, cf. Rolf Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40; idem, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad, eds. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961), pp. 81-94; W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 129-140; also cf. supra, pp. 6-12, and infra, pp. 101-111.

work in history.²⁴ In a similar way, the ultimate significance of a prophetic word does not only lie in its historical meaning, but it involves the fact that this word becomes a part of the historic traditions of Israel, which provide the linguistic and thought context in relation to which new events in history are experienced in a meaningful way as God's work. This continuing work of God in history takes place within a context of thought that includes these prophetic words. In this way, God takes up these words and gives them new content and new meaning.²⁵ This future belongs to the historic significance of these

²⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 134-135, 169; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 90-95; idem, "Wirkungen biblischer Gotteserkenntnis auf das abendländische Menschenbild," Studium Generale, XV (1962), 587, 593. In this respect it is not clear that Jürgen Moltmann's emphasis on the future possibilities of events really represents an alternative to rather than an aspect of Pannenberg's theology. Cf. J. Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung: Untersuchungen zur Begründung und zu den Konsequenzen einer christlichen Eschatologie (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 38; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), esp. pp. 67-84. The central role which Moltmann gives to eschatology for theology, of course, gives his theology a different orientation. Whether this is an improvement is another question. Cf. the similar criticism of Pannenberg made by Hans-Georg Geyer, "Geschichte als theologisches Problem," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 103-104; also Pannenberg's reply in "Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage," Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 147.

²⁵This would correspond structurally to the way in which Pannenberg understands the relation of the use of analogy in the words men use in praise of God to the continuing experience of God's work in history. The use of words in relation to God has its basis in the experience of God's work in history and the ordinary sense of the word. However, the use of men's words in relation to God means that the continuing work of God in history gives these words new meaning and content as God takes them to himself in his self-disclosure in history. Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 81-99; idem, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, eds. Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 96-115; also cf. supra, pp. 14-15, and infra, pp. 184-185, 191-192.

prophetic words. In this way, faith can understand God as faithful to his work in the past in that this past is taken up and transformed in the new work of God.²⁶ Within the context of the revelation of God in the history of Jesus, as the prolepsis of the end of history, one also has to make a distinction in the intention involved in words of judgment and words of hope, since in Jesus Christ one knows that God's ultimate purpose in relation to man is love and not judgment. Hence, the judgment of God must be ultimately intended to serve his love (Ro. 3). Such an understanding of the relation between the prophetic word and revelation would fit in with Pannenberg's intention in his understanding of truth as historic and of history as the history of traditions.

Pannenberg thinks that the understanding of truth as history corresponds to the Israelite concept of God, which makes such an understanding of reality possible.²⁷ In distinction from mythological

²⁶Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), 617; idem, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 285; idem, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 31: "In seiner Treue lässt Gott sein voriges Tun nicht einfach um der neuen Möglichkeiten seiner Freiheit willen fallen, sondern nimmt das Vorige in das Neue mit auf. Das erst ermöglicht eine Dauerhaftigkeit, Kontinuität des Geschaffenen. . . . Die Treue Gottes aber vollzieht sich als freier Akt gerade in seinem kontingenten, geschichtlichen Handeln."

²⁷W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 220. He distinguishes the understanding of reality in its totality as history, which is the contribution of the Hebrews, from the beginning of the writing of history as was done by the Greeks (ibid., p. 222). "Das Verständnis der Welt als Geschichte der Mensch-

thought, in which man sought God by participation in the changeless myth of the primeval event through the cult, or in distinction from thought that seeks meaning in the changeless or cyclical structures of the natural world, the Israelites were encountered by God precisely in the changing course of history. In contrast with the Greek understanding of the divine as the origin of the world, of the normal structured order of nature, and of the things at hand in the world, the God of Israel is understood as radically free over against the world as its Creator so that he acts contingently in the world doing new and unforeseen things.²⁸ This also means that the essence of God cannot be

heit" was first disclosed "durch das Alte Testament und das von hier ausgehende Geschichtsdenken" (W. Pannenberg, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, p. 22). If in fact the concept of reality as history was grounded in the Israelite understanding of God, Pannenberg would question whether this understanding of reality as history is possible apart from the Israelite concept of God or whether it can long survive its isolation from its historical ground.

²⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 220: "Die Voraussetzungen des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins in Israel liegen in seinem Gottesgedanken. Weil die Wirklichkeit Gottes für Israel nicht darin aufgeht, Ursprung der Welt zu sein, d.h. Ursprung der normalen, sich immer wiederholenden Vorgänge und Begebenheiten, darum kann dieser Gott in einer unvorhersehbaren Weise in den Gang seiner Schöpfung eingreifen und Neues in ihr wirken. Die Gewissheit, dass Gott immer wieder Neues wirkt, dass er ein 'lebendiger Gott' ist, bildet die Grundlage für Israels Verständnis der Wirklichkeit als linear zu einem Ziele hineilender Geschichte." Cf. also idem, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 3-6, 14-15, 30-31, 37-38. However, one should also note Hans-Georg Gadamer's suggestion that a concept of the nature of history is not the exclusive property of Jewish-Christian theology or of a philosophy that stands in a historical relation to this tradition. Rather, all religions have a certain kind of philosophy of history. "Auch der Mythos erzählt wie der Augenzeuge von einem einmaligen Geschehen und kennt keine andere Bestätigung als die Autorität des

understood as bound up with or analogous to the rational structures of the world. That the God of Israel works contingently in history, both in creation and in his subsequent acts in history, means that one cannot work back by analogy from the world or history to the essence of God.²⁹ While God is in this way the incomprehensible God who remains the hidden God even in his revelation, God is personally present to men in his acts in history. In his free choice of his acts in history, God

Zeugen selber. Insofern liegt in aller mythischen Überlieferung eine Art historischen Bewusstseins." H.-G. Gadamer, "Geschichte und Geschichtsauffassung III. Geschichtsphilosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 1489. In this case, one would have to distinguish between the various ways of understanding history. The western world's understanding of history and of reality as history together with its philosophy of history, nevertheless, stands under the influence of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. However, one must then consider the relation between this Hebrew-Christian understanding of history and other ways of understanding history, rather than simply regarding it as a contrast between historical and unhistorical thought.

²⁹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 37-38. Perhaps the discussion in the "Einführung" to Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 17, does not make the relation between the revelation of God in history and the essence of God adequately clear to avoid misunderstanding his position by taking it to mean that one can work back from history to the essence of God. The fact that one cannot work back behind the acts of God in history to speak of the essence of God in abstraction from what he does is central to the distinction between revelation in history and revelation in nature. Thus, J. Moltmann's criticism that Pannenberg's understanding of revelation as history corresponds in structure with the Greek understanding of revelation in the structures of nature behind which one must discover the essence of God fails to understand Pannenberg at this central point (J. Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, pp. 68-69). In every case where Moltmann cites Pannenberg's "Rückschlussverfahren" in the sense of moving back from history to God (ibid., p. 68, n. 98), Pannenberg in fact uses this term only of the Greek understanding of the relation between the world and God and not of his own understanding of the relation between the revelation of God and history.

freely chooses how he would be God in relation to men. In this way, the essence of God is bound up with his presence to men in his work in history so that what God is cannot be abstracted from what he does.³⁰

2. The understanding of reality in its totality as history, then, had its origin in the Biblical concept of God and in the encounter between God and Israel in history.³¹ Therefore, Pannenberg thinks that an adequate understanding of the nature of history is possible only as it is grounded in the encounter of man by God in historic events.³² This can be seen in relation to the two principle aspects of an adequate concept of history: the contingency of events, including the uniqueness of events and the openness of the future, and the unity of history, including its continuity.

An essential aspect of a satisfactory concept of history is that it must give an adequate place to the contingency of events in his-

³⁰W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 33.

³¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, p. 22; idem, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 222, 231.

³²Ibid., pp. 230-233. In view of the necessary relation that Pannenberg sees between Christian theology and an adequate understanding of reality as history, he insists that theology is the true philosophy: "Sie legt aber die Phänomene des Daseins auf einen andern und weiteren Horizont hin aus als alle griechisch fragende Philosophie. Dabei muss die Theologie in Anspruch nehmen, selbst die 'wahre Philosophie' zu sein, ein umfassenderes Verständnis der jedem zugänglichen Wirklichkeit zu entwerfen als es der Philosophie von ihrem griechischen Ursprung her möglich ist: Die Kontingenz des Geschehens kann eben der griechisch orientierten philosophischen Fragestellung nicht in ihrer vollen Tragweite in den Blick kommen" (W. Pannenberg, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII, 1963, p. 9).

tory.³³ It belongs to the essential character of history that new, unforeseen, unpredictable things happen so that it neither follows laws nor fits into a logical structure. This gives history a moment of discontinuity, for the future does not simply flow out of the past. A concept of history that understands it primarily in terms of the future developing out of the past is inadequate, even though such a relationship may exist for limited segments of history.³⁴ The contingency of events in history means that the future is radically open. The future cannot be calculated. Not even the revelation of God in Christ makes such an overview of world history possible.³⁵ The Christian also lives in history with an unknown future, and he can only trust in God's faithfulness to his promise in Jesus Christ. Further, the contingency of history means that the understanding of history must be oriented to the unique and the individual. Every historical event is more or less unique and unrepeatable, although there may be certain analogies to it.³⁶ The essential character of a historic event does not lie in its similarities with other events but in its uniqueness. In distinction from a concept of reality that is oriented to the ordered structure of

³³E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 264-266.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 261-263.

³⁵E.g., ibid., pp. 236-237; W. Pannenberg, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 275.

³⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 263-267; idem, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, p. 21.

things, to the unchangeable, or to the repeatable, an adequate concept of reality as history excludes the principle similarity of all events in history.³⁷

Pannenberg understands the contingency of events in history as related to the concept of God, "who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist" (Ro. 4:17), and his freedom:

Dass in der Wirklichkeit immer Neues, zuvor nicht Dagewesenes auftritt, ist charakteristisch für das Wirken des transzendenten Gottes, dessen Wesen in keiner kosmischen Ordnung adequat zum Ausdruck kommt, sondern jeder Ordnung frei gegenüberbleibt. Daher wird die Theologie am Individuellen, Besonderen, Kontingenten vor allem interessiert sein.³⁸

In the history of God's self-disclosure, the new and contingent things that God does are the most significant. Truth is to be seen in the unique and contingent rather than in the constant, changeless, or calculable.³⁹ It is in the unexpected, contingent events that one sees

³⁷It is the failure to take seriously the contingency of history with the resulting loss of a real future and an inadequate place for the unique and individual which Pannenberg regards as the chief problem in the philosophy of Hegel. E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, p. 234; idem, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 110, 120. The same would also be true of secularized forms of Christian eschatology, as in Marxism or in any inner worldly program or ideology that is willing to sacrifice the present for the sake of attaining the calculated ideal future for which it strives.

³⁸W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 266; also, idem, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 6.

³⁹Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Geschichte und Geschichtsauffassung III. Geschichtsphilosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1953), 1494, where he relates this orientation to the unique and contingent to the Christian concept of the incarnation.

the work of God in his freedom so that duration, continuity, or reliability can be grounded only in the faithfulness of God.⁴⁰

This emphasis on the contingency of history makes the unity or continuity of history a problem. However, Pannenberg thinks that an adequate concept of reality as history is only possible under the presupposition of the unity of history.⁴¹ An event in history has its significance or meaning only in the context of other events with which it is interwoven. The narrower context in which an event has its immediate significance is in turn interwoven with broader historical contexts in relation to which it must be evaluated. Furthermore, the more

⁴⁰W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 31; *idem*, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 6.

⁴¹Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 234-237, for the discussion of the understanding of the unity of history in relation to the freedom of God; also *ibid.*, pp. 280-287. Cf. also W. Wittram, Das Interesse an der Geschichte: Zwölf Vorlesungen über Fragen des zeitgenössischen Geschichtsverständnisses (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 59/60/61; 2nd ed., 1963; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1958), pp. 122-136, esp. p. 135: "Ohne Weltgeschichte gibt es keinen Sinn der Geschichte." Hence, the problem arises that while the end of world history is "überhaupt kein Gegenstand der Geschichtswissenschaft, die Frage nach ihm aber" is "für unsere Geschichtsauffassung entscheidend" (*ibid.*). Also H.-G. Gadamer, "Geschichte und Geschichtsauffassung III. Geschichtsphilosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 1489: "Das 'die G[eschichte]' zum Gegenstand der Erkenntnis wird, setzt aber auf alle Fälle voraus, dass sie als eine Einheit gedacht ist." Partly due to a failure to attain an adequate concept of the unity of history and to the modern criticism of any philosophy of history as metaphysics, the philosophy of history turned its attention primarily to methodology and to the theory of historical knowledge. Cf. also Wolfgang Müller-Lauter's criticism of Heidegger's attempt to overcome historical relativism through a concept of "das Geschick der Wahrheit des Seins" in "Konsequenzen des Historismus in der Philosophie der Gegenwart," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 234-251, 254-255.

important an event, the broader the historical context is in relation to which it must be seen for its full significance and meaning as a historic event to be understood.⁴² Thus, for example, the historic significance of an event in history can only be evaluated in relation to its importance for the following course of history, in other words, in relation to the future of that event. This importance of an event for the future is itself an integral part of that event as a historic event. Indeed, the present of the historian himself also belongs to the historic significance of that past event.⁴³ Thus, the question of the ultimate significance or meaning of events in history moves in the direction of a conception of the whole of history in relation to which these events can be evaluated. However, history as a whole and, hence, the meaning of history and of particular events in history can be seen only from the end of history.⁴⁴ Similarly, if the meaning of history is the indirect self-disclosure of God, then only the whole of history can be understood as his self-revelation.⁴⁵ The question of God arises

⁴²E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 91-92.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 91-93; W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 281-283.

⁴⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 120-121. Cf. R. Bultmann, Geschichte und Eschatologie (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), 164-165. Since no one stands at the end of history, Bultmann rejects the possibility of seeing the meaning of history in universal history. Rather, the meaning of history lies in the present of one's existence, and the unity of history is grounded in one's responsibility to the past and to the future (pp. 164-184).

⁴⁵W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 16-20.

in relation to the understanding of reality in its totality.⁴⁶ Hence, only within the horizon of universal history "kann die Frage sinnvoll gestellt werden, ob der Eine Gott sich in der Geschichte hier oder dort offenbart hat."⁴⁷

The problem of an adequate concept of history is then to understand it as a unity without sacrificing its contingency. Often, attempts to understand history as a unity, whether this take the form of the concept of development, or of a morphologically conceived unity, or of Hegel's understanding of the unity of history, result in the loss of an adequate place for the contingency of history.⁴⁸ Pannenberg thinks that this problem can be avoided only if the unity and contingency of history have a common root. He argues that this condition cannot be adequately met when man is regarded as the subject of history. Rather, he thinks that the loss of the unity of history through historicism is the result of the anthropocentric turn of the philosophy of history, which made man the subject of history, for man exists concretely only as an individual.⁴⁹ Mankind cannot be thought of as

⁴⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 108-109; idem, "Die Frage nach Gott," to be published in Evangelische Theologie; cf., e.g., Gerhard Ebeling, Wort und Glaube, p. 404.

⁴⁷W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 280.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 284-285.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 231-233, 284; W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 102-103.

a unity in such a way as to ground the unity of history, nor can the historicness (Geschichtlichkeit) of human existence be the ground of the unity of history. Of course, history has a certain meaning and unity in its relation to a man's existence, determining his possibilities and making him what he is as a person. The unity and meaning of history is then related to his responsibility in the present in relation to both the past and the future.⁵⁰ However, this constitutes the individuality of persons rather than the unity of history. Further, one's individual existence realizes only certain possibilities of human existence, and only certain aspects of history are significant for one's existence. Finally, Pannenberg would question whether history can be understood as grounded in the historicness of man. He regards the historicness of man as grounded in his radical openness beyond all that is at hand in his world, which is ultimately to be understood as man's openness for God. This historicness is first fully realized when man becomes conscious of historical change and of his historicness. This consciousness first arose in Israel's experience of history as the contingent work of God. Hence, Pannenberg thinks that the historicness of human existence is grounded in the experience of the reality of history, rather than the reverse.⁵¹

⁵⁰ E.g., R. Bultmann, Geschichte und Eschatologie, pp. 164-184, esp. pp. 172, 184; cf. the discussion of the history of the individual and of the way in which this history constitutes a person's individuality in W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 96-97.

⁵¹ W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 232-233; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 98-100; cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (9th ed., 1960; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer

Pannenberg thinks that an adequate understanding of the unity of history is possible only when it is grounded in the faithfulness of God, who in his freedom acts contingently in history producing new and unforeseen things. However, this does not yet answer the question as to how the unity or continuity of history is to be understood. If the continuity of history is understood in terms of a continuous process of history in which the future possibilities are somehow contained in the past or develop from the past, then the contingency of history is lost. Hence, if the future work of God in history grows out of his promises in the past, then these future acts of God cease to be contingent and history is understood in a way that makes it more or less determined. One has to begin with the contingency of the cross and resurrection of Jesus as a new and unforeseen act of God in which he justifies sinners, giving them community with himself. The possibility of such an act of God is not given beforehand in the Jewish traditions, even though these traditions provide the historical context in relation to which this new act of God is meaningful. In fact, these Jewish traditions can be a hindrance to understanding the new thing that God has done in Jesus Christ. The continuity of history is not demonstrable as such apart from faith.⁵²

What then does it mean to speak of God as faithful or of history

Verlag, 1926), pp. 372-404, esp. pp. 392-397, who grounds the experience of history in the historicness of human existence.

⁵²W. Pannenberg, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 617; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 92-93.

as continuous? The fact that the history of Jesus takes place and has its meaning within the context of the history of Israel, of the Old Testament, and of Jewish traditions means that this new work of God takes these up and gives them new meaning in their relation to this new work of God. The work of God in the past is taken up, broken, and thus fulfilled in his new work. For example, from the standpoint of the work of God in Christ, in which God justifies sinners by his grace alone apart from the works of the law, Paul can say that the law was never intended to be the means by which a man is justified, but that it was intended to show all men as sinners under the wrath of God so that God might show his grace to all men in Jesus Christ (Ro. 3:9-4:25; 7:1-8:4; Gal. 2:15-3:29). However, Paul could only say this from within Christian faith. The faithfulness of God, in which the unity or continuity of history is grounded, can be seen only retroactively from the standpoint of the new work of God in which he takes up the old traditions, thus transforming them and giving them new meaning:

Wenn aber der Zusammenhang der Begebenheiten in der Treue des freien Gottes gründet, dann haben wir nicht eine Kontinuität des Durchhaltens aus der Vergangenheit in die Zukunft hinein ins Auge zu fassen, etwa in der Weise einer Entwicklung, sondern die in sich kontingenten Ereignisse werden gleichsam nach rückwärts angeknüpft, auf das Gewesene zurückbezogen. Durch solche Rückbindung wird die Kontinuität je immer neu hergestellt. So äussert sich die Treue Gottes. Nur in dieser Weise, als rückgreifende Eingliederung des kontingent Neuen in das Gewesene, nicht aber umgekehrt als vorgegreifende Lenkung und Wirkung kann der primäre Zusammenhang der Geschichte gedacht werden, ohne dass ihre Kontingenz verlorenght. In diese Richtung weist auch die Tatsache, dass die Kontinuität des Geschehens immer erst vom Ende her überschaubar wird.⁵³

⁵³W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 285, also the discussion on pp. 280-287; idem, "Die

Thus, Pannenberg thinks that only the Biblical understanding of God as working in history makes it possible to think of the unity of history in such a way that the contingency of history is pre-

Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 31. This same retroactive structure can be seen in Pannenberg's discussion of Christology. Since the resurrection of Jesus is the eschatological self-disclosure of God, this event belongs to the essence of God so that men can only speak about God by speaking about what he has done in Jesus Christ. This is the ground for the statements of the unity of Christ with God. However, this means that the history of Jesus from the beginning belongs to the essence of God as his self-revelation. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 131-158. This also corresponds to the relation that Pannenberg sees between language about God and the continued experience of God's work in history, esp. "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 96-115. It is not clear that Günter Klein's criticism of Pannenberg for sacrificing the contingency of history with the conception of "eines stetig fortschreitenden Prozesses von Traditionsanreicherung" reflects an adequate understanding of Pannenberg's position (G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 23-24). In New Testament scholarship, a debate has developed between Günter Klein and Ulrich Wilckens over Paul's understanding of history. Klein accents the contingency of the Christ event for Paul so that the history of Israel is secularized and God's salvation in Christ has no necessary relation to that history. Paul finds in Abraham another contingent event of God's grace through faith. The word of God and faith are the only connection between Abraham and Christians, who are the true descendants of Abraham. Cf. G. Klein, "Offenbarung als Geschichte? Marginalien zu einem theologischen Programm," Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), 71-77; idem, "Römer 4 und die Idee der Heilsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXIII (1963), 424-447; idem, "Individualgeschichte und Weltgeschichte bei Paulus: Eine Interpretation ihres Verhältnisses im Galaterbrief," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 126-165; idem, "Exegetische Probleme in Römer 3:21-4:25: Antwort an U. Wilckens," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 676-683. Wilckens accents the continuity of history as the work of God for Paul, although he recognizes that Paul excludes righteousness by works of the law and a purely natural descent from Abraham as the basis for true sonship of Abraham and for salvation. Cf. U. Wilckens, "Das Offenbarungsverständnis in der Geschichte des Urchristentums," Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 42-90; idem, "Die Rechtfertigung Abrahams nach Römer 4," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 111-127; idem, "Zu Römer 3:21-4:25: Antwort an G. Klein," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 586-610; cf. also idem, "Die Bekehrung des Paulus als religionsgeschichtliches

served.⁵⁴ However, this does not mean that the humanity of history, or history as the work of man, is denied. God, as the Creator, can and does work in history through human agents and immanent human

Problem," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVI (1959), 273-293. This discussion represents an interesting example on both sides of the differences that can emerge in exegesis due to diverging theological starting points. However, in addition to the question of the understanding of Paul, it is not clear that the way in which Wilckens emphasizes the continuity of history corresponds to the way in which Pannenberg understands the unity or continuity of history. Cf. esp. U. Wilckens, "Zu Römer 3:21-4:25," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 591-606. Wilckens comes close to an understanding of the continuity of history in the sense of a continuous process, while Pannenberg understands the continuity of history from within the contingent new acts of God in the sense of taking up and transforming the old in relation to the new. Wilckens emphasizes the continuity of history by distinguishing between the revelation of the righteousness of God and the righteousness of God itself, which was hidden prior to its revelation, using Jewish apocalyptic as his basis (ibid., p. 592). If this were true of Pannenberg, then one could distinguish between the work of God in history and the attributes of God that lie behind those works, one could in fact move back behind the work of God in history to what God is in himself, and the distinction between revelation in nature and revelation in history would be lost. Further, as Klein correctly recognizes, if Wilckens were right at this point, then Klein's criticisms of Pannenberg for making revelation the mediation of information about God would also be correct. Cf. G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 54-70; idem, "Exegetische Probleme in Römer 3:21-4:25," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 679. This emphasis on the continuity of history also causes a certain unclarity in Wilckens' discussion of the function of the law and the question of justification, as Klein correctly recognizes (ibid., pp. 678-679). One could ask to what extent Wilckens' understanding of the continuity of history actually comes from Luke and whether there should not be a more precise working out of the distinction between Luke's understanding of history and Paul's. To the theology of Luke, cf. U. Wilckens, "Kerygma und Evangelium bei Lukas: Beobachtungen zu Acta 10:34-43," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, XLIX (1958), 223-237; idem, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte: Form- und traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 5; 2nd ed., 1963; Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961), esp. the theological evaluation, pp. 193-218; also the discussion of Luke and the summary in Wilckens' article in Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 73-77, 87-90; cf. Ernst Haenchen's criticism of Wilckens' theological evaluation of Luke

actions and decisions.⁵⁵ Pannenberg thinks that an adequate understanding of history has to embrace the humanistic, immanent understanding of history. It cannot simply appeal to the supernatural intervention of God as the basis for its concept of history. Similarly, historical study cannot assume a supernatural understanding of history as the basis of its work, but it must be oriented to the immanent human activity of history.⁵⁶

Der in der Kontingenz des Geschehens wirkende und zugleich die Kontinuität der Ereignisse stiftende Gott kann für den Historiker, wenn er an seine Arbeit geht, zunächst nur Problem sein. Wie Gott wirkt und wie er die Kontinuität der Geschichte je und je gestiftet hat, das kann nur die Geschichte selbst lehren.⁵⁷

This understanding of history as the work of man does not avoid the question of the relation of history to God. History and man are, of course, bound inseparably together so that history is the concrete

in Die Apostelgeschichte (Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, III, Begr. v. H.A.W. Meyer; 13th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 682-689, esp. pp. 686-688, where Haenchen emphasizes Paul's understanding of Heilsgeschichte, and pp. 688-689, where he discusses the place of history for Luke. For Luke's theology cf. also esp. Hans Conzelmann, Die Mitte der Zeit: Studien zur Theologie des Lukas (Tübingen: J.C.E. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1954); also G. Klein, "Lukas 1:1-4 als theologisches Programm," Zeit und Geschichte: Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 80. Geburtstag (Tübingen: J.C.E. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1964), pp. 193-216.

⁵⁴W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 286.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 286-288; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 96-97, where he speaks of the way in which human actions produce results that transcend these actions and the intentions lying behind them.

⁵⁶W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 286, 288.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 286.

realization of what man is.⁵⁸ While the way in which history encounters a man's own existence and his decisions make him what he is as a person, the question of what he is as a man cannot be answered apart from other men and their common quest for the meaning of human existence. The question of the fulfillment of one's own existence as a man is bound up with history as the quest for the definition of what man is.⁵⁹ But what does history say about man? History makes clear man's radical openness beyond everything that is at hand in his world, both cultural and natural, so that he has to move constantly beyond all his attainments in the world in which he lives and beyond every form of his society and culture. Man can never identify himself with anything that he attains, as though this represented the fulfillment of his existence. Thus, history itself brings to expression the fact that the fulfillment of human existence, which defines what man is, does not rest in his own attainments or accomplishments. Pannenberg identifies this radical openness of man beyond all boundaries with the question of God in relation to whom man is what he is.⁶⁰ The openness of man beyond everything in this world is to be understood as his openness to God. Hence,

⁵⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 95-103.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 96-101.

⁶⁰Ibid., pp. 5-13, esp. p. 11: "Für dieses Gegenüber, auf das der Mensch in seinem unendlichen Streben angewiesen ist, hat die Sprache den Ausdruck Gott. Das Wort Gott kann nur sinnvoll verwendet werden, wenn es das Gegenüber der grenzlosen Angewiesenheit des Menschen meint." This question of God, which is associated with the radical openness of man, is not to be understood as a proof for the existence of God (ibid.).

if history defines what man is, it can do this only in its relation to God, as he works in history to give man community with himself in life for God. Only so is man what he is intended to be as man.

History, as the means by which God reveals himself, is the means by which God makes man what he is intended to be by giving man community with God. The resurrection of Jesus, as the prolepsis of the end of history, is both the revelation of God and his drawing near to man in such a way that he makes man truly man. As such the resurrection of Jesus is the fulfillment of all of history.⁶¹ This also means that all man's attempts to find the fulfillment of his existence in his own works or to find security in what he has accomplished represent his sin, and these attempts fall under the judgment of God.⁶² In this way, the revelation of God in Christ qualifies the rest of history and provides the center in relation to which it has its meaning, although the future remains open and unpredictable, and although what resurrection means is unknown to us.

Such a theological understanding of history also poses the problem of the relation between history as the work of God and history as the work of man, which brings to expression man's self-assertion and sin. Some aspects of this problem are clear. God can use events that express human sin to accomplish his purposes.⁶³ Further, man's sin

⁶¹E.g., ibid., pp. 100-103; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 195-199, 357-361, 393-406.

⁶²W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 22-31, 40-58.

⁶³E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche

cuts him off from God, in relation to whom he is what he is intended to be as man. In this way, sin brings with it God's judgment, for man looses that which he seeks by turning to himself.⁶⁴ Finally, while much of history remains unclear and ambiguous to men, in Jesus Christ they know that all of history must ultimately serve God and his purposes and that God's will in relation to men is essentially love. However, a theology of history must make the way it understands the relation between the work of God in history and human sin in history clear, for such a theology immediately stands under the suspicion of representing an optimistic view of history which does not take sin with sufficient seriousness, which would be contrary to Pannenberg's own intention.

3. The primary interest of the Pannenberg circle in the understanding of history is the relation between event and meaning, or event and language.⁶⁵ A program that is oriented to an understanding of

Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 277-280; cf. the use of evil nations to punish Israel in the Old Testament (e.g., Is. 10:5-19), the crucifixion of Jesus, Paul's emphasis on the fact that even the demonic forces have to serve God's purpose of love for his people (Ro. 8:28-39; I Cor. 2:6-11; 3:21-23), or even Paul's understanding of the way in which the law calls forth man's sin, leading to his destruction and death, thus preparing for God's grace in Christ (Ro. 7).

⁶⁴Cf. W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 22-31, 40-49, and esp. pp. 49-53; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 271-277; also Klaus Koch, "Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LII (1955), 1-42; Gerhard von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, I (2nd ed., 1956; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957), 261-271.

⁶⁵Cf. esp. W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 129-140;

revelation as history must at the same time involve a concept of history as the interrelation between event and meaning. Since understanding only takes place in language,⁶⁶ the interrelation between event and meaning is the interrelation between event and language. Only when history is understood in a way that embraces both event and meaning is it meaningful to speak of history as the means by which God reveals himself to men. Hence, Pannenberg is interested in overcoming the distinction between inner and outer history, between history and meaning or language.

Initially, Pannenberg sought to understand the relation between word and events in terms of promise and fulfillment as the structure of history. The movement from promise to fulfillment gives history a linear direction into the future.⁶⁷ This structure cannot be understood in a mechanical way. The fulfillment did not simply reproduce that which was promised, but it transcended and, thus, it broke the promise.

R. Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40; idem, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 81-94.

⁶⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 111.

⁶⁷E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 220-221. Cf. Walther Zimmerli, "Verheissung und Erfüllung," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 34-59; Gerhard von Rad, "Typologische Auslegung des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 17-33. Pannenberg has continued to defend the use of this structure to some extent, in "Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage," Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 133, n. 3, although the understanding of history as Überlieferungsgeschichte, toward which the Pannenberg circle is moving, seems to be more adequate.

Nevertheless, this terminology itself tends to carry with it a more or less formal and mechanical connotation. Hence, it tends to become an external structure that is imposed onto history.⁶⁸ For this reason, Pannenberg has been moving away from this structure. However, it served two functions for him in the beginning. First, it gives history a forward movement into the future. Second, the promise has a hermeneutical function in that the event that is seen as its fulfillment is understood in a meaningful way in terms of the promise, even though the event does not correspond to the promise but breaks it. Both of these functions are carried out in a better way by the understanding of history as Überlieferungsgeschichte.

For Pannenberg, history is not to be understood as simply the external course of events or as political history. History is essentially the history of traditions.⁶⁹ Events in human history are never

⁶⁸Cf. James M. Robinson, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, ed. Bernhard W. Anderson (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 128-129 [German: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 117].

⁶⁹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, p. 136. He thinks that the primary theological contribution of G. von Rad's Theologie des Alten Testaments, Vols. I and II (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957-1960), lies in bringing together history and tradition, thus overcoming the isolation of the kerygma from history and the distinction between outer and inner history, i.e., between event and meaning. Cf. also R. Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 39-40; idem, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, p. 83; cf. Martin Noth, Überlieferungsgeschichte des Pentateuch, (2nd ed., 1962, photomechanically reprinted by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1946), p. 272.

simply external events or brute facts. They are always interwoven with meaning for the people experiencing them, and this meaning is itself a part of that event as it is experienced. The form in which an event is transmitted and, thus, is effective in history as a historic event, is never the event in its bare facticity. It is the event together with its significance for the men involved. Thus, history is essentially constituted by the interweaving of events and meaning in the history of traditions.⁷⁰ This is the history in which God reveals himself.⁷¹

This interrelation between traditions and events in history is many-sided. First, the traditions form the thought world in relation to which people experience new events in a meaningful way, that is, in relation to which the events are historic events:

So ist Geschichte immer auch Überlieferungsgeschichte, und selbst die Naturereignisse, die in die Geschichte eines Volkes eingreifen, haben ihre Bedeutung nicht ausserhalb ihres positiven oder negativen Bezugs zu den Überlieferungen und Erwartungen, in denen seine Menschen leben. Die Ereignisse der Geschichte reden ihre eigene Sprache, die Sprache der Tatsachen, aber diese Sprache wird nur im Kontext des Überlieferungs- und Erwartungszusammenhangs hörbar, in den hinein die Begebenheiten sich ereignen.⁷²

Events have meaning for men in the history of traditions context in

⁷⁰ Traditions, of course, include many non-historical "events." But the process by which these "events" become a part of the traditions is itself a historic event of significance for the future, and this process may itself reflect events in history that do not directly come to expression in the traditions.

⁷¹ Cf. esp. R. Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 39-40; idem, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 89-91, 93-94.

⁷² W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 112, cf. also pp. 136-142; also idem, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960,

which they are experienced. Thus, for an adequate understanding of history and of events in history, one cannot abstract these events from the history of traditions context within which they happened.⁷³ For example, the death and resurrection of Jesus cannot be abstracted from the historical context in which it stands and within which it has its meaning, which includes the Old Testament, first century Judaism, and the ministry of the pre-Easter Jesus, all of which provide the thought world within which the death and resurrection of Jesus happened. The fact that an event has meaning within the context of the world of thought in which the people experiencing the event live, does not mean that the meaning of that event is already implicit within

No. 4, pp. 7-8. One should compare this with the insistence of Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling that a word event is not simply to be equated with speaking, but that a word event can occur independently of words being used. Cf. E. Fuchs, "Was ist ein Sprachereignis? Ein Brief," Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), pp. 424-430; G. Ebeling, "Die Evidenz des Ethischen und die Theologie," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVIII (1960), 345, n. 1. Ebeling uses the parable of the Good Samaritan to illustrate the way an action can be a word event in relation to the need that it meets so that the action itself speaks in that situation.

⁷³This context may also be expressed in terms of a linguistic "world" within which men live, think, and experience reality, as is done by James M. Robinson in an unpublished essay, "Historiography and Hermeneutic." Thus, for example, von Rad describes the contribution of the Old Testament to the New Testament as providing the language in terms of which the revelation of God in Christ happens and is expressed (Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 365-369). While von Rad recognizes that it is not only the Old Testament as such which provides the linguistic context for the New Testament, one ought to emphasize Hans Conzelmann's suggestion that this context is not so much the Old Testament as it is first century Judaism and the Hellenistic world. H. Conzelmann, "Fragen an Gerhard von Rad," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 113-125, esp. pp. 118-119; cf. G. von Rad, "Antwort auf Conzelmanns Fragen," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 388-394.

those traditions. The kerygma is not a continuation of certain Jewish traditions or even of the proclamation of the pre-Easter Jesus. As a contingent event in which God discloses himself, the cross and resurrection of Jesus has a critical function and breaks the traditions in relation to which it is meaningful. However, it can have this critical function only within the context of the traditions or world of thought that it breaks. For example, Paul's understanding of the act of God in Christ as the end of the law, in which God justifies men through the cross of Christ apart from the works of the law, is meaningful only in relation to an understanding of the law as the means by which a man is justified before God.⁷⁴

Second, events in the past are preserved and, thus, accessible to the present only through the traditions that they produced and in which they are presented in their meaningfulness, with the exception of some events that may be reconstructed by means of archaeology.

⁷⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 112; cf. G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube, pp. 351-356, for the relation of thought about God and tradition, even when that thought is critical of the tradition. Günter Klein's criticisms of Pannenberg for eliminating the contingency of events in history by insisting that they have their meaning in their history of traditions context fails to understand the way that Pannenberg understands the relation of an event and its history of traditions context (G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 22-37, esp. pp. 22-24). An event that radically calls the traditions or the world of thought of the people experiencing it into question also occurs in a meaningful way within the context of the traditions that it calls into question. An event that would have no point of contact with the world of thought of the people experiencing it, if such an event were possible in history, would also have no meaning for them. Cf. the discussion of the relation of the resurrection of Jesus to apocalyptic, infra, pp. 173-180.

While events give rise to the development of traditions, these traditions are never simply fixed. The tradition itself develops in relation to the further course of history. For example, the coming together of the various tribes to form the Israelite amphictyony is reflected in the history of Israel's traditions by the bringing together of the various traditions into the picture of the history of the one Israel. This process is not simply unhistorical. It is a part of the continuing history of Israel, which comes to expression in the way that the older traditions are combined and reworked. The early history of Israel prior to the monarchy is largely accessible to the modern historian only by analyzing Israel's early traditions and the way in which they developed and were combined. These traditions, in turn, are the historic form in which this early history is presented to and continues to be important for the following course of history.⁷⁵

This tradition building process in the history of early Israel could be called a hermeneutical event of historic significance in that it brought together the traditions which already existed, presenting and reinterpreting them in terms of their significance for the present. This is the third aspect of the relation between history and traditions: history as the history of traditions is a hermeneutical process. This process moves in two directions. First, the traditions

⁷⁵Cf. the discussion in R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 31-94, esp. pp. 84-88. Cf., also, e.g., the discussion of the way that tribal realignments are expressed in their genealogies, Roland de Vaux, Les Institutions de l'Ancien Testament, I (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1958), 17-20.

are reinterpreted in the light of the present course of history, and, thus, they are applied to new historical situations. Second, this then involves an interpretation of the present historical situation in terms of these traditions. For example, the prophets used the historical traditions of Israel to interpret the present existence of the people in terms of the judgment of God so that God's decisive saving act, which was presented as analogous to his saving acts in the past, was pushed into the future beyond his judgment.⁷⁶ This involved both a reinterpretation of Israel's traditions and a new interpretation of the present situation in terms of these traditions. The history of traditions involves an interplay between the traditions and the present historical situation in which the present is interpreted in terms of the traditions and this in turn involves a reinterpretation or a re-formation of the traditions.⁷⁷ This aspect of the relation between the history of traditions and the continuing experience of history is also reflected in Pannenberg's emphasis that one of the criteria for the reality of the revelation of God in Christ is its ability to interpret the present reality of history in a deeper way than would otherwise be possible and that the continuing experience of history can

⁷⁶Cf. G. von Rad's discussion of the prophetic movement in Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 20-328.

⁷⁷Cf. Hans Walter Wolff, "Das Kerygma des Jahwisten," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 73-98, esp. 31-35, where he presents this twofold relation between history and traditions in terms of the way that the Yahwist used his traditions in relation to the beginning of the monarchy: "Das alte Wort lehrt die neue Geschichte verstehen; andererseits legen die neuen Geschichtstaten Jahwes ganz neu die früher nie so ausgesprochene Fülle des alten Wortes aus" (p. 83).

bring new dimensions of the meaning of God's revelation in Christ into focus.⁷⁸

Fourth, the development of the traditions or the re-formation of the traditions is itself a historic event that is important for the subsequent course of history.⁷⁹ For example, the tradition of the one Israel provided the necessary consciousness of the unity of Israel for the establishment of the kingdom. Indeed, one could ask to what extent the split between the kingdoms may have been facilitated by the difference in the traditions that were considered primary.⁸⁰ Similarly, the Zion tradition played an important role in the continuing history of Jerusalem and the Kingdom of Judah as well as in the growth of the Messianic expectations.

Another aspect of the traditions of Israel was their orientation to the future so that hope and expectation were essential parts of Israel's world of thought. The promise of God was an essential part of the content of Israel's traditions, opening the existence of Israel to the future. The recounting of the work of God in the past then had the function of showing the faithfulness of God in the past and thus

⁷⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), esp. 91-99; idem, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 106-109.

⁷⁹Cf. R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 84-88.

⁸⁰E.g., in the eighth century prophets, Amos and Hosea stood primarily in the context of the Exodus traditions, while Isaiah and Micah (?) stood primarily in the context of the Davidic and Zion traditions (G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 139-185).

grounding trust and hope in God for the future on the basis of his promises. Of course, there was also the possibility that Israel would use these traditions in such a way as essentially to deny the openness of the future. Thus, Israel could regard the saving acts of God in the past as a guarantee for the future. The prophets had to combat this misunderstanding. Also, the concrete content of the promises can determine one's expectations in such a way that it closes one's view for the future, and the promises themselves become a hindrance to seeing and understanding the contingent new work of God. Only the understanding of the freedom of God to do new and unforeseen things enables one to trust in God as faithful to his word and yet to live with an open future.⁸¹

In this way, the Pannenberg circle seeks to overcome the distinction between event and meaning or between history and language by means of an understanding of history as Überlieferungsgeschichte. It is this interwoven complex of event and meaning or language which constitutes history. Event and meaning are not two separate things that come together only secondarily. The history in which God reveals himself is not simply a sequence of events nor is it only word, but it is the interrelation of word and event in history. It is by means of this understanding of history that the Pannenberg circle seeks to move beyond the split between historical-critical history and the understanding of history as the work of God by which he encounters men. The

⁸¹ E.g., W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 90-95.

danger of such a theology of history is that the subject matter of theology could become a theory of history rather than the revelation of God and his judgment and grace in relation to men. While Pannenberg understands history as the means of God's revelation rather than as the object of revelation, there is always the danger that this relation might be reversed so that revelation becomes the means for understanding history.⁸² This danger may be reflected in the tendency to discuss the history of God's revelation and the concept of revelation in a way that is relatively removed from the character of God's acts in history as his judgment or grace in relation to men.

⁸²The awareness of this danger is reflected, for example, in Hans-Georg Geyer's criticism that the concept of God tends to become a postulate or speculative principle by means of which one has an adequate concept of history ("Geschichte als theologisches Problem," Evangelische Theologie, XXII, 1962, pp. 97-98). Pannenberg himself would argue that this understanding of history in fact arises from the biblical concept of God, rather than the reverse. Also, while the problem of an adequate understanding of the concept of history may pose the question of God, the existence of this question neither establishes the existence of God nor does it give content to the concept of God. Pannenberg's essential concern in discussing the concept of history in relation to God is to show that the reality in which man lives can be understood more adequately in relation to Christian faith and the Christian understanding of God than apart from it. The problem of making history itself the object of theological interest is apparent, however, when Rolf Rendtorff suggests that the purpose of the prophets was to show the people that God was at work in history ("Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII, 1962, p. 636), as well as when Ulrich Wilckens orients the discussion of the understanding of revelation in the New Testament to the question of whether the place of salvation lies in the past, present, or future ("Das Offenbarungsverständnis in der Geschichte des Urchristentums," Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 63-90). Similarly Wilckens' emphasis on faith as faith in history ("Die Rechtfertigung Abrahams nach Römer 4," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, p. 123). While events in history are important for the biblical authors, and while they do have a certain understanding of history, the concept of history as such does not become a central object of interest.

II. HISTORICAL METHOD AND HERMENEUTIC

A particular understanding of the nature of history brings with it a corresponding understanding of the nature of historical method and of the object of historical study. Thus, historical method must be understood in such a way that it embraces both the unity and contingency of history. Further, if history is understood as the interrelation of event and meaning, then the object of an adequate historical research must be this total event-meaning complex. It cannot simply be the collection of brute facts about the past. Hence, if the meaning of history is the revelation of God, then an adequate historical methodology cannot simply reject the question of the work of God in history on the ground that it represents a presupposed supernaturalism. To the extent that the historian asks the question of the meaning of events, he must be open to the question of the understanding of the whole of history and, hence, to the question of God and his revelation. The understanding of historical methodology corresponding to Pannenberg's understanding of history must be examined at this point. Since historical study is involved with the understanding of texts and since history itself involves understanding, Pannenberg's understanding of hermeneutic must also be considered.

1. Two basic principles of historical research are universal correlation and analogy.⁸³ All events in history stand in an inter-

⁸³W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 260-267; cf. Ernst Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, II

woven connection with other events and circumstances in the environment. Hence, an event cannot be treated in isolation from the other events in relation to which it happens. So also, the events that the Bible describes cannot be isolated and taken for themselves apart from the rest of history, as though God's saving acts happened outside the universal interrelatedness of human history. God's revelation does not constitute a special history. Rather, it takes place within human history. However, the contingent character of events in history means that the concept of universal causation, which is closely related to that of universal correlation, as the total explanation of history must be rejected, even though there are sequences of events that do fit within such a causal nexus.⁸⁴ Thus, for example, the concept of history as an evolutionary development, whether this development is understood positively or negatively, must be rejected as inadequate.

The use of analogy is also an essential tool of historical research. One can only proceed from the known to the unknown, and when something has no analogies to that which one knows, it remains obscure. However, events in history are more or less unique in character. This means that analogy cannot be used in the sense of postulating the basic similarity of all reality. Analogy must be used as an aid to the historian in perceiving and understanding the uniqueness

(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1913), 729-753.

⁸⁴W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 261-263.

of the events in question:

Die Erkenntniskraft der Analogie beruht nämlich gerade darauf, dass sie das Gleichartige im Ungleichartigen sehen lehrt. Mit dem Ungleichartigen, in keiner Analogie restlos Aufgehenden hat es der Historiker zu tun, wenn er das unverwechselbar Individuelle und die Kontingenz einer Begebenheit ins Auge fasst.⁸⁵

It is by means of this kind of use of analogy that knowledge increases and that historical knowledge is possible. Theology, with its interest in the revelation of God in history, is interested above all in the uniqueness and contingency of events and, hence, in this kind of use of analogy in historical study.⁸⁶

In this way, Pannenberg thinks that the contingent character of events in history limits the use of analogy, since the principle similarity of all reality is rejected. Analogy must then be oriented primarily to understanding that which is unique and without analogy in an event. Also the extraordinary character of a reported event for which there is no analogy cannot in itself be the criterion for denying its facticity. Hence, Pannenberg thinks that the fact that the resurrection of Jesus is without positive analogy in human experience is not a sufficient ground for denying its reality.⁸⁷ Pannenberg thinks that a negative judgment over the reality of an event can be made by means of analogy when the historical sources have positive analogies to forms of

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 264-265; cf. idem, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, p. 131.

⁸⁶W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 263-266.

⁸⁷For the discussion of the problem of the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event see the Appendix.

literature, as myths or legends, that do not transmit real events or when the event reported has analogies to forms of consciousness that do not have real content.⁸⁸ The difficulty with this is that it is the use of analogy in the sense of saying that certain things do not happen that provides the basis for regarding certain literary forms as reporting myths or legends rather than real events or for saying that certain forms of consciousness have no real content. Certainly, one has to use such analogies with caution, especially in view of recent studies in the field of parapsychology, but it is doubtful that critical historical work is possible at all without such use of analogy. Even when one grants the possibility that an event that is denied as factual on this basis actually may have happened, it is also not clear how historical research can affirm the occurrence of such an event without positive analogies for its possibility.⁸⁹ The difficulty with trying to understand historical method in such a way that the resurrection of Jesus can be affirmed as a historical event is that such an effort threatens the critical character of historical research itself. Also, one of the basic principles of historical research is that one recognize the limits of what one can determine by historical

⁸⁸W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 266-267.

⁸⁹Cf. ibid., 267-268: "In dem Masse aber, in dem ein überliefertes Datum die bekannten Vergleichsmöglichkeiten sprengt, bleibt es selbst für den Historiker, den mit aussergewöhnlichen Okularen für das Gewesene ausgerüsteten Menschen, dunkel. . . . Vielmehr sind die Grenzen der Erkenntniskraft der historischen Analogie jeweils die Grenzen des möglichen Wissens vom Gewesenen überhaupt."

method. Has one not moved beyond these limits when it comes to affirming the resurrection of Jesus?

If history involves the interaction of events and meaning, then historical research cannot only devote itself to the task of determining what actually happened in the past, as important as that is for historical study. The object of historical study must also involve the interrelation of events and meaning, which means that historical study also should include the evaluation of the significance of events. The meaning or significance of an event in history can be seen only when that event is seen in its historical context and when its importance for the following course of history is seen. In this way, the understanding of the meaning of events in history poses the question of an understanding of world history in relation to which particular events are understood, for events have their ultimate historic significance only in the context of history as a whole. It is above all in the understanding of the meaning of events in relation to the whole of reality that the question of God arises. In fact, for many particular areas of historical study the question of God does not immediately press itself upon the historian, as it would in the study of the history of religions, for example. But in so far as the historian must ask about the meaning of particular events in relation to reality as a whole or to the whole of history, he is also placed before the question of God.⁹⁰ While Pannenberg regards the question of God as unavoid-

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 278-288; idem, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 108-109.

able for the historian in this sense, this does not mean that the historian should do his work under the presupposition of a supernatural relation between God and history. God, as the Creator, is able to accomplish his will through the experiences, plans, and work of men in spite of man's sinfulness. Hence, theological history writing must also be oriented to this immanent human activity of history rather than to supernatural speculation.⁹¹

The theory of historical knowledge with which Pannenberg thinks this approach to historical study is possible basically involves three steps. First, one begins with an imaginatively projected theory or picture of the history involved. Second, one does concrete historical research in terms of this theory and the questions that it suggests. Third, this research confirms the theory, or it requires its modification or rejection.⁹² The imaginatively projected theory involves

⁹¹W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 288.

⁹²Cf. the discussion of R.G. Collingwood and Hans-Georg Gadamer, *supra*, pp. 25-29; W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 231-282, esp. pp. 266-282; *idem*, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, p. 21; *idem*, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 224-231; *idem*, Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), pp. 146-147; *idem*, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 90-121. Cf. also, R. Röhrich, "Review: W. Pannenberg et al., Offenbarung als Geschichte," Sonntagsblatt, 1961, No. 29, p. 31; Lothar Steiger, "Offenbarungsgeschichte und theologische Vernunft: Zur Theologie W. Pannenburgs," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), esp. 91-103; Rüdiger Schmidt, "'Universal Bescheidwissen?': Die Grenze der theologischen Erkennens in der Theologie von Pannenberg," Oekumenica: Professor Dr. D. Edmund Schlink, D.D. zum 60. Geburtstag, eds. Rolf Herrfahrdt and Artur Gerwinat (Heidelberg: Oekumenisches Studentenheim, 1963), pp. 37-40; Günter Klein, Theologie des Wortes

things that are already known so that it has some relation to the history involved. However, the precise origin of this theory is not itself a criterion of its truth. This is determined only by the subsequent research, which confirms, modifies, or eliminates the theory. The scope of the projected theory could presumably be as broad or as narrow as one desired, depending on the material under consideration. However, in so far as the historian is interested in the ultimate significance or meaning of historic events, it becomes necessary to project a picture of world history in relation to which the significance of these events can be seen. In so far as subsequent research confirms the imaginatively projected theory, this theory becomes binding on the historian until the evidence requires its change or rejection.⁹³

It is within this horizon that Pannenberg understands the question of the historical verifiability of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. If scholarship involves the verifiability of imaginatively projected theories, then the origin of the theory does not decide its scholarly character. If the theory grows out of the Christian kerygma, this does not make it different in kind from any other projection of

Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 54-70. The basic structure of proleptic anticipation of the results and subsequent confirmation, modification, or rejection runs throughout Pannenberg's theology.

⁹³W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 281-283. This understanding of the relation between an imaginatively created theory of the way things are and the subsequent research done in terms of the theory is, for Pannenberg, basic to the theory of knowledge in any field. E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit," Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 227-228.

reality. It is the subsequent examination and research that supports it or requires its rejection:

Eine Verifizierung durch nachträgliche Prüfung an Einzelbeobachtungen darf von einem theologischen Entwurf der Geschichte uneingeschränkt erwartet werden. Seine Fähigkeit, alle bekannten Einzelbefunde zu berücksichtigen, wäre das positive Kriterium seiner Wahrheit; der Nachweis, dass ohne seine spezifischen Behauptungen die zugänglichen Befunde nicht oder nicht voll erklärbar sind, kann als negatives Kriterium Anwendung finden.⁹⁴

For example, Pannenberg's discussion of the understanding of history, in which he argues that the unity of history can be thought of in such a way that it does not destroy the contingency of history only when both are grounded in God, who has revealed himself in the history of Jesus as the prolepsis of the end of history, is one way in which he applies this criterion.⁹⁵ Similarly, the concrete form of the kerygma or the theology of the church⁹⁶ is the starting point for theological

⁹⁴W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 287; cf. also, idem, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, p. 14. L. Steiger recognizes the basic structure of Pannenberg's theory of knowledge in the structuring of Pannenberg's articles, but he does not bring this into sharp enough focus to enter into a discussion of Pannenberg's theory of knowledge as such. L. Steiger, "Offenbarungsgeschichte und theologische Vernunft," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 91-103.

⁹⁵E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 231-238.

⁹⁶G. Klein criticises Pannenberg for failing to distinguish between theology and the kerygma, or between the concrete forms of the kerygma and the common kerygmatic impulse (G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 19-21, 27-30--Klein's discussion of Pannenberg's understanding of the word of God under the assumption that Pannenberg's intention is to show its deficiency, rather than in terms of a material discussion of the divergence in the understanding of language, is unfortunate and misleading, even though such an approach may be suggested by what Pannenberg him-

consideration, and the criterion of the concrete formulation or understanding of the kerygma is its relation to the meaning of the history of Jesus and to the early Christian proclamation on the one hand and to the whole realm of human knowledge and experience on the other.⁹⁷ The

self says). If the kerygma exists only in concrete forms, cf. Rudolf Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), pp. 583-589, what does it mean to speak of a common kerygmatic impulse or of the unity of the kerygma? Is it a common unspoken kerygma behind the concrete formulation of the kerygma? So, for example, Heinrich Ott, "Was ist systematische Theologie?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Beiheft 2 (1961), 19-46, esp. 27-28, Engl. trans., "What is Systematic Theology?" The Later Heidegger and Theology, eds., James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., pp. 77-111, esp. pp. 87-88, in dependence on Martin Heidegger. Cf. also the discussion of Ott in the latter volume. If this is so, what can it mean to speak of such an unspoken kerygma? Or is it the fact that the kerygma is the power of God or the address of God, or the means by which the Holy Spirit calls forth faith in men? So, for example, R. Bultmann, who does not speak of the one kerygma behind its concrete formulations, Theologie des Neuen Testaments, pp. 583-589. One must, of course, distinguish between the kerygma as the means by which God encounters men with his power and love and the concrete formulations of the kerygma or theology, even though these two cannot be separated. Pannenberg would not disagree (e.g., "Einsicht und Glaube: Antwort an Paul Althaus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII, 1963, pp. 85-86, 88-90), but he would ask how this is to be understood. He would insist that the kerygma is the power of God only in its relation to its content, i.e., in its relation to the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's eschatological saving act, which comes to expression or to understanding only in concrete forms but which cannot be simply identified with those formulations. The act of God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus as that which is proclaimed and interpreted constitutes the unity of the kerygma (e.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 102, 133-134). This corresponds to Pannenberg's understanding of language. For Pannenberg, language is communication or address (the kerygma as the means by which God encounters men, forgiving their sins, creating faith, and imparting new life in community with himself) only in its relation to its content (the kerygma as the proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's saving act) and in its character as statement (the kerygma as the concrete formulation of the meaning of the Christ event as God's saving act).

⁹⁷Cf. the discussion in W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische

question is, however, whether one can go behind the early Christian proclamation as it is presented in the New Testament to the history of Jesus as the criterion of that proclamation.⁹⁸ The difficulty is twofold. First, what is presented in the New Testament about Jesus is so overlaid by the proclamation of the early church that the historian knows very little about the pre-Easter Jesus. Second, what is known about first century Judaism and about early Christian theology is so limited that it is difficult to reconstruct with any certainty the rise and development of theology within the early church. It may be that within the limits of historical research one can only raise the ques-

Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), esp. 87-99; idem, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, p. 14.

⁹⁸There is also the problem of the legitimacy of such an endeavor to go behind the kerygma. If, as for Bultmann, the kerygma is understood primarily as address, then this would be illegitimate as seeking to find human security outside God's presence and his claim on man in the kerygma. If, however, as for Pannenberg, the kerygma is understood as address or communication only in its relation to its content or to its character as statement, then such an endeavor is both legitimate and necessary. Cf. the discussion supra, pp. 38-41. To the problem of the relation between the historical Jesus and the kerygma, cf. esp. Ernst Käsemann, "Das Problem des historischen Jesus," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, I (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960), 187-214; idem, "Sachgassen im Streit um den historischen Jesus," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964), 31-68; James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (Studies in Biblical Theology, 25; London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959); Van A. Harvey and Schubert M. Ogden, "Wie Neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem historischen Jesus'?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 46-87; Hans Conzelmann, "Jesus Christus," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, III (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959), 620-653; R. Bultmann, Das Verhältnis der urchristlichen Christusbotschaft zum historischen Jesus (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-historische Klasse; 3rd ed., 1962; Heidelberg: Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag, 1960).

tion as to whether the kerygma of the early church is possible as an interpretation of the history of Jesus. The Pannenberg circle seeks to understand the rise and development of early Christian theology by seeing the ministry of Jesus and his resurrection within the horizon of first century Jewish apocalyptic, which in turn stands in a history of traditions relation with the Old Testament, and of early Christian apocalyptic. This serves as their working hypothesis for understanding early Christian theology and for critically understanding the theological tradition of the church.⁹⁹ Thus, for example, Pannenberg regards the ability to understand critically the development and significance of the Christological tradition of the church as one of the criteria of such a theology of history.¹⁰⁰ In this way, the entire theological program of the Pannenberg circle is in one way or another an evaluation

⁹⁹ Cf. the criticisms of such a use of apocalyptic by G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 24-32. However, it is not clear that Klein adequately recognizes the basic structure of Pannenberg's theological program, which corresponds to his theory of knowledge. Pannenberg is quite aware that many of the historical problems on which he takes a particular position are still debatable. He is also quite aware that the criterion of his working hypothesis is subsequent investigation, which may confirm or modify the hypothesis or force its rejection. This is, of course, true of any theological program, especially when it wants to take developments in Biblical scholarship seriously. Of course, such a program must be undertaken in full consciousness of the limitations of our knowledge of first century Christian theology, and in the awareness that other projections of the development of early Christian theology are possible and may turn out to be more adequate in the long run. Klein does, however, point out the danger of such a theological program, in that it could simply impose its system onto the Biblical materials or onto history rather than being open to change through concrete research.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, esp. pp. 9-10.

of their projection of a theology of history as a means for understanding Christian theology.

2. Historical research encounters the problem of hermeneutic in several ways. First, historical study involves the interpretation of texts written in a thought world that is remote from the historian's own world of thought. Second, if history involves both events and meaning, then history itself is a hermeneutical process. Correspondingly, historical study involves understanding or hermeneutic. Third, the historian is involved with texts that claim an understanding of reality. As long as he confines himself to the task of only describing what people said or thought in the past, the hermeneutical problem does not press itself upon him too sharply. It is at the point at which the historian must concern himself with the truth of these texts and their claim that the hermeneutical problem becomes pressing. This is especially so when the historian is confronted with texts that claim to be decisive for the understanding of reality by speaking of God, as, for example, New Testament texts, which claim that the Christ event has decisive significance for all men of all times as God's eschatological saving act that determines men's relation to him. In fact, the historian always makes a decision with regard to the truth of the text and its claim, and this decision is significant for his historical work. The only question is whether or not this decision involves methodological reflection so that it becomes a conscious part of his historical work and can be examined.

The foregoing already indicates the close relation that exists

between the historical and the hermeneutical problem.¹⁰¹ In theology both arose as problems with the rise of historical criticism, which brought to light both the difference between what the text describes and the actual course of history (the historical problem) and the difference between the past world of thought and our own (the hermeneutical problem). The historical and the hermeneutical questions are both aspects of the same problem.¹⁰² The relation between them is one both of concurrence and of convergence. It is a relation of concurrence in that both have to do with texts and both involve the interpreter himself in the interpretation of the text, although historical method does this in a more indirect way by asking about the historical events lying behind the texts and their historic significance, which includes their significance for the present. It is also a relation of convergence. The hermeneutical question involves the question of the subject matter of the texts, and, especially in relation to Biblical texts, this leads to the historical question. However, even when the subject matter is not closely involved with history as such, the subject matter is historical in character, being historically conditioned,

¹⁰¹Cf. the discussion in W. Pannenberg, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 7-14; idem, "Die Fragwürdigkeit der klassischen Universalwissenschaften: Evangelische Theologie," Die pädagogische Provinz (1963), pp. 173-188; idem, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 90-121. The following discussion is based largely on these articles.

¹⁰²Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Die Fragwürdigkeit der klassischen Universalwissenschaften," Die pädagogische Provinz (1963), pp. 184-186; idem, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 91-93.

so that the problem of hermeneutic again leads to the historical question. Further, if historical research is to be something more than a positivistic collecting of facts, it must ask about the meaning of events in their historical context. For some events the immediate context is more restricted, but the context of these events is interwoven with larger contexts in relation to which it must be understood and evaluated. The more important the event is the broader its context, for the historical context in relation to which an event is meaningful also includes the working out of that event in the following course of history. This context also involves the present time of the historian. Thus, historical study cannot present these events as something in the past, "sondern muss sie in ihren Bedeutungszusammenhängen mit der Gegenwart des Historikers erfassen."¹⁰³ Hence, historical study involves both the question of hermeneutic and of universal history. Pannenberg thinks that both the historical and the hermeneutical problems lead to and can be dealt with adequately only within the horizon of universal history.¹⁰⁴

In his article "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte,"¹⁰⁵ Pannenberg presents what he regards as the most important contribution

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 93; for this entire discussion, pp. 91-93.

¹⁰⁴This can be seen from both sides, esp. in W. Pannenberg, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 8-14; idem, "Die Fragwürdigkeit der klassischen Universalwissenschaften: Evangelische Theologie," Die pädagogische Provinz (1963), pp. 179-188.

¹⁰⁵Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 90-121.

of Hans-Georg Gadamer¹⁰⁶ to the hermeneutical discussion in relation to the recent history of hermeneutic beginning with Schleiermacher. In this history of hermeneutic, the problem of understanding is handled by means of some more or less constant structure of human existence that bridges the distance between the text and the interpreter.¹⁰⁷ Pannenberg rejects such an approach both as too narrow and as failing to take the historical distance between the text and the interpreter into the process of understanding with sufficient seriousness.¹⁰⁸ Gadamer avoids this narrowness in the prior-understanding and at the

¹⁰⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960).

¹⁰⁷ W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 94-105.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Pannenberg's discussion of Bultmann as an example, *ibid.*, pp. 100-104, also pp. 105-106. In this respect cf. also Heinz Kimmerle, "Hermeneutische Theorie oder ontologische Hermeneutik," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 114-130, in which he rejects any timeless constant as the basis for understanding; *idem*, "Metahermeneutik, Application, hermeneutische Sprachbildung," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LXI (1964), 221-235, esp. 223-224. Kimmerle rejects Pannenberg's conclusions under the category of "Metahermeneutik" in that Pannenberg turns to universal history as the basis of understanding rather than taking the linguisticity of understanding seriously enough. Kimmerle, who also rejects a concern for present application as hindering understanding, prefers to speak of understanding in terms of hermeneutical building of language and of history as the development of language. This poses the question of language, its subject matter, and hermeneutic, as well as the question of the understanding of reality. Pannenberg and Kimmerle are agreed in rejecting an ontology of understanding, which Kimmerle sees in the hermeneutical discussion associated with Heidegger. Cf. also Gerhard Ebeling, Wort und Glaube, p. 333, where he speaks of "Fundamental-ontologie als Hermeneutik" in dependence on Heidegger. On the other hand, Pannenberg and Kimmerle differ on the question of the relation between language and its subject matter and on whether understanding involves language or the subject matter expressed in language.

same time makes the historical difference between the text and interpreter constitutive for the structure of understanding with his concept of this process as a merging of horizons.¹⁰⁹

Pannenberg argues that this conception of the process of understanding as the projection of ever broader horizons embracing the prior horizons of the text and interpreter moves in the direction of a total understanding of reality, and that the only adequate concept of reality corresponding to the hermeneutical task is the concept of reality as history. He thinks that Gadamer attempts to avoid such a projection of a total understanding of reality as history by the consideration of the linguistic character of understanding. Pannenberg agrees that the process of understanding is essentially a linguistic process in which language is the means of understanding so that the process of understanding takes place in the subject matter coming to expression in language.¹¹⁰ However, while Gadamer separates the linguistic character

¹⁰⁹W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 105-109. Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 275-283, for his discussion of "die hermeneutische Bedeutung des Zeitabstandes," and pp. 284-290, for the development of the concept of "horizon" and its significance for hermeneutic. Cf. the discussion of the process of the merging of horizons, supra, pp. 27-29.

¹¹⁰W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 110-115, esp. 111. In the process of understanding, the broader horizon must be stated in language. This emphasis on understanding as taking place only in language makes it clear that history as meaningful history--and hence as always coupled with understanding--cannot be separated from language or from its meaning coming to expression in language. Theologically this means that history and the kerygma should be regarded as essentially belonging together so that it would be meaningless to speak of the meaning

of understanding from language as statement, for statements conceal the unspoken horizon of meaning of that which is to be said,¹¹¹

Pannenberg argues that the character of language as statement is the basis of understanding and that Gadamer is inconsistent when he devalues this aspect of language.¹¹² While every spoken word has "einen unendlichen ungesagten Sinnhintergrund," this is accessible only through statements in language.

Der implizierte, ungesagte Sinnhorizont wird dem Verstehen nur von der Aussage her zugänglich, nicht etwa ohne sie. Und zweitens kann von der Aussage her die Einheit des Sinnhintergrundes nur dadurch dem Ausleger zu klarem Bewusstsein kommen, dass sie nun auch ihrerseits Inhalt von Aussagen wird.¹¹³

In this way, the consideration of the linguistic character of herme-

of the Christ event as something independent of its coming to expression in the language of the kerygma. It is questionable whether Pannenberg has brought this relation between history and kerygma to expression in an adequately consistent way. On the other hand, in view of this essential interrelation between history and language in Pannenberg's understanding of history, Kimmerle's criticism does not present the alternatives in a way that is entirely correct when he says, "Es ist nicht so, wie Pannenberg meint, dass für den Verstehenden hinter der Sprache die Geschichte sichtbar wird, sondern diese wird für ihn gerade in der Sprache, als Sprachentwicklung sichtbar." Heinz Kimmerle, "Metahermeneutik, Application, hermeneutische Sprachbildung," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LXI (1964), 233; cf. pp. 223-226, for his discussion of Pannenberg's hermeneutic. While Pannenberg does not separate history from language or from the process of language building, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 111-112, he would insist that history or reality cannot be reduced to language. He understands language as statement and as essentially related to its subject matter.

¹¹¹H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, pp. 444-445, esp. p. 421.

¹¹²W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 112-115.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 113. This emphasis on language as statement corre-

neutic leads back to the understanding of the subject matter that comes to expression in language. This subject matter itself is not timeless and unchanging in distinction from its formulation in language. The subject matter is also changing and historically conditioned.¹¹⁴ Hence, the unspoken horizon of meaning of the text is a historically conditioned horizon, which is different from that of the interpreter. This, then, leads back to the concept of understanding as the merging of horizons and to the question of the broadest horizon and of a concept of the whole of reality.

In this way, Pannenberg argues that Gadamer's concept of understanding points in the direction of a concept of the whole of reality and, hence, to the concept of universal history as the horizon within which understanding takes place--a direction which Gadamer avoids only on the basis of an abstract concept of language viewed independently of its character as statement.¹¹⁵ Understanding, for Pannenberg, takes

sponds to Pannenberg's emphasis that the kerygma has its character from its content--language is what it is only from its content.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 117: "Der Begriff der Wahrheit selbst ist wesentlich als Geschichte zu fassen. Das bedeutet keineswegs ihre relativistische Auflösung, wohl aber die Ummöglichkeit, die Einheit der Wahrheit als zeitlose Identität der jeweiligen Sache zu denken; sie ist nur als das Ganze eines Geschichtsverlaufes zu erfassen." In view of the historical character of the subject matter, understanding requires a projection of a history of the subject matter that relates the perspective of the text to that of the interpreter. This again tends to the projection of a total conception of history in that all aspects of human thought are interwoven with all other aspects. Cf. ibid., pp. 117-118.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 120. Pannenberg points out that Gadamer wants to avoid such a concept because of the impossibility of appropriating

place within the projection of a concept of the whole of reality as history, in which the relation between the text and the interpreter is a historical one. This allows the text to stand in both its historical distance from and its historical connection with the present.

Nur eine Konzeption des die damalige mit der heutigen Situation und ihrem Zukunftshorizont tatsächlich verbindenden Geschichtsverlaufes kann den umfassenden Horizont bilden, im welchem der beschränkte Gegenwartshorizont des Auslegers und der historische Horizont des Textes verschmelzen; denn nur so bleiben im umgreifenden Horizont das Damalige und das Heutige in ihrer geschichtlichen Eigenart und Differenz gegeneinander erhalten, aber nun so, dass sie als Momente in die Einheit eines beide umgreifenden Geschichtszusammenhanges eingehen.¹¹⁶

Such a projection of a concept of universal history is itself not an unchanging, unhistorical projection of reality. It is modified by the continuing experience of history as well as by the continuing interpretation of texts that belong to the traditions out of which men live. This concept, as a historical concept, is itself modified and transformed in the process of understanding. In fact, it is just this provisional and questionable character of the present understanding of reality which is the basis of interest in transmitted texts, which may

Hegel's concept of history for our day, since we recognize the necessarily limited, finite character of all human thought, the openness of the future, and the importance of the contingent and of the uniquely individual in history (*ibid.*, pp. 110, 118). However, this does not mean that a concept of reality as universal history is no longer possible, even though Hegel's way of doing it is. For Pannenberg, a way out of the difficulty is provided by the recognition of the eschatological character of the New Testament, which suggests a concept of history based on the history of Jesus as an anticipation of the end of history (*ibid.*, p. 119).

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 116.

open up new possibilities for understanding reality.

In seiner Fraglichkeit ist das gegenwärtige Sachverständnis bezogen auf Überlieferung, angesichts einer offenen Zukunft. Das bedeutet, dass die Sache, um die es heute geht, nicht ohne Rücksicht auf früher dazu Gesagtes und Geschriebenes verstanden werden kann.¹¹⁷

The key for such a projection of reality as history, for Pannenberg, is that the end of history has been proleptically disclosed in the history of Jesus. The revelation of God in Jesus is the all-embracing horizon and critical norm of an understanding of reality as history. The particular understanding of the meaning of that which God has done in Christ is then the horizon that is modified and is expanded by both the continuing experience of new things in history and the continuing interpretation of the Biblical texts and Christian tradition. The history of Jesus provides the critical norm for this process, and from the continued involvement with the history of Jesus and the Biblical texts new possibilities of understanding are continually opened in relation to the present experience of reality. This does not mean that the way in which we see the history of Jesus is constant. This also is determined by our standpoint within the history of traditions.¹¹⁸

The most extensive example of Pannenberg's use of his hermeneu-

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 119.

¹¹⁸For the relation between theology, the present experience of reality, tradition, and the history of Jesus, cf. the discussion in W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 90-99.

tic is in his discussion of Christology.¹¹⁹ He interprets the ministry and fate of Jesus in relation to a conception of reality as history in which the full revelation of God occurs at the end of history in the resurrection of the dead. He sees this as the historical context in which the Christ event in fact occurred and was understood as the decisive eschatological act of God, in the light of the Old Testament and Jewish apocalyptic. From this standpoint, he interprets the rise and meaning of Christological statements in the early church and also in the later history of the church. They have their ground in the character of the Christ event as God's eschatological revelation so that we can only know or speak about God as he was present for us in Jesus Christ. These Christological statements have their meaning and their criterion in their connection with the meaning of the history of Jesus in its historical context. They also must be understood in their relation to the present in terms of the extent to which they can express something about the meaning of the Christ event in the present situation with its understanding of reality. This can be done only when these Christological statements are seen in their historical relation to the history of Jesus and to the present. Within this overarching historical framework, Pannenberg critically evaluates and interprets the Christological conceptions in the history of the church.

¹¹⁹W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie. When Pannenberg says in the introduction, "Das theologische Recht der geschichtstheologischen Fragestellung hängt entscheidend an dem mit ihr verbundenen Christusverständnis" (p. 9), this means that one decisive criterion of the adequacy of his theology is the adequacy of its hermeneutical function in interpreting the Christological tradition.

The way in which Pannenberg deals with the problem of hermeneutic corresponds to the basic structure of the rest of his theology. Just as the Christ event or Christology is the ground for understanding history so that history has its meaning only in its relation to this event, so also Christology provides the ultimate horizon for the process of understanding. The hermeneutical problem falls within the horizon of Pannenberg's conception of reality as history and is an integral aspect of it, although hermeneutic itself cannot be the ultimate horizon for theological or philosophical thought. This also means that Pannenberg's entire theological conception itself has hermeneutical significance.¹²⁰

¹²⁰Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte (2nd ed.), p. 139.

CHAPTER IV

REVELATION IN HISTORY

Pannenberg's programmatic statement that "Geschichte ist der umfassendste Horizont christlicher Theologie"¹ is an echo of Gerhard von Rad's earlier programmatic statement that "das Alte Testament ist ein Geschichtsbuch."² Von Rad's Theologie des Alten Testaments³ brought this program to expression by working out the relation between Israel's theological traditions and the course of her history. This provides the background for the Pannenberg circle's understanding of the history in which God reveals himself as involving the interaction between events and traditions or between events and meaning.⁴ It is

¹W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 218.

²G. von Rad, "Typologische Auslegung des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 23.

³Vols. I and II (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957-1960). Von Rad traces the process of interpretation and reinterpretation of the historic traditions of the people of Israel in the changing situations of the continuing process of Israel's history. This means that the areas of Old Testament introduction, the history of Israel, and Old Testament theology are all interrelated with each other (cf. Theologie des Alten Testaments, I, 7-9).

⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad, eds. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961), pp. 129-140; R. Rendtorff, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40; idem, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 81-94. For the relation between the Pannenberg circle and G. von Rad, cf. supra, pp. 6-12.

this understanding of history as the revelation of God which must now be illustrated. First, this will involve a discussion of the revelation of God in the history of Israel, dealing especially with Israel's early traditions, the prophetic movement, and the development of Jewish apocalyptic. Second, it will involve a discussion of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, dealing with the history of Jesus and its relation to Christology and soteriology.

I. REVELATION IN THE HISTORY OF ISRAEL

1. Pannenberg thinks that the presupposition for Israel's consciousness of history lay in her concept of God as producing new and unforeseen things.⁵ This does not assume a static, unchanging concept of God in Israel's history. The understanding of God is itself modified and transformed in the continuing experience of history as the encounter of man by God. In this history, an understanding of God corresponding to his revelation emerges. God's revelation is not a special revelation at the beginning of Israel's history that sharply distinguishes her from her religious environment. It is only through the subsequent history that God discloses himself and that Israel's religion becomes more and more distinctive. Ultimately it is only at the end of history, which has occurred proleptically in the fate of Jesus, that God is fully revealed.⁶

⁵W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 220.

⁶Ibid., pp. 269-270; idem, "Dogmatische Thesen zur Lehre von

The beginning of Israel's history and of her understanding of God is interwoven with the history and religious thought world of the ancient Near East. Israel's religion is not a revealed religion in the sense that her understanding of God was given by God from the beginning.⁷ While it is difficult to say much about the pre-history of Israel's understanding of God, some of the roots out of which this understanding grew are apparent. One was the God of the fathers in the religion of the Patriarchs.⁸ The God of the fathers was associated with a particular group of people whom he had elected. Essential elements of this religion were "die göttlichen Weisungen und Zusagen,"

der Offenbarung," Offenbarung als Geschichte (Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1; 3rd ed., 1963; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), pp. 95-98, 103-106; also the discussion of the relation between language and revelation, idem, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, eds. Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 96-115.

⁷Cf. Klaus Koch, "Der Tod des Religionsstifters: Erwägungen über das Verhältnis Israels zur Geschichte der altorientalischen Religionen," Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 100-123; W. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," which is to be published in Theology as History, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New Frontiers in Theology, III; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers). Cf. the criticism of Koch's article by Friedrich Baumgärtel, "Der Tod des Religionsstifters," Kerygma und Dogma, IX (1963), 223-233. Baumgärtel argues that Israel's religion is a religion of revelation, because her understanding of God is markedly different from the religious environment from the beginning. For example, Yahweh has no female companion.

⁸Cf. Albrecht Alt, "Der Gott der Väter," Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel, I (2nd ed., 1959; München: Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1953), 1-78; also Victor Maag, "Der Hirte Israels," Schweizerische theologische Umschau, XXVIII (1958), 2-28; idem, "Malkût Jhwh," Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, VII (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), 129-153; cf. also R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 624-626.

which were centered in the guidance and protection of the people by their God.⁹ In Canaan, this tradition merged with the Canaanite high God El, perhaps the creator and the king of the gods,¹⁰ who was represented under different names in various holy places.¹¹ Other roots of Israel's understanding of God lay in the Kenite deity Yahweh and in the God who led some of the people out of captivity in Egypt. As the various groups came together in Canaan and united in the amphictyony, these various strands merged to form Israel's understanding of God, which continued to develop in Israel's continuing experience of God's work in history. The merging of these various religious traditions was one of the most significant aspects of the early history of Israel.

Just as Israel's understanding of God involved the merging of various strands of tradition, so also her picture of her early history

⁹Ibid., p. 625; also A. Alt, Kleine Schriften, I, 66; V. Maag, "Malkût Jhwh," Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, VII, 140.

¹⁰Exactly how El should be understood is not entirely clear. Cf. Otto Eissfeldt, El im ugaritischen Pantheon (Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, 98, 4; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1951); idem, "El and Yahweh," Journal of Semitic Studies, I (1956), 25-37; idem, "El," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), 413-414; idem, "Jahwe, der Gott der Väter," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 481-490. Eissfeldt thinks that the God of promise in the Patriarchal narratives is El, and that the previous gods that the Patriarchs worshiped were eliminated. "El and Jahweh," Journal of Semitic Studies, I (1956) 35-36; "Jahwe, der Gott der Väter," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 487-488. Cf. also, Marvin Pope, El in the Ugaritic Texts (Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, II; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955); Frank Moore Cross, Jr., "Yahweh and the God of the Patriarchs," Harvard Theological Review, LVI (1963), 225-259.

¹¹Cf. O. Eissfeldt, "Jahwe der Gott der Väter," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 486.

is the result of a long process in which various traditions were brought together, combined, and reworked. Gerhard von Rad has shown that these traditions came together around the outline given by a brief historical credo, as is seen in Deuteronomy 26:5-9, recounting the Exodus and the conquest of the land as the work of God.¹² Two other large blocks of traditions, in addition to the primeval history, were also combined with this: the traditions of the Patriarchs and the Sinai tradition.¹³ The most important aspect of the history of the various groups that came together to form the Israelite amphictyony was not the external course of their history but the traditions that they brought with them. The historic process by which these groups came together to form the amphictyony came to expression in the combination and reinterpretation of the older traditions into the picture of the history of the one Israel. Indeed, the historian can recon-

¹²G. von Rad, "Das formgeschichtliche Problem des Hexateuch," Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament (Theologische Bücherei, 8; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959), 9-86. Cf. the similar passages in Deut. 6:20-24; Josh. 24:2b-13; I Sam. 12:8; Ps. 105; 135; 136; 78 (which includes the period up to the time of the kingdom); Neh. 9:6-37 (which includes Sinai for the first time, and continues to Nehemiah's own time). Cf. also G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, I, 127-134. Cf. the detailed analysis in Martin Noth, Überlieferungsgeschichte des Pentateuch (2nd ed., 1960, reprinted photomechanically by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt; Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1948). In distinction from von Rad, Noth argues that the various themes in the credo were also originally independent (*ibid.*, pp. 48-67).

¹³Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 169-287; *idem*, Gesammelte Studien, pp. 20-33, 58-70; Rolf Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 84-85. The independence of the Sinai and the Exodus traditions continues to be disputed. Cf. most recently, Walter Beyerlin, Herkunft und Geschichte der ältesten Sinaitraditionen (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961).

struct certain aspects of the course of the pre-history of Israel by analyzing the development of her traditions. These traditions not only reflect the early history of Israel in which the various groups came together to form a unity; the traditions themselves were a historic force, molding a consciousness of unity among the tribes, thus providing the presupposition for the kingdom. In this way, the external events of Israel's early history and her traditions are closely inter-related and interact with each other.¹⁴ This process of the interpretation of these traditions in relation to the continuing course of the history of Israel is itself a historic event and belongs to the historic significance of the traditions and of the events lying behind them, for the significance of an event for the future is a part of its meaning as a historic event.¹⁵ It is this total complex involving both

¹⁴R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 84-88. "Überall zeigt sich, dass die Entstehung und Weiterbildung der Überlieferungen ein wesentlicher Bestandteil der Geschichte Israels ist; ja, vielfach sind hier die eigentlich geschichtswirksamen Vorgänge zu erkennen, die über den Wechsel der politischen Verhältnisse hinaus die Geschichte Israels bestimmen" (*ibid.*, p. 88). Cf. also, *idem*, "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40.

¹⁵R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, pp. 88-90. A good illustration of this relation between events and language is given by James M. Robinson, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, ed. Bernhard W. Anderson (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 124-158, esp. pp. 130-150 [German: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 113-141, esp. 118-134]. He discusses the Eurachoth in the Old Testament. The formula "blessed be God who has . . ." followed by a brief statement of what God has done was already a fixed formula in J and can be assumed to go back some time before that. "The material represented within the context of

events and their meaning, including their meaning for the ensuing course of history, that is the history in which God works to reveal himself.¹⁶

This process of combining and reinterpreting Israel's traditions also had other results. First, the accent shifted from particular events, remembered in particular traditions or cultic celebrations,¹⁷

these formulae is historical, not simply in that it may preserve historical fragments of a factual kind, but primarily in that the cast given the material by these formulae corresponds to the cast which the history had as it was experienced when it happened; for the formulae arose as part of the original historical events when they happened. Thus the formulae themselves both are a part of the history that happened and preserve the historical mode in which the history happened. But the material brought together in terms of these formulae also presents this history in its historicness. The formulae themselves were called forth and molded by that history and are thus themselves one way in which that history was historic, i.e., survived as a continuing influence" (*ibid.*, p. 134). These formulae in turn provide the linguistic context within which events continue to be experienced meaningfully as the work of God (*ibid.*, pp. 146-150).

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 90, 93-94. "Die Geschichte Israels vollzieht sich in den äusseren Vorgängen, die herkömmlicherweise Gegenstand der historisch-kritischen Geschichtsforschung sind, und in den vielfältigen und vielschichtigen inneren Vorgängen, die wir in dem Begriff der Überlieferung zusammenfassen. Erst das Gesamtbild, das sich aus beiden ergibt, zeigt im vollen Sinne Israels Geschichte" (*ibid.*, pp. 93-94).

¹⁷To the historical content of Israel's cultic festivals, which she took over from Canaan, in which the saving events of the past were actualized in the present, cf. M. Noth, "Die Vergegenwärtigung des Alten Testaments in der Verkündigung," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 6-17, reprinted in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik, ed. Claus Westermann (Theologische Bücherei, 11; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960), pp. 54-68; R. Rendtorff, "Der Kultus im Alten Israel," Jahrbuch für Liturgik und Hymnologie, II (1956), 1-21; *idem*, "Kult, Mythos und Geschichte im Alten Israel," Sammlung und Sendung: Vom Auftrag der Kirche in der Welt: Eine Festgabe für D. Heinrich Rendtorff zu seinem 70. Geburtstag am 9. April 1958, eds. Joachim Heubach and Heinrich-Hermann Ulrich (Berlin: Christlicher Zeitschriftenverlag, 1958), pp. 121-129; G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 115-118.

to the whole of this history as God's saving and revelatory work.¹⁸

Second, Israel's consciousness of history emerged in this process of combining and reinterpreting her traditions. "In der Verknüpfung und Zusammenordnung der Traditionen wird das Entstehen des Geschichtsbewusstseins sichtbar, ja mehr: es vollzieht sich darin."¹⁹ Third, this consciousness of history and its understanding as the work of God made it possible to understand the ordinary course of history as being under the guidance of God (as in Gen. 37-50--a story--; II Sam. 6-I Ki. 2). Even though the events were understood as the work of God, it was possible to focus the attention on the causal relations of human actions in writing history in an almost secular way.²⁰ This understanding of the ordinary course of history as the work of God was, in turn, a basic presupposition for the prophetic movement and its proclamation of history as God's work in which he judges or saves his people.

2. The prophetic proclamation had its roots in Israel's historic traditions, which proclaimed the saving acts of God in which he elected Israel and made her his people. The prophet's proclamation

¹⁸Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 91-92. Compare Ex. 14:31 with Ex. 6:2-8; Deut. 4:37-40; 7:7-11.

¹⁹R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, p. 92, also pp. 91-92; cf. G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 112-125.

²⁰Cf., e.g., R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 632-637; also G. von Rad, "Der Anfang der Geschichtsschreibung im alten Israel," Gesammelte Studien, pp. 148-188.

was essentially a reinterpretation of these traditions in their new historical situation in terms of God's judgment and salvation for Israel in history.²¹ The messages of the different prophets were rooted in different traditions. For example, the message of Amos and of Hosea was primarily an interpretation of the Exodus tradition, while Isaiah's was rooted in the Zion and Davidic traditions. In the seventh century and later these traditions became more mixed. The prophetic movement also presupposed the consciousness of history and the understanding of the ordinary course of history as the work of God, which arose in the development of Israel's traditions.

While the precise origins of the prophetic movement in Israel are more or less obscure,²² it is clear that Israel's traditions were oriented to the promise of God and thus to the future from the beginning. While these traditions also involved the judgment of God on sin, the accent tended to be on the grace of God and the fulfillment of his promises so that it was possible for the people to look back on the past work of God as a guarantee of security for the future. The prophets reversed this by speaking of God's judgment on Israel for her

²¹ Cf. esp. G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments II, 139-313, esp. 186-198, 275-290.

²² Cf. M. Noth, "Geschichte und Gotteswort im Alten Testament," Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament (Theologische Bücherei, 6; 2nd ed., 1960; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957), pp. 230-247; R. Meyer, "Propheten II. In Israel A. Bis auf Amos," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961), 613-618; R. Rendtorff, "Erwägungen zur Frühgeschichte des Prophetentums in Israel," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 145-167.

sins, which was necessary precisely because God had elected them in the past (Am. 3:1-2), and of a new saving act of God that lay in the future beyond his judgment. The prophets reoriented the understanding of the work of God in history to the future, which moved into the center of their proclamation.²³

In the prophetic movement, what was understood as the scope of God's activity in history continued to expand. First, they proclaimed the work of God in the history of the nations of the Near East, even in events that did not directly involve Israel.²⁴ The invading nations or rulers of the nations were understood as the agents of God to accomplish his will (Is. 10:5-19; 44:24-45:13). For Deutero-Isaiah, God alone is the one who directs the course of history (Is. 41:2-4, 21-29). Second, the message of the prophets took on an eschatological character.²⁵ The prophets used the traditions of Israel to announce the judgment of God in which he breaks off the relation with Israel that

²³For the importance of the orientation of Israel's traditions to the future, esp. with the beginning of the prophetic movement, cf. W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 139/140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 90-95.

²⁴E.g., Am. 9:7-8; Is. 2:2-4; 20:1-6; Jer. 43:8-13; Ezek. 26:7-14; 29:17-20. G. von Rad suggests that the prophets did not yet achieve an understanding of universal history or world history as the work of God, since their interest was primarily for Israel. This was also true of Deutero-Isaiah. G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 120-121, 195; cf. R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1963), 639.

²⁵To the eschatological understanding of history in the prophets, G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 125-132; cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, 92, 96.

he established through his former saving events (Hos. 1:8-9; 11:5-7; Am. 7:10-17; 8:11-12; Is. 5:1-7). Therefore, Israel's relation with God and her salvation would no longer be determined by the previous saving acts of God in her history but only by God's new saving work in the future.²⁶ This new saving work of God was described in analogy with the old but in such a way that it exceeds the old (Is. 9:1-7; 11:1-9; Hos. 1:10-2:1; 2:14-23; Is. 43:16-19; Ezek. 11:17, 19-20; Jer. 31:31-34). Third, the fact that the prophets were interpreters of Israel's old traditions in relation to the present historical situation and that they proclaimed a new saving act of God in the future that would be decisive for Israel's relation to him means that the particular events that they announced were seen and were important within the horizon of a broader, more embracing view of the work of God in history.²⁷

One of the problems that emerges clearly in the prophetic movement is that of the relation between word and history. Rolf Rendtorff argues that the basic understanding of the relation between word and history in the Old Testament is that the word of promise or the word of judgment becomes event in history in the sense that it is ful-

²⁶G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 188-196, 284.

²⁷R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 637-646; M. Noth, Gesammelte Studien, 241-247; also, Hans Walter Wolff, "Das Geschichtsverständnis der alttestamentlichen Prophetie," Evangelische Theologie, XX (1960), 218-235, reprinted in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik, pp. 319-340.

filled.²⁸ In the difficult discussion with the false prophets, the fulfillment of the word was one of the criteria that was used (Deut. 18:21-22; I Ki. 22:28; Jer. 28:9). There are actually only a few places where an understanding of the nature of the word of God and its relation to history actually comes to expression in the prophets (Is. 9:7; 55:10-11; Jer. 5:14; 23:29). This reflects the common Near Eastern concept of the word of God as a power filled word in the sense that it produces what it says:

Dabei wird vorausgesetzt, dass das Wort im Geschehen voll zur Wirkung kommt, ja man könnte fast sagen: dass es das Geschehen hervorbringt. Es werden also Wort und Geschehen in einem unmittelbaren Zusammenhang gesehen.²⁹

The difficulty with this understanding of the prophetic word is that many of these words in fact remained unfulfilled. Rendtorff tries to handle this problem by arguing that the particular prophetic word is not to be taken by itself, but it is to be seen within the context of the proclamation of the broader plan of God for history. He regards this as confirmed by the fact that after the Exile the emphasis in the prophetic proclamation gradually shifted from the proclamation of particular events to the proclamation of the plan of God for history. In other words, it is confirmed by the shift from the prophetic movement

²⁸R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evan-gelische Theologie, XXII (1963), 621-649; cf. W. Pannenberg, Offen-barung als Geschichte, p. 112.

²⁹R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evan-gelische Theologie, XXII (1963), 643; for his discussion of the proph-ets, pp. 637-646, and of the prophetic word theology, pp. 641-643; cf. G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 93-111.

to apocalyptic.³⁰ The problem is whether this is entirely adequate for understanding the prophetic message.³¹ There is another possibility for understanding the prophetic word as revelation within the program of the Pannenberg circle, since history is understood as the history of traditions, which includes both external events and understanding.

This may be seen in relation to the scope of the prophetic word. The content of the message of the prophets was the announcement of particular events as the work of God, which the prophets applied to particular people.³² Does this mean that the scope of their message was the history as such or that their intention was to show that this history was the work of God?³³ That history is the work of God was the common presupposition of the prophets and their hearers. The difference lay in the understanding of what God would do. This announcement of the work of God in history must be understood within the context of Israel's traditions. Within this context, the proclamation of the impending invasion, of the conquest of the land and the destruction of the kingdom, and of the exile was not simply the announcement of the external events in history as the work of God. It was the removal of those blessings God gave Israel in electing her to be his people. This

³⁰Ibid., pp. 643-646.

³¹Cf. supra, pp. 79-84.

³²E.g., G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 85-87; R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1963), 639.

³³Ibid., 338, 340; cf., however, Georg Fohrer, "Prophetie und Geschichte," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 481-500, esp. 495-499.

is clearly expressed by Hosea when he interprets the coming exile as a return to Egypt (Hos. 11:5-7), or when he interprets his message as the announcement that Israel is no longer God's people (Hos. 1:8-9). In its historical context, the prophetic word in its concrete content is the proclamation of the wrath and judgment of God on Israel for her sins. This judgment breaks off the relation he had established with her as his people. The judgment of God is the scope of the prophetic word when its significance is understood within its history of traditions context. This can be seen even more clearly in the prophetic words of promise or hope, where the events are proclaimed as the saving work of God by which he creates a new relation between himself and his people (Hos. 1:10-2:1; Jer. 31:31-34; Ezek. 11:19-20; 36:26-28; Is. 40-55). The promise of God in the prophetic proclamation qualifies the judgment of God by showing that this is not his ultimate will or intention for Israel (Hos. 11:8-9; Is. 28:21). Just as God's salvation or judgment is present to Israel in his concrete acts in history, so also the prophets announce his judgment or grace by speaking of what God will do in history. Certainly, the prophetic word cannot be understood as the proclamation of God's judgment or grace apart from its content, but its content gives it this meaning within its historical context. To isolate either aspect from the other would be an abstraction.

Such an understanding of the prophetic word itself as an event in history in which God discloses himself to men would be consistent with the Pannenberg circle's emphasis on revelation as history. If

history is not to be understood only as external political history but includes understanding, changes in understanding, and, thus, language, then the prophetic word should itself be understood as an event in history by means of which God encounters men. As with other events in history, the significance of the prophetic word must be understood in terms of its meaning for the people addressed in its history of traditions context. Within this context, the prophetic word must be understood as a historic event in which the judgment or grace of God is disclosed to his people and thus is made present to them. Perhaps the reason that the Pannenberg circle has not followed through this possibility that their program offers is because they tend to orient the question of the revelation of God primarily to the disclosure of his divinity or power and because of their interest in the transition from the prophetic movement to the apocalyptic projection of a picture of world history.³⁴ If the development of their concept of revelation were oriented to the works of God in history by which he makes himself known to men as his acts of judgment or salvation, the prophetic word, in which God's judgment or salvation is announced, could be understood more easily as revelation. In this way, their theological program could be carried out more adequately in understanding the word as a historic event in which God encounters men, disclosing himself to them.

The prophetic word, thus, should be regarded as a historic event

³⁴ Cf. the development in R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1963), 643-646, 649.

in which God encounters men in judgment and grace within the context of their traditions and world of thought. This proclamation in turn qualifies the way the ensuing history is experienced as the work of God in relation to men so that this is experienced meaningfully as his judgment or grace, or as his judgment qualified by his grace. Further, the words of the prophets themselves become a part of Israel's traditions and are interpreted and reinterpreted in the light of the continuing course of history and changing historical situations. In this way, they continue to influence history and to qualify the way it is experienced as meaningful history.

3. While the understanding of the scope of the work of God in history was broadened by the prophets, an understanding of world history or universal history first emerged in Jewish apocalyptic.³⁵ The precise origins of apocalyptic are not clear.³⁶ While apocalyptic shows some relations to prophetic eschatology, to the Qumran community, and to wisdom literature,³⁷ its roots probably lie with eschatologi-

³⁵Cf. G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 120-121. Albrecht Alt, however, thinks that Israel had an eschatological understanding of world history from a very early time, cf. A. Alt, "Die Deutung der Weltgeschichte im Alten Testament," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVI (1959), 129-137; cf. also Hans-Peter Müller, "Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung der biblischen Eschatologie," Vetus Testamentum, XIV (1964), 276-293.

³⁶Cf. esp. Paul Vielhauer, "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes, Einleitung," Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, II. Apostolisches und Verwandtes, eds. Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1964), 407-427, esp. 417-420.

³⁷Cf. esp. G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 314-321, esp. 319-321, where he argues that the roots of apocalyptic lie in the wisdom movement. The difficulty is that while there are many

cally oriented groups that opposed the theocracy and were driven more and more to assume the role of sects.³⁸ The Pannenberg circle regards apocalyptic as a development from the prophetic movement and its understanding of history and eschatology.³⁹ However, apocalyptic's pessimistic dualism and determinism separate it from the prophetic understanding of history.⁴⁰

The Pannenberg circle regards apocalyptic as a development beyond the prophetic movement in apocalyptic's understanding of history as world history and in its eschatology. The apocalyptic prophet was

points of contact with wisdom literature, the eschatological orientation of apocalyptic cannot be explained from the wisdom movement. Cf. P. Vielhauer, "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes," Neutestamentliche Apokryphon, II, 419-420.

³⁸Esp. Otto Plöger, Theokratie und Eschatologie (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 2; 2nd ed., 1962; Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1959); also, P. Vielhauer, "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes," Neutestamentliche Apokryphon, II, 420; also W. Pannenberg, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 19.

³⁹Cf., e.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 92, 96-97; Klaus Koch, "Spätisraelitisches Geschichtsdenken am Beispiel des Buches Daniel," Historische Zeitschrift, 193/1 (1961), 1-32, esp. 28-31; R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 643-646, 649; also, e.g., H.H. Rowley, The Relevance of Apocalyptic (New York: Harper, 1955); H. Ringgren, "Apokalyptik II. Jüdische Apokalyptik," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, I (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1957), 464-466; A. Alt, "Die Deutung der Weltgeschichte im Alten Testament," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVI (1959), esp. 137.

⁴⁰E.g., G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 314-321. Von Rad suggests that the apocalyptic view of history cannot be united with that of the prophets, and he asks whether apocalyptic does not represent a loss of history, since the contingency of events is eliminated (*ibid.*, pp. 316, 318-319). Also P. Vielhauer, "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes," Neutestamentliche Apokryphon, II, 418-419.

the recipient of a visionary revelation of the end of history and, hence, of God's plan for history.⁴¹ Thus, with the aid of mythological imagery and conceptions, they were able to present a picture of the unity of history by showing its periods to be a movement toward that end.⁴² For the first time, one has a conception of world history, which is projected from the standpoint of a proleptic revelation of the end of history.⁴³ The understanding of history in apocalyptic was largely a result of its eschatology. The prophets had proclaimed the decisive saving act of God for Israel as lying in the future beyond his judgment. In apocalyptic this eschatology is radicalized. The decisive revelation of God, in which he would disclose his glory and divinity, lay at the end of history in the eschatological judgment,

⁴¹E.g., Ulrich Wilckens, "Das Offenbarungsverständnis in der Geschichte des Urchristentums," Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 49-50; idem, "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der Erscheinung des Auferstandenen: Zur traditionsgeschichtlichen Analyse von 1. Kor. 15:1-11," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, eds. Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 84-86; to the discussion of the apocalyptic view of history, esp. Dietrich Rössler, Gesetz und Geschichte: Untersuchungen zur Theologie der jüdischen Apokalyptik und der pharisäischen Orthodoxie (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 3; Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1960), esp. pp. 55-70; cf. also W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 96-97.

⁴²E.g., M. Noth, "Das Geschichtsverständnis der alttestamentlichen Apokalyptik," Gesammelte Studien, pp. 264-271; cf. K. Koch, "Spätisraelitisches Geschichtsdenken," Historische Zeitschrift, 193/1 (1961), 1-32; also D. Rössler, Gesetz und Geschichte, pp. 57-58.

⁴³This in turn provides the starting point for the concept of world history in the western world. Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, "Geschichte und Geschichtsauffassung III. Geschichtsphilosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 1491; K. Koch, "Spätisraelitisches Geschichtsdenken," Historische Zeitschrift, 193/1 (1961), 1-3.

when God would destroy all that opposed him and would bless those who had been faithful to him with eternal life in the resurrection of the dead. For Pannenberg, this does not mean only the destruction of history, but it also means the fulfillment of history. The resurrection of the dead in which God gives men community with himself is the gift of the fulfillment of man's existence for which man has searched in his history. The apocalyptic expectation of the resurrection of the dead and the new age has essentially to do with man becoming truly human, for what man is he is only in his relation to God.⁴⁴

The question is, however, whether apocalyptic is essentially interested in world history as the revelation of God, or whether it represents a basically unhistorical world of thought in view of its eschatology.⁴⁵ This problem is apparent in the pessimistic dualism and the determinism of apocalyptic. One of the characteristic aspects of apocalyptic is its dualistic world view, which comes to expression in the concept of the two ages: the present evil age, dominated by sin, and the new age, when God's rule will be established. While this dual-

⁴⁴E.g., K. Koch, "Spätisraelitisches Geschichtsdenken," Historische Zeitschrift, 193/1 (1961), 25-28; W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch?

⁴⁵D. Rössler, Gesetz und Geschichte, argues that apocalyptic remains essentially interested in history as the work of God in distinction to Pharisaical Judaism. Cf. P. Vielhauer, "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes," Neutestamentliche Apokryphen, II, 416, where he suggests that Rössler can maintain the "curious" thesis that the essential interest of apocalyptic is in history only by ignoring the eschatology and imminent expectation of apocalyptic. Cf. also G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, II, 317-319, where he suggests that apocalyptic represents basically unhistorical thinking in its elimination of the contingency of history.

ism is modified by the fact that both ages are created by God (IV Ezra 7:50; 8:1) and by the fact that God also governs the course of the present age, the new age can only come as a radical end to history in which the present evil age is destroyed.⁴⁶ In the present age, God's righteousness and his salvation for his people are hidden so that they can be described only from the standpoint of the end of history when they will be revealed. Then the significance of the present events will be seen in their relation to God's eschatological judgment. In this world, the life of God's faithful people is characterized by suffering at the hands of the sinful world.⁴⁷ In this situation, the purpose of apocalyptic is to exhort the suffering people to faithfulness to God in the present evil age in view of the imminence of the end of history in which their salvation will be manifested. This apocalyptic eschatology raises the question as to whether it is meaningful to speak of the encounter of man by God in history. In distinction from the Old Testament prophets who saw history as the judgment of God on sin, the apocalyptic prophet points away from the present experience of history to God's revelation at the end of history. In view of the end of history they can only exhort God's people to repentance and to faithfulness in this world.

The determinism of apocalyptic is closely related to its pessi-

⁴⁶E.g., R. Eultmann, Geschichte und Eschatologie (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), pp. 30-36, esp. p. 35; P. Vielhauer, "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes," Neutestamentliche Apokryphon, II, 412-415.

⁴⁷E.g., D. Rössler, Gesetz und Geschichte, pp. 77-100.

mistic dualism. Apocalyptic seeks to strengthen faith in the present difficult times by unveiling the divine secret, namely, God's plan for history. This revelation discloses the fact that the present is the last stage of history before its imminent end in which God will save his faithful people and destroy evil. Its interest is essentially in eschatology rather than history. It gives a schematic overview of the periods of history in the form of vaticinia ex eventu in order to show that history has proceeded according to God's plan and, therefore, that it will proceed to its imminent end according to the revealed plan of God.⁴⁸ This determinism of apocalyptic sacrifices the contingency of history that is so important for Pannenberg, for if history proceeds according to a revealable plan, then the future is fixed and is no longer open for new and unforeseen things.

In view of its interest in eschatology rather than history, its pessimistic dualism, and its deterministic view of history, it is questionable whether Pannenberg can regard the apocalyptic understanding of history as adequate. While there are certain impulses to a material criticism of apocalyptic on the part of the Pannenberg circle,⁴⁹ the

⁴⁸E.g., H. Ringgren, "Apokalyptik II. Jüdische Apokalyptik," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, I (3rd ed., 1958), 465; Paul Vielhauer, "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes," Neutestamentliche Apokryphon, II, 410-411, 414-417. U. Wilckens' attempt to defend the contingency of history in apocalyptic (Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 49-50) is not convincing.

⁴⁹W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 236-237; U. Wilckens, "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 86, 88, n. 80. Cf. infra, pp. 173-180.

failure to carry through a critical discussion of apocalyptic in the light of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ can only lead to confusion and misunderstanding.

II. REVELATION IN JESUS CHRIST

The Pannenberg circle regards the historical world of thought within which the revelation of God in Jesus Christ took place primarily as that of first century Jewish apocalyptic. Even though this revelation involved a breaking of the apocalyptic world of thought, the history of Jesus, nevertheless, must be understood as the revelation of God within the horizon of the conceptions and expectations of Jewish apocalyptic. It is necessary to examine the way the Pannenberg circle understands the ministry, the resurrection, and the cross of Jesus within this horizon as the eschatological revelation of God in which he has acted decisively for man's salvation.

1. Jesus' proclamation was characterized by the announcement of the imminence of the kingdom of God.⁵⁰ The one thing that was deci-

⁵⁰To the ministry of Jesus, cf., e.g., Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus (2nd ed., 1951; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1926); idem, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), pp. 1-34; Günther Bornkamm, Jesus von Nazareth (6th ed., 1963; W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1956); Hans Conzelmann, "Jesus Christus," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, III (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959), 619-653; also Werner Georg Kümmel, "Die Naherwartung in der Verkündigung Jesu," Zeit und Geschichte: Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 30. Geburtstag, ed. Erich Dinkler (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1964), pp. 31-46; U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 50-63; W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), pp. 47-61, 218-250. The following discussion will basically present the position of the Pannenberg circle.

sive for the existence of men was the nearness of God and his kingdom. However, in distinction from John the Baptist, who called men to repentance in hope of salvation in view of the imminent judgment of God, for Jesus, the nearness of God meant the proclamation of the presence of God's eschatological salvation to men in their concrete existence in this world.⁵¹ This is expressed in the parables as well as in the emphasis on the goodness of God as Father. The healing miracles themselves were a part of Jesus' proclamation of the presence of God's salvation in view of the nearness of the kingdom of God. Since the future salvation was already present in the proclamation of Jesus, Jesus did not retreat into the wilderness but announced God's salvation to men where they were in their daily existence in the world. The nearness of God's kingdom and of his salvation meant that this was the only decisive factor in man's relation to God. Hence, many other elements of the Jewish traditions, like the emphasis on the law, receded into the background.⁵² Thus, Jesus went to tax collectors and sinners, as well as to Pharisees, and announced God's forgiveness to them, making them participants in God's eschatological salvation and celebrating the

⁵¹E.g., U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 55-56; W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 234-239; cf. Ernst Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964), 99-100, 107-110.

⁵²E.g., W. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," to be published in Theology as History, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New Frontiers in Theology, III; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers); U. Wilckens, "Review: Herbert Braun, Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 665-666.

eschatological meal with them.⁵³ The previous character of a man's life no longer determined his relation to God's kingdom. The nearness of God's kingdom and the forgiving love of God also provided the central orientation for Jesus' call for men to live in a way that corresponded to God's love.

Since the proclamation of Jesus was centered in the imminence of God's kingdom, which was the only decisive thing for man's salvation, a decision with regard to Jesus' message was also a decision with regard to the kingdom of God, for Jesus' proclamation was the last sign before the coming of the kingdom. Pannenberg sees this expressed above all in the saying: "Everyone who acknowledges me before men, the Son of Man also will acknowledge before the angels of God; but he who denies me before men will be denied before the angels of God" (Lk. 12:8-9; also Mt. 10:32-33; Mk. 8:38 and Lk. 9:26).⁵⁴ Pannenberg sees both the

⁵³E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 234-235; idem, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," to be published in Theology as History. For the meal fellowship with Jesus in the sense of participation in God's eschatological salvation, cf. also Ernst Fuchs, Das urchristliche Sakramentsverständnis (Bad Cannstatt: R. Möllerschön Verlag, 1958), esp. pp. 37-41.

⁵⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 53-57, esp. n. 22; U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 56-58. The question of the authenticity of the future Son of Man sayings is also a much debated one at present. Among those maintaining their authenticity, cf. R. Bultmann, Die Geschichte der Synoptischen Tradition (4th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1958), pp. 135, 163; Heinz Eduard Tödt, Der Menschensohn in der synoptischen Überlieferung (2nd ed., 1963; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1959), esp. pp. 37-42, 50-56, 83-84, as well as his discussion of P. Vielhauer on pp. 298-316; Ferdinand Hahn, Christologische Hoheitstitel: Ihre Geschichte im frühen Christentum (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, 83; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 23-32, and esp. pp. 32-36. On the other hand, the

importance of one's relation to Jesus and his proclamation as the criterion of one's salvation or rejection in the future judgment and the structure of Jesus' proclamation of salvation as the anticipation of the future eschatological judgment of God reflected in this statement. He speaks of this as the proleptic structure of the claim of Jesus.⁵⁵ As with the prophetic word and the apocalyptic revelation, Jesus' claim is held out to its historical verification by God. It is not self-

authenticity of these sayings is disputed from a variety of sides. Cf. Ernst Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, I (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960), 211; idem, "Sätze heiligen Rechtes im Neuen Testament," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964), 69-82, esp. 78-79; Paul Vielhauer, "Gottesreich und Menschensohn in der Verkündigung Jesu," Festschrift für Günther Dehn, ed. W. Schneemelcher (Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1957), pp. 51-79; idem, "Jesus und der Menschensohn: Zur Diskussion mit Heinz Eduard Tödt und Eduard Schweizer," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 133-177; Hans Conzelmann, "Jesus Christus," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, III (3rd ed., 1959), 360-361; Ernst Haenchen, "Die Komposition von Mk. VIII:27-IX:1," Novum Testamentum, VI (1963), 81-109; for a somewhat different approach, cf. also Eduard Schweizer, "Der Menschensohn: Zur eschatologischen Erwartung Jesu," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, L (1959), 185-209; idem, "The Son of Man," Journal of Biblical Literature, LXXIX (1960), 119-129. While Pannenberg argues that it is difficult to understand this saying as arising in the early church as a saying of Jesus (Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 53, n. 22), the weight of the argumentation seems to favor its inauthenticity.

⁵⁵E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 47-61, esp. p. 55: "Das Verhalten der Menschen jetzt zu Jesus ist das Kriterium ihres Bestehens oder Nichtbestehens im künftigen Gericht. Hier wird derselbe Anspruch Jesu sichtbar, der in dem 'ich aber sage euch' der Bergpredigt, in der Feier des eschatologischen Mahles mit Zöllnern und Sündern zum Ausdruck kam, wie auch in der Betonung der Gegenwart des Heils im Ganzen der Botschaft und des Wirkens Jesu. Diese Gegenwart des Heils wird durch den jetzt behandelten Spruch in ihrer genauen Struktur sichtbar, nämlich als Vorwegnahme der künftigen Entscheidung. Das ist die proleptische Struktur des Anspruchs Jesu." Cf. also W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 112, 147; U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 58-62.

validating.⁵⁶ This means that faith in the proclamation of Jesus, or following Jesus, then, had the character of a proleptic anticipation of the fulfillment of Jesus' word or its confirmation in the eschatological judgment.⁵⁷ Pannenberg regards the resurrection of Jesus as God's confirmation of Jesus' proclamation.⁵⁸

Jesus' proclamation of the nearness of God and his kingdom presupposes a knowledge of God and the expectation of the kingdom of God. The distinctive aspect was his proclamation of the immediate nearness of God and, thus, of the presence of God's salvation, which was depend-

⁵⁶W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 57: "Der Anspruch Jesu stimmt--bei allen Unterschieden--auch darin mit apokalyptisch-prophetischen Inspirationen überein, dass er künftiger Bewährung bedurfte. Er war ebensowenig wie prophetische Worte oder apokalyptische Visionen schon aus sich selbst gültig." Cf. U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 53-62. Both Wilckens and Pannenberg (Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 58-60) think Jesus regarded his miracles as provisional confirmation of his proclamation, on the basis of Mt. 11:5-6 and Lk. 11:20. The difficulty is that these sayings do not fit into the category of verification, but they point to Jesus' miracles as a part of his proclamation of the presence of God's salvation in view of the imminence of God's kingdom. The present use of Mt. 11:5-6, in which it takes on the character of the verification of Jesus' claim, is a later interpretation of the early church. Cf. Rudolf Pultmann, Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, pp. 22, 136-137; also the criticism of Pannenberg and Wilckens by G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, p. 25, n. 22. There is also the problem that Jesus rejects the question about a sign to give support to his proclamation (Mk. 8:11-12; Mt. 12:38-42; 16:1-4; Lk. 11:16, 29-32; 12:54-56). Cf., however, Pannenberg's discussion of these sayings in Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 59-60. Cf. also the discussion of the prophetic word, supra, pp. 78-84.

⁵⁷The correspondence of this to Pannenberg's theory of knowledge should be noted. Cf. supra, pp. 25-29, 117-123.

⁵⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 62-64, 131-136; U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 60-62.

ent only on the nearness of God's kingdom.⁵⁹ While Jesus was not an apocalyptic,⁶⁰ the Pannenberg circle argues that the thought world of apocalyptic with its expectation of the coming kingdom of God provides the horizon within which the proclamation of Jesus must be seen.⁶¹

⁵⁹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," to be published in Theology as History.

⁶⁰E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 223: "Aber er [Jesus] selbst ist weder Prophet noch Apokalyptiker gewesen," Also, ibid., pp. 55-57, 221-223; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 107, 140; U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 54, n. 31.

⁶¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 107, 139-140; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 51-57; U. Wilckens, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 50-63, where he argues at length for seeing Jesus' proclamation within the horizon of the apocalyptic world of thought. While one can grant that Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God is to be understood within the horizon of first century Jewish eschatological expectations, which included apocalyptic conceptions, Wilckens' argument for the relation of Jesus to apocalyptic is not convincing because of its heavy dependence on an uncritical use of the distinction between the Pharisaic and apocalyptic understanding of the law made by D. Rössler, Gesetz und Geschichte. The distinction which Rössler makes is based on a very narrow definition of apocalyptic as a Gattung (ibid., pp. 43-45), and it can hardly be applied without further argumentation to "die gemeinjüdische Theologie der frühjüdischen Zeit" as Wilckens does (Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 46-50). Cf. the criticism of Rössler for an excessive limitation of the texts representing apocalyptic, Werner Georg Kümmel, "Jesus and Paulus," New Testament Studies, X (1964), 174. The difficulty is that the Pannenberg circle does not entirely make clear what they mean by speaking of Jesus' proclamation as occurring within the horizon of the apocalyptic world of thought while Jesus himself was not an apocalyptic. For the distinction between Jesus and apocalyptic, cf. Hans Conzelmann, "Jesus Christus," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, III (3rd ed., 1959), 641-646, esp. 646; E. Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II, 99-100, 107-110; also the criticisms of Pannenberg and Wilckens by G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 25-27. Of course, even if Jesus' proclamation stands in a critical relation to Jewish apocalyptic, this can be understood only within the horizon of the apocalyptic thought world, and it presupposes that horizon of thought. Another point at issue is whether it still remains meaningful to speak in terms of present or future eschatology, i.e., of the relation of the "now" and the "not yet," in

While much of Jesus' message may stand in tension with apocalyptic or may even be critical of it, the proclamation of the kingdom of God, which was central for Jesus, presupposes the apocalyptic expectation of the coming of the kingdom of God and of God's salvation in the resurrection of the dead.

2. The Pannenberg circle regards the apocalyptic expectation of the resurrection of the dead at the end of history, when God would fully reveal himself and his glory, and the ministry of Jesus as providing the thought world within which the resurrection of Jesus happened in a meaningful way as the eschatological self-disclosure of God. The apocalyptic horizon itself belonged to Jesus' own proclamation, so that it was already given as the horizon within which Jesus' resurrection was to be understood.⁶² Jesus' resurrection meant the beginning of the general resurrection of the dead. He was the first fruits of the dead (Ro. 8:29; I Cor. 15:20; Col. 1:18; Rev. 1:5). In Jesus' resurrection, the end of history had already broken into history. The

Jesus' proclamation in view of the immediateness of the kingdom. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 52, 238; cf. Hans Conzelmann, "Jesus Christus," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, III (3rd ed., 1959), 644; E. Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II, 109.

⁶²Cf. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 61-69. He develops the significance of Jesus' resurrection in relation to the ministry of Jesus and to apocalyptic under six points: the resurrection of Jesus means that the end of the world has begun, that God has confirmed the pre-Easter ministry of Jesus, that Jesus is identified with the coming Son of Man, that God has definitively revealed himself in Jesus, the necessity of the Gentile mission, and that the words transmitted as sayings of the risen Lord express the inherent meaning of the resurrection itself.

change of ages had begun. The powers of the new age were already present proleptically in the gift of the Holy Spirit (Ro. 8:23; II Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Eph. 1:13; 4:30).⁶³ Initially the resurrection of Jesus and the beginning of the new age were coupled with the imminent expectation of the end of the world and the general resurrection.⁶⁴ Thus, Paul also seems to have expected the end of history to come within his lifetime, apparently only giving up this hope relatively late (I Thes. 4:15-17; I Cor. 15:31; compare Phil. 1:19-23). This connection between the resurrection of Jesus and the general resurrection is an important aspect of its meaning for Pannenberg:

Die Bedeutung der Auferweckung Jesu war ursprünglich daran gebunden, dass sie nur den Anfang der allgemeinen Totenauf resurrection und des Weltendes bildete. Nur unter dieser Voraussetzung ist mit der auferweckung Jesu das Ende da.⁶⁵

When the second generation Christians had to incorporate an indefinite temporal difference between the resurrection of Jesus and the end of history as a whole, as in Luke, the danger was also present that they could lose sight of the essential relatedness of the two. Only in con-

⁶³For the concept of the Holy Spirit and its connection with the resurrection of Jesus as the power of life from God, cf. ibid., pp. 170-181; idem, "Einsicht und Glaube: Antwort an Paul Althaus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 89-90; also E. Käsemann, "Geist IV. Geist und Geistesgaben im NT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 1272-1279.

⁶⁴Cf. also E. Käsemann, "Die Anfänge christlicher Theologie" and "Zum Thema der urchristlichen Apokalyptik," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II, 82-104, 105-131.

⁶⁵W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 103. He then goes on to argue that the material relation between the fate of Jesus and the end of history is independent of the length of the intervening time (pp. 103-105).

nection with this future expectation is the resurrection of Jesus what it is, namely, the prolepsis of the end of history and, thus, the eschatological revelation of God. But as such, the resurrection of Jesus, in which the end of history has already broken into history, means that in Jesus God has fully revealed himself once and for all. In this event the God of Israel, whom Jesus proclaimed, has shown himself as God, who effects all things and has power over all things, "who gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist" (Ro. 4:17).⁶⁶

For Pannenberg, the Christological conception of the unity of Christ with God is based on the resurrection of Jesus as the full and final revelation of God.⁶⁷ If God's revelation is understood as his

⁶⁶It is at this point that the emphasis on the demonstrability of God's revelation has its place together with the emphasis on the historical demonstrability of the resurrection. From within the horizon of apocalyptic as well as of the later Hebrew prophets, like Deutero-Isaiah and Ezekiel, the revelation of God is understood as the open manifestation of his power in relation to men in such a way that it is apparent to all. The revelation in Jesus corresponds to this in that it manifests God's power in relation to man, especially for those who believe in Jesus, and in that the resurrection is seen as a historical event which is accessible to man through historical research within the limits of historical probability. Cf. the discussion of the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event in the Appendix.

⁶⁷E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 8-11; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 124-158. Similarly, Pannenberg sees other Christological statements as essentially related to the resurrection of Jesus. For example, because of his resurrection Jesus was identified with the eschatological Son of Man who would come in the clouds to judge the world and to inaugurate the kingdom of God (ibid., pp. 63-64). Similarly, the resurrection confirms the superscription on the cross giving the basis of Jesus' crucifixion, and, thus, Jesus was identified as the Messiah, or Christ (ibid., pp. 24,

self-disclosure, and if God reveals himself fully in a person or an event, then that person or event cannot be separated from the nature of God himself. God is himself present to man as he is God for man in his revelation.⁶² A Christian can speak adequately about God only in relation to Jesus and what God has done in him. Apart from Christ God is not fully known or fully revealed to men. To be sure, this does not mean that God is simply unknown or has no relation with men of the Old Testament or with other men of history, for all of history is the self-disclosure of God. It does mean that the knowledge of God elsewhere, including the Old Testament, is relativized by God's revelation in Christ. The latter casts the former into a new light, so that the former can only have its full significance in its relation to Christ. It is from the standpoint of this understanding of the unity of Christ with the essence of God, in that the history of Jesus is the full eschatological revelation of God, that Pannenberg interprets and evaluates the Christological tradition of the church and its conceptions of the unity of Christ with God.

The relation between the resurrection of Jesus and the pre-

223-224). For the authenticity of the inscription, cf. M. Dibelius, "Das historische Problem des Leidensgeschichte," Botschaft und Geschichte, I (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1953), 256, F. Hahn, Christologische Hoheitstitel, p. 178. The fact that the inscription is neither a religious designation nor a specifically Messianic one seems to work against Bultmann's view of it as secondary, reflecting the church's Messianic interest (Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition, p. 293).

⁶²Cf. supra, pp. 45-47.

Easter Jesus involves two aspects. First, the resurrection of Jesus has retroactive (rückwirkend) force, so that what Jesus is in view of his resurrection, he always was.⁶⁹ What a person is can be seen only from the end of the course of his life. Since the resurrection of Jesus means that he is the full eschatological revelation of God, and, thus, belongs to the essence of God, the work of the pre-Easter Jesus also belongs to the essence of God as his self-revelation. What God is cannot be separated from what he is for man in the history of Jesus. This retroactive character of the resurrection of Jesus was expressed in the early church by presenting all of Jesus' ministry as the manifestation of the Son of God, beginning with John's baptism. That the entire life of Jesus from the beginning is a part of the revelation of God is expressed in the virgin birth stories of Matthew and Luke. Here Jesus is the Son of God from his birth. Elsewhere, for example, Philippians 2:6-11, the unity of Jesus with the essence of God is reflected in the concept of the incarnation of the pre-existent Son

⁶⁹W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 131-136, and also the entire discussion of "die Wesenseinheit Jesu mit Gott," pp. 131-158. "Das Wesen eines Menschen oder eines Zustandes, oder auch der Welt überhaupt, ist dann noch nicht daraus zu erkennen, was jetzt davon sichtbar ist. Erst die Zukunft wird darüber entscheiden. Es muss sich erst noch zeigen, was aus dem Menschen und aus dem Zustand der Welt in Zukunft werden wird. Insofern ist es kein Sonderfall, dass von der Auferweckung Jesu her, vom Ende seines Weges her rückwirkend sein Wesen begründet ist, nicht nur für unsere Erkenntnis, sondern auch seinhaft: Wäre Jesus nicht auferweckt worden, so wäre damit entschieden, dass er auch vorher nicht mit Gott eins war. Durch seine Auferweckung hingegen ist nicht nur für unsere Erkenntnis, sondern auch der Wirklichkeit nach entschieden, dass Jesus mit Gott eins ist, und zwar nun rückwirkend, dass er auch schon zuvor mit Gott eins war" (pp. 134-135).

of God.

Vom Bestätigungscharakter der Auferweckung Jesu her gesehen liegt es nun in der inneren Logik der Sache, dass Jesus immer schon mit Gott eins war, nicht erst von einem bestimmten Datum seines Weges ab. Und im Hinblick auf die Ewigkeit Gottes besagt der Offenbarungscharakter der Auferweckung Jesu, dass Gott immer schon eins ist mit Jesus, auch schon vor dessen irdischer Geburt. Jesus ist von Ewigkeit her der Repräsentant Gottes in der Schöpfung; wäre es anders, dann wäre Jesus nicht in Person die eine Offenbarung des ewigen Gottes, so dass wir fortan Gott in seiner ewigen Gottheit nicht mehr ohne Jesus denken können. Dass aber ist doch der Sinn der Auferweckung Jesu.⁷⁰

Pannenberg thinks that two aspects of the concept of the incarnation must be maintained: the essential connection between the distinct moments of "der Gottessohnschaft und der irdischen Daseinsweise Jesu," and the movement from God to man which comes to expression in this concept.⁷¹ It is only when one separates the being of the pre-existent Son from the concrete history of Jesus that the concept of the incarnation becomes mythological.⁷² For Pannenberg, a Christology projected from the standpoint of the revelation of God in the history of Jesus avoids this problem.

Second, the resurrection of Jesus is God's confirmation of the proclamation of the pre-Easter Jesus. In raising Jesus from the dead, God took the proclamation of Jesus to himself as the disclosure of the way he is God for men. This means that in Jesus Christ God's salvation is present to men in a definitive way so that a man's relation to Jesus is the only determinative factor in his relation to God. In the resur-

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 152.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 155.

⁷²Ibid., p. 154.

rection of Jesus, God identifies himself as the loving Father who encounters men with his salvation in their concrete existence in this world, forgives their sins, and, thus, gives them community with himself by his grace alone. Therefore, the history of Jesus is the word of God's forgiveness and salvation for all men of all times. It is the interrelation between the resurrection of Jesus and the pre-Easter Jesus that gives the history of Jesus the meaning of God's eschatological saving work for men that is the ground for their community with God, just as the apocalyptic context gives the resurrection of Jesus meaning as the ground of the gift of the Holy Spirit as the foretaste of the power of the new life of the new age of God's rule.

3. It is only within the context of the ministry of the pre-Easter Jesus and of the resurrection of Jesus that the crucifixion of Jesus is meaningful as the saving work of God. Apart from the resurrection, the crucifixion of Jesus is ambiguous; only from the standpoint of the resurrection of Jesus is it clear that the crucifixion must be understood positively as God's work for men.⁷³

⁷³E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 252. The example of the crucifixion shows that Pannenberg does not think that one can simply read God's revelation out of all historical events, as though they were equally transparent to their meaning in relation to God. Ultimately, it is only in Christ, and in particular the resurrection, that history is transparent to God. Other events in history, which are more or less ambiguous in themselves, receive light from this event and have their meaning in its context. However, within the context of the ministry and resurrection of Jesus, the crucifixion does have its own inherent meaning. For the statement of the methodological procedure in interpreting the crucifixion, cf. ibid., pp. 281, 282-283; cf. also ibid., pp. 251-288, for the application of this procedure to understanding the saving significance of the crucifixion of Jesus. This provides the basis for the following discussion.

Pannenberg regards the crucifixion of Jesus as being closely connected with his ministry. By setting his own authority over against that of the law, which is expressed in the phrase "but I say to you," by forgiving sins, and by eating and associating with tax collectors and sinners, Jesus came into conflict with the law and claimed for himself authority that belonged only to God. However, these aspects of Jesus' proclamation were essentially bound up with his proclamation of the nearness of God and his salvation. This emphasis on the nearness of God pushed all other aspects of the Jewish traditions into the background, since the only decisive thing for man's participation in God's salvation was the nearness of God's kingdom. From the standpoint of a law that was understood as the final criterion of one's salvation, Jesus could only appear as a blasphemer against God. Pannenberg understands this as the ground for the condemnation of Jesus by the Jews.⁷⁴ Because of the central character of his proclamation, Jesus came under the condemnation of the Jewish law, and the Jews sought his execution for blasphemy. However, that God raised Jesus from the dead meant that the one who came into conflict with the law and was condemned by the law was justified by God. This in turn meant that the law could no longer be regarded as the unqualified expression of God's will. Christ was the end of the law.⁷⁵ Thus, Paul speaks about the crucifixion in terms of Jesus bearing the curse of the law for us (Gal. 3:10-14), of the one who knew no sin being made to be sin (II Cor.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 257-260.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 261-265.

5:21; compare also Ro. 8:3), and of Christ as the end of the law (Ro. 10:4).

It is within this horizon that Pannenberg interprets the death of Jesus as a death for others. The Jews who were faithful to the law condemned Jesus under the law as a blasphemer. However, the resurrection means an interchange of roles so that Jesus is justified and the blasphemy for which he died was that of those who condemned him.⁷⁶ In view of the connection between sin and death, which is generally valid, and in view of the character of the Jewish law as one concrete realization of man's life in community with some structured form of justice, the Jewish law has general human significance. Jews and Gentiles are in the same situation before God. In this respect, the Jews are representative of mankind in general in their condemnation of Jesus in the name of the law. Thus, both Jews and Gentiles, as well as everyone "der den Sinn der vorhandenen Welt in ihr selbst oder im irdischen Leben des Menschen sucht,"⁷⁷ can only take offence at the fact that salvation lies in one who is crucified and, thus, is an outcast from the order of human society. As with Jesus' proclamation of the nearness of God, so also his crucifixion calls into question all human pride and accomplishments eliminating their definitive character and disclosing them as provisional.⁷⁸ Since Jesus' death was for the sins of others, only his death is a death in complete abandonment by God.

⁷⁶Ibid., pp. 266-267.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 270.

⁷⁸To the death of Jesus as a death for humanity, ibid., pp. 267-270.

The death of the Christian is taken up into Jesus' death so that its sting is overcome and it is transformed into a death in hope.⁷⁹

That God's saving work in which he reveals himself to men is associated above all with the death and resurrection of Jesus also brings to expression the fact that God's salvation is not the accomplishment of a man, but the work of God in human existence. The proclamation and work of Jesus was centered in the imminence of God in such a way that all objective accomplishments of men in which they sought their security in relation to God became irrelevant. The only decisive thing remained the nearness of God, with his salvation and forgiving love. But Jesus' own proclamation led only to the cross, where all human possibilities and accomplishments came to their end. That God in his grace raised Jesus from the dead made this history something other than the work and accomplishments of a man. It made this history of Jesus the work of God in which he is present to all men in a decisive way, revealing himself and giving them community with himself. In Jesus Christ, the salvation of God is dependent only on the grace of God, who in his love does not destroy man but forgives him, rather than on human accomplishments or on anything that man has objectively at his disposal or in his control. The God of grace, who raised Jesus from the dead, can never be an object at man's disposal.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 270-271. Pannenberg regards this character of Jesus' death as a death for the sins of men as coming to expression the most adequately in Paul and Luther (ibid., pp. 268-270, 286-287).

⁸⁰Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Mythus und Wort: Theologische Überlegungen zu Karl Jaspers' Mythusbegriff," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,

4. In this way, Pannenberg seeks to interpret the revelation of God in Jesus Christ in terms of the concrete meaning of the history of Jesus, including the cross and resurrection, within the framework of the thought world that provided its historical context. The ministry and the resurrection of Jesus are interpreted in their relation to each other and the cross is interpreted as the saving work of God within the context of both. That the revelation of God occurs in history means that one cannot abstract the history of Jesus as the revelation of God from the historical world of thought within which it happened. The history of Jesus must be seen within that world of thought in all its strangeness. This does not mean, of course, that a Christian has to repristinate a first century world of thought. The meaning of Jesus as God's eschatological revelation in which he acted must be expressed in ways that are meaningful in one's own world of thought. Already within the New Testament, the gospel is translated into other categories than those of Jewish apocalyptic. However, the criterion of this process is always the inherent meaning of the concrete history of Jesus within its historical context as well as the contemporary possibilities for thought. The content of the Christian proclamation must correspond to the content of God's revelation in Jesus Christ. The difficulty with applying this method too rigidly lies in the fact that the sources about Jesus are so overlaid by the proclamation of the early church that it is difficult to determine

LI (1954), 167-185, esp. 177-185; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 29-30.

very much about the pre-Easter Jesus. One has to bear in mind the limitations of the historian's knowledge of Jesus and to be prepared to recognize that at times the most one can say is that the kerygma is possible as an interpretation of the history of Jesus. Another problem that has to be recognized is that from the beginning of the church it was possible to proclaim and to defend the gospel with little or no reference to the historical Jesus.⁸¹

While the revelation of God in Jesus Christ must be understood in its history of traditions context, its meaning as the eschatological revelation of God requires that it must be proclaimed to all men in a meaningful way within their different worlds of thought. This brings to expression the universal character of the revelation of God in Christ, which must be examined next.

⁸¹E.g., Rudolf Bultmann, "Die Bedeutung des geschichtlichen Jesus für die Theologie des Paulus," Glauben und Verstehen, I (4th ed., 1961; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1933), 188-213; also W.G. Kümmel, "Jesus und Paulus," New Testament Studies, X (1964), 163-181.

CHAPTER V

THE REVELATION IN JESUS CHRIST AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY

Pannenberg regards all of history as the work of God in which he discloses himself to men.¹ However, he also speaks of a particular event in history, namely, the history of Jesus, as the unique, eschatological revelation of God. How is this particular event related to the whole of history as God's self-disclosure?² First, this involves the relation of the history of Jesus to the concept of history as a whole. Second, the proleptic character of God's revelation in Jesus Christ and its implications must be discussed. Finally, the relation of God's work in Jesus Christ to his work in all of history must be indicated.

1. If historical research is to be more than a positivistic collecting of "historical facts," then some understanding of the meaning of history is necessary. History is characterized by the interrelation of events, which in turn interact in a meaningful way with

¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, Wolfhart Pannenberg et al. (Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1; 2nd ed., 1963; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), pp. 16-20, 95-109; idem, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 7-14.

²Cf., e.g., John Dillenberger, "Revelational Discernment and the Problem of the Two Testaments," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, ed. Bernhard W. Anderson (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 174-175; Günter Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Wolfhart Pannenberg (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 37; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), pp. 72-73.

human consciousness.³ History itself is selective in that some events have greater historic significance than others. While events have meaning for men in their immediate history of traditions context, their ultimate significance for history can only be seen in the way they influence the following course of history. Hence, the ultimate significance of events for history can be seen and evaluated only in relation to the whole of history. However, history can be understood as a meaningful unity only from the standpoint of the end of history.

The difficulty is that no one can stand outside history or at the end of history in order to discover its meaning. One possibility that avoids this problem is to understand the meaning and unity of history in terms of the historicness of human existence, that is, in terms of the way in which the past impinges on one's existence and determines one's possibilities for the future. Historical study is then the encounter between the historian and possibilities for understanding his existence.⁴ Pannenberg, however, regards this as an inadequately

³Cf. supra, pp. 87-110; also, Erich von Kahler, Der Sinn der Geschichte (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964), esp. pp. 18-22.

⁴E.g., Rudolf Bultmann, Geschichte und Eschatologie (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), esp. pp. 164-184; Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (9th ed., 1960; Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1926), pp. 372-404. In his later work, Heidegger has moved to an understanding of history as the history of the unveiling of "being." E.g., M. Heidegger, Identität und Differenz (Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1957); idem, Über den Humanismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949); cf. James M. Robinson, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith, esp. pp. 150-158 [German: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), esp. 134-140]; idem, "The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger," The Later Heidegger and Theology, eds. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New Frontiers in Theology, I;

narrow and individualistic understanding of the meaning and unity of history, although history does in fact have meaning in its relation to one's existence.⁵ However, other attempts to understand the meaning or unity of history in terms of a movement toward some projected goal of history, as the consciousness of freedom for Hegel, the ideal classless society for Marx, or a kingdom of God identified with the moral improvement of man for liberal Protestantism, sacrifice the contingency and openness of the future for an understanding of the unity and meaning of history. The same is also true of Jewish apocalyptic, in which the understanding of history as world history, which has its unity and meaning in relation to the end of history, first arose. While Hegel

New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 3-76; Walter Schulz, "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers," Philosophische Rundschau, I (1953/1954), 65-93, 211-232; Heinrich Ott, Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1959); Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, "Konsequenzen des Historismus in der Philosophie der Gegenwart," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 226-255, esp. 234-255. If history is the history of the unveiling of "being," then the meaning of history can be seen only from the end of history. Heidegger has a kind of eschatology of "being" in which the provisional character of thought is clear in that the future is unknown. E.g., M. Heidegger, Holzwege (3rd ed.; Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 1957), pp. 301-302. Heidegger suggests that Historie destroys the future and, hence, is a part of the present withdrawal of "being." This means that Historie by itself is an inadequate approach to Geschichte. Cf. the discussion of Heidegger's eschatology of "being" in W. Müller-Lauter, "Konsequenzen des Historismus," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 242-248. W. Müller-Lauter questions whether Heidegger's concept of history does not overcome relativism at the expense of the unique and contingent character of events in history.

⁵Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 220, 232-233; idem, Was ist der Mensch? Der Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 139/140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 96-98.

was able to understand history as a unity by identifying his own thought with the goal of the history of thought, apocalyptic was able to understand history as a meaningful unity because of a proleptic revelation of the end of history and, hence, of the divine plan for history. Both resulted in the loss of the openness of the future and of the contingency of events in history.

Does the revelation of God in Jesus Christ ground the meaning and unity of history in such a way that it preserves the openness of the future and the contingency of events? Pannenberg thinks that the meaning of the resurrection of Jesus within the context of the Jewish apocalyptic world of thought as the prolepsis of the end of history and the eschatological judgment of God in fact enables one to understand the unity of history in its relation to the saving act of God in Jesus Christ while the contingency and openness of the future is preserved.⁶ This essentially poses the question of the critical relation of the revelation of God in Jesus to the apocalyptic thought world. While, for Pannenberg, the resurrection of Jesus is meaningful within the context of Jewish apocalyptic, this is a critical relationship in which the revelation of God breaks the apocalyptic thought world. The starting point of a critical discussion of apocalyptic is

⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 278-288; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 103-106; idem, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit: Festschrift für Heinrich Vogel, ed. Kurt Scharf (Berlin: Lettner-Verlag, 1962), pp. 235-238; idem, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 120-121.

indicated by Ulrich Wilckens:

Aber der Inhalt dieser Offenbarung ist es, der den Rahmen grundsätzlich sprengt, insofern Gott ihn nicht den Lauf der Geschichte, nicht Befindlichkeiten der oberen Welt, nicht den Ausgang des künftigen Gerichtes, sondern den auferweckten himmlischen Christus sehen liess.⁷

Unfortunately, the implications of this impulse have not been adequately carried through by the Pannenberg circle.

A critical evaluation of apocalyptic in view of the work of God in Jesus Christ involves the question of the relation of this event to the determinism and to the pessimistic dualism of apocalyptic. The apocalyptic prophet was the recipient of a mythologically colored revelation of God's plan for history including its end in the eschatological judgment, thus calling men to faithfulness and to hope in the present time of suffering. Within this context, the resurrection of Jesus is the revelation of God as the prolepsis of the end of history. However, in place of a disclosure of the plan of history and information about the heavenly world, the history of Jesus is an eschatological event in which God is present to men of all times so that all other

⁷U. Wilckens, "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der Erscheinungen der Auferstandenen: Zur traditionsgeschichtlichen Analyse von 1. Kor. 15:1-11," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, eds. Wilfried Joest und Wolfhart Pannenberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), p. 86, also p. 88, n. 80; cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 236-237. The failure of the Pannenberg circle to carry through such a critical discussion of the relation of the revelation of God in Jesus to the context of the apocalyptic thought world has resulted in unclarity with regard to the way they understand apocalyptic. Cf. G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 22-24. The following discussion will indicate this critical aspect of the work of God in Jesus Christ over against the apocalyptic world of thought in a way that is consistent with Pannenberg's position.

events in history have their meaning as the work of God only in their relation to this particular event. In place of a call to endurance in the present in view of the imminence of the eschatological judgment and the salvation of God, in Jesus Christ God has acted in human history for man's salvation so that in this event God's grace and forgiveness are present to men. One's relation to Jesus Christ determines one's relation to God, for the Christ event as the event of God's grace for man is the ground for community with God for men. The Christ event is the means by which God makes man truly man, and, thus, it is the fulfillment or goal of history. If history is the quest of man for the meaning of his existence as man, and if man is what he is only in his relation to God, then events in history have their true significance only within the context of the death and resurrection of Jesus as the eschatological revelation of God. The revelation of God in Jesus means both the fulfillment of history and the judgment of God on man's self-assertion in which he seeks the fulfillment of what he is as man by his own accomplishments independently of God's grace in Jesus Christ. While, for Pannenberg, the history of Jesus has its meaning within the context of the apocalyptic world of thought, this event also breaks the structure of apocalyptic and its determinism. In the place of the revelation of the divine plan for history in which the present time was seen as the last period before the end of history, in Jesus the grace and power of God, who gives life to the dead and calls into existence that which did not exist, is present in history, the new age of God's rule has dawned, the church lives from the power of the risen Lord, and

the Holy Spirit is given to men as the foretaste of the new life of the new age.

Another characteristic of apocalyptic is its pessimistic dualism, which makes it difficult to speak of a meaningful encounter of man by God in history, in distinction from the prophets. The apocalyptic prophet can only call God's people to faithfulness in the present time of suffering in view of the imminence of God's salvation at the end of history. In distinction from John the Baptist, however, Jesus proclaimed the presence of God's salvation for men in view of the imminence of the kingdom, regardless of the previous character of their lives.⁸ In the cross and resurrection of Jesus, God's grace and salvation became a present reality for men in this world. This breaks the pessimistic dualism of apocalyptic for which history had largely lost its meaning as the encounter of man by God. First, in place of the exhortation for the righteous to endure the present in view of the coming kingdom, God has acted in Jesus Christ to forgive sinners and to give them community with himself. Second, in Jesus Christ the powers of evil that held men in bondage and separated them from God are broken (for example, Ro. 8:38-39). Third, in Jesus Christ God claims man and his world for himself so that man's concrete existence in the world is the place where he lives under the rule of God in community with God in Jesus Christ.⁹ While the rule of Christ remains hidden

⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), pp. 234-235.

⁹Cf. Ernst Käsemann, "Gottesdienst im Alltag der Welt," Exege-

in this world, for faith that lives from the proclamation of the grace of God in Jesus Christ, Christ is Lord over all aspects of one's existence in this world even now, and it is meaningful to speak of one's encounter by God in this world. Much of history remains characterized by suffering and sin so that it seems meaningless to men, yet in Jesus Christ, who has entered into the depths of human suffering and weakness for us, men are enabled to trust in God's grace and faithfulness.¹⁰

The revelation of God in the history of Jesus means that the end of history has broken into history so that the meaning and unity of history lies in the relation of other events to this particular event in which God is decisively present to men, rather than in some kind of attempt to project the future course of history. Hence, the Christ event gives meaning to all of history while it preserves the openness of the future. Because of the presence of God's grace in Jesus Christ, men are able to live in history under God and his grace with an open and unknown future. What this means can be seen more clearly in the concept of the proleptic character of the Christ event and of Christian existence in history.

2. One of the most important concepts in Pannenberg's theological system is that of prolepsis. The proleptic character of the resurrection of Jesus as the pre-happening of the end of history means

tische Versuche und Besinnungen, II (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964), 193-204.

¹⁰E.g., W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 101, 103.

this event is the full and final revelation of God.¹¹

Das Ende der Geschichte aber ist mit der Auferweckung Jesu an ihm schon geschehen, obwohl es für uns andere noch aussteht. Darum-- und nur unter dieser Voraussetzung--hat der Gott Israels im Geschick Jesu endgültig seine Gottheit erwiesen und ist nun auch als der eine Gott aller Menschen offenbar.¹²

It is only in its connection with the end of history when God fully reveals himself and makes man what he is intended to be in the resurrection of the dead that the resurrection of Jesus has its full significance. This proleptic character of the resurrection of Jesus, however, does not mean that it is only the first occurrence of an event that is still future for other men.¹³ God's revelation in Jesus is his act in history for man's salvation. It is that event that decisively determines man's relation with God.¹⁴ Related to the proleptic character of the history of Jesus as the eschatological revelation of God is the proleptic character of man's present participation in God's salvation, of his knowledge of God, and of his existence under God's lordship.¹⁵

¹¹Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 103-106, 141-147.

¹²W. Pannenberg, ibid., pp. 104-105; idem, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, p. 113.

¹³This misunderstanding is reflected in J. Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung: Untersuchungen zur Begründung und zu den Konsequenzen einer christlichen Eschatologie (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 38; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), p. 73; also G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 40-46.

¹⁴Cf. esp. the discussion of "Jesus, der Mensch vor Gott," in W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), pp. 195-288.

¹⁵Cf. the criticism of the concept of prolepsis by G. Klein,

First, just as the resurrection of Jesus is a prolepsis of the end of history, so also the presence of salvation in history through Christ is the proleptic foretaste of God's promised salvation in Jesus. The Holy Spirit is the down payment or foretaste of the resurrection life which awaits men.¹⁶ The present aspect of man's salvation is inseparably bound up with the not yet--with the promise of God for the future. Indeed, salvation is only present in the word of promise for the future that is spoken to us in Jesus Christ. The revelation of God in Jesus Christ is the promise of God's salvation, and it makes that salvation proleptically present to men in history. The fate of Jesus is essentially connected with the future of mankind as God's ultimate promise and his decisive act determining man's relation with him. "Nur weil in Jesus die eschatologische Bestimmung und Zukunft der Menschheit angebrochen ist, kann er unbeschadet der offenen Zukunft der Menschheit dennoch ihre einigende, alles zusammenfassende Mitte sein."¹⁷ History, as the history of the proclamation of the gospel, as well as

Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 38-53.

¹⁶Cf. the discussion of the Holy Spirit, W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 170-181; *idem*, "Einsicht und Glaube: Antwort an Paul Althaus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 81-92, esp. 89-90. The relation between the Holy Spirit and the power of new life from God means that the presence of the Holy Spirit is essentially connected with the resurrection of Jesus and its proclamation.

¹⁷W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 406; cf. also pp. 195-199, 357-361, 393-406, esp. p. 361: "Nur durch diesen einen Menschen hat Gott die Menschheit überhaupt in die Gemeinschaft mit sich aufgenommen."

the future for which the Christian hopes are essentially the unfolding and accomplishment of God's work for man in Jesus Christ.

The concept of prolepsis involves, second, the proleptic character of all theology or knowledge.¹⁸ God has fully revealed himself in the fate of Jesus. Therefore, this event provides the norm and center for all theological thinking. Human knowledge or thought about God and his grace is possible in an adequate way only in terms of God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. However, the full meaning of this event for man can be seen only in its working out in history and ultimately only in its final fulfillment in the resurrection of the dead. "For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood" (I Cor. 13:12). Hence, any theological system, including Pannenberg's, has its possibilities and limitations in its historically conditioned setting. While Pannenberg regards universal history as the horizon of theology in general, he also insists that

die universalgeschichtlichen Konzeptionen selbst jeweils von einem bestimmten geschichtlichen Ort aus entworfen werden und so ihrerseits wieder der historischen Differenz unterliegen. Dies letztere zeigt die Vorläufigkeit aller Entwürfe, ihren Abstand von der Endgültigkeit des Eschaton.¹⁹

All theology is done within history, in the context of the revelation

¹⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 96-115, esp. pp. 113-115; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 139-148; idem, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 120-121; idem, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 94-99.

¹⁹W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 139.

of God in the resurrection and appearance of Jesus, and, hence, theology shares in the proleptic character of this event.

This may be illustrated in the use of human language to speak of God. Pannenberg distinguishes between two different ways of speaking of God: kerygmatic and doxological.²⁰ The former involves speaking about a particular event in history as an act of God. The events described in this way can be and are, of course, described in ways other than in their relation to God. The latter is involved when the events are understood in their relation to the whole of reality. This way of speaking about an event is a different "language" than normal in that it involves speaking of God. The justification for this way of speaking about events is that apart from it, they "werden . . . dann weniger sachgemäss, mehr oberflächlich beschrieben."²¹ Doxological speaking of God, however, is a more general statement about God, grounded in his acts in history and offered up as praise to God. Examples would be speaking of God as Father, as love, as almighty, or as working in history. These two forms of speaking of God are not independent of each other. To speak of the acts of God in history presupposes the doxological aspect of the concept of a God who acts as a person. On the other hand, doxological speaking of God is grounded in the concrete encounter with God in his acts in history. Further,

²⁰Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, p. 111. The following discussion is based primarily on this article.

²¹Ibid., p. 103.

both involve the use of analogy. For Pannenberg, however, this use of analogy is an analogy in language, that is, an analogy between the ordinary meaning of the word and its use in relation to God, rather than an analogy to the being of God.²² Men can only offer up their language in praise to God in awareness of its inadequacy and in the hope that God himself will accept it, thus transforming its content. This use of language forms the linguistic context for God's self-disclosure in history, which then has the structure of his taking our language upon himself, thereby giving it new content. "Die Metaphorik unseres Redens von Gott, die auch Jesus teilte, wenn er von Gott als dem Vater sprach, ist gleichsam durch Gott selbst angenommen worden, indem er Jesus auferweckte und so sich zu ihm bekannte."²³ The revelation of God in Christ provides the ground for man's use of his language to speak of God, but it does not eliminate the metaphorical character of man's language. Language also shares in the proleptic character of God's revelation in Christ, which is the standard and criterion of all man's speaking of God. That God accepts our language and thus transforms its content is dependent on his grace alone.

A third aspect of the concept of prolepsis is its relation to human existence in history and to human goals.²⁴ The meaning or goal

²²Ibid., pp. 100-102.

²³Ibid., p. 113.

²⁴For the following discussion, cf. esp. W. Pannenberg, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 251-280; idem, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 1-23.

of human existence, which man has only in community with God,²⁵ is not at man's disposal. He can only receive it as a gift from God.²⁶ Man's desire to have his existence at his own disposal and to control his own destiny is precisely his sin.²⁷ In Jesus Christ the fulfillment of human destiny has been manifested in history in that his resurrection is the prolepsis of the end of history. This means one can live in the present in terms of the final revelation of God in Jesus in which he has acted to make man truly human by giving man community with himself. This does not remove men from history or enable them to transcend the historicness of human existence. Christian existence in history shares in the proleptic character of the revelation of God in Jesus.

Concretely, this means that men and their present existence cannot be claimed for this worldly goals or ideals that are attainable by men.²⁸ Christian faith can neither be identified with such goals nor

²⁵Cf. Klaus Koch, "Spätisraelitisches Geschichtsdenken am Beispiel des Buches Daniel," Historische Zeitschrift, 193/1 (1961), 24-25; also, W. Pannenberg, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 18; idem, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, p. 113; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 195-199, 357-361, 393-406; idem, Was ist der Mensch? esp. pp. 31-58.

²⁶Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 280: "Das Wesen des Menschen kann nur Gott, nicht der Mensch selbst verwirklichen, weil das Wesen des Menschen eben nicht in innerweltlichen zusammenhängen aufgeht."

²⁷Cf. W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 40-49.

²⁸Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 276-277, 280. The Christian is bound only to God and is, therefore, free in relation to the world: "Indem die Gebundenheit an Gott eine letzte Unabhängigkeit gegenüber der Welt begründet, ist nicht nur jedes deterministisch gedachte Auf-

can it mean a conservative satisfaction with and maintenance of the status quo. Over against all forms of human existence in society and programs for society Christian faith is essentially a revolutionary, critical force. This is reflected clearly in Pannenberg's analysis of the historicness of justice, which represents the concrete form of human community.²⁹ In view of the radical openness of human existence, no particular system of justice can be finally valid. Justice is related to the fulfillment of human existence in so far as this is always existence in community. Just as the fulfillment of human existence is an eschatological gift from God, so also the form of community that corresponds to this is God's eschatological gift. The fulfillment of human existence, Gottesgemeinschaft, and Rechtsgemeinschaft belong essentially together. In each historical situation, the appropriate form of justice must be attained in relation to God's future. The formative force for justice is the creative power of love:

So wirkt die von Gottes Zukunft ausstrahlende Macht der Liebe die Gemeinschaft der Menschen untereinander. Durch die Liebe Gottes ist im Wirken und in der Botschaft Jesu die kommende Gottesherrschaft schon gegenwärtig.³⁰

Through the death and resurrection of Jesus, the power of God's love, or of his kingdom, is present in the world, and this creative love

gehen des Menschen in den Abläufen der Welt ausgeschlossen, sondern auch seine gänzliche Inanspruchnahme für innerweltliche Zwecke" (p. 280).

²⁹W. Pannenberg, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 1-23.

³⁰Ibid., p. 21.

creates human community. "Durch die Liebe nämlich erkennt der Mensch das ihm Entgegenstehende an, nimmt es so in sein eigenes Leben auf und gelangt damit zu einer Gemeinschaft, die vorher nicht bestand."³¹ Love itself cannot be used as a timeless norm or principle from which one can derive the content of a system of law.³² Concretely, the formative power of Christian love does not manifest itself in the creation of a new system of law, but in the constant criticism and, hence, transformation of already existing forms of law and of the organization of man's life in society in light of the love of God in Jesus Christ.³³

As with man's participation in the eschatological reality of God's salvation in Jesus Christ and man's knowledge of God, Christian

³¹Ibid.; cf. also idem, "Die Krise des Ethischen und die Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVII (1962), 7-16, where he emphasizes the creative character of love, which perceives need where it otherwise would not be seen. For Pannenberg, ethics cannot be simply oriented to the needs of the situation in which one finds himself, for this situation is ambiguous apart from the perception of creative love. "Erst die schöpferische Phantasie der Liebe entdeckt in der Situation eine Not und zugleich das Mittel, ihr abzuhelpfen" (ibid., col. 13; cf. esp. col. 12-14).

³²E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 11.

³³Ibid., pp. 8, 11, 22. On p. 8, Pannenberg states this in a general way that applies to any understanding of reality which the Christian proclamation encounters: "Aber dass von Jesus Christus her das Verständnis der Wirklichkeit neu erschlossen wird, bedeutet nicht, dass abgesehen davon überhaupt kein Verständnis der Wirklichkeit, zum Beispiel des Rechts, da wäre, sondern es bedeutet, dass jenes vorangehende Wirklichkeitsverständnis verwandelt wird. Und solche Verwandlung betrifft nicht nur das theoretische Verständnis des schon Vorhandenen, sondern kann auch zum Impuls seiner Umgestaltung werden. Um diese Verwandlung als solche in den Blick zu bringen, müssen jedoch die phänomenalen Gegebenheiten in den Ansatz der theologischen Frage aufgenommen werden. Erst so können die Vorgänge der Rechtsbildung in ihrer geschichtlichen Konkretheit zugänglich werden."

existence in relation to the revelation of God in Christ has the proleptic character of "now" but "not yet." Christian ethics and life in society have their ground in the presence of the power of God's kingdom and of his love in Jesus Christ. At the same time it is not the realization of that kingdom. That remains in the hands of God in the eschatological future. Christian existence is existence in relation to that future which has been proleptically revealed in Christ, and it is existence in full awareness of its own inadequacy and provisional character.

3. The particularity of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus as the final revelation of God seems to stand in some tension with Pannenberg's programmatic emphasis on all of history as the revelation of God. If God's revelation lies essentially in this particular person and his fate in history, what does it mean to speak of all of history as the revelation of God? What concrete form does this aspect of Pannenberg's theology have?

First, the relation between the revelation of God in Christ and in all of history involves the fact that all of history is not equally transparent to its meaning in relation to God.³⁴ Much of history in

³⁴This is indicated in connection with the crucifixion of Jesus in, e.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 252; cf. idem, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," section IV. Perhaps this could be expressed in relation to Heidegger's concept of history as Lichtungsgeschichte, as is suggested by James M. Robinson, "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith, esp. pp. 150-158. [German trans.: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 134-141].

itself is ambiguous and open to varying interpretations.³⁵ For example, what is the relation of history as the work of God to human sin and evil that comes to expression in history as well as to the suffering that characterizes so much of history?³⁶ When so much of history reflects man's sin and the power of evil in the world, how does one know anything of God in history except his wrath? When so much of history reflects the wrath and withdrawal of God, how can man know of the love and grace of God, which claims men and draws them into God's fellowship? If history is God's work in relation to man, what does it really say to us about God as he is God for man? The ambiguity and uncertainty of history finds its answer only in Jesus Christ, whose resurrection, being the prolepsis of the end of history, provides the key for the meaning of history. Only in God's grace in Jesus Christ do men know that behind the ambiguity and uncertainty of history God is at work in love--even though they cannot always see or understand that in this world. Only in Jesus Christ can men see that God's grace is hidden under his judgment in this world.

History has its real meaning as God's revelation only in its relation to that which God has done in Jesus Christ. God's revelation

³⁵E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, pp. 108-109.

³⁶Cf. the discussion of the relation between sin and judgment in W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 271-277; K. Koch, "Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, III (1955), 1-42; cf. G. von Rad, Theologie des Alten Testaments, I (2nd ed., 1958; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957), 261-271. A similar relation between sin and judgment is reflected, for example, in Ro. 1:18-32.

cannot be simply read out of the events in themselves. Apart from the proleptic revelation of the end of history in the resurrection of Jesus, these events remain obscure and ambiguous, for they lack the proper context within which they have their essential meaning. Within the context of the Christ event they are cast into a new light as God's work in history. These events in turn, as part of history, provide a part of the context for understanding all that is involved in the meaning of the history of Jesus as the revelation of God. In this way, Pannenberg speaks of the act of God in Jesus as the final revelation of God that illuminates the meaning of all of history as the work of God.³⁷

Second, the revelation of God does not happen in isolation from human experience, thought, and traditions, but it occurs within the context of these. Revelation happens within the context of a prior understanding of God on the part of man, although it does not only confirm this prior understanding but breaks and transforms it and, thus, takes up these pre-conceptions of God and fulfills them.³⁸ It is within this kind of interaction between the history of God's acts and men's thought world that a conception of God corresponding to his revelation comes about.³⁹ This relation between pre-conception and

³⁷ Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 103-111.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 107-109; idem, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 8.

³⁹ E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 269-270.

revelation is reflected in Pannenberg's discussion of the character of all speaking of God.⁴⁰ In praising God verbally, the normal sense of the words is given up, "und allein der Umgang des Beters mit Gott, die Erfahrung von Gottes weiterem konkreten Handeln vermag zu zeigen--in immer nur vorläufiger Weise--, was dabei aus unsern Worten geworden ist."⁴¹ Man's language provides the context within which further encounters with God's acts in history take place. On the other hand, God's continued work in history gives new content to and influences man's language.

Darum ist Gott nicht--gleichsam naturhaft--in Analogie zu unserm Reden von ihm, sondern--wiederum in einer Metapher gesagt--er macht sich unser metaphorisches Reden zueigen durch seine Offenbarung, und er gibt dadurch unsern lobpreisenden Worten erst ihren endgültigen Inhalt."⁴²

In this way, Jesus is the revelation of God within the context of the history of God with Israel, and in Jesus the nature of the God of Israel is first fully disclosed.⁴³ A similar, though not identical, relation exists between the revelation of God in Jesus and the perception of reality outside of Israel. The revelation of God in Jesus stands in a relation of critical fulfillment to these perceptions of reality, for as the gospel is proclaimed in relation to them, they are

⁴⁰W. Pannenberg, "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, esp. pp. 100-101, 107, 109, 112-115.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 101.

⁴²Ibid., p. 115.

⁴³W. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," to be published in Theology as History, eds. James M. Robinson and John E. Cobb, Jr. (New Frontiers in Theology, III; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers); idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 103-109.

taken up in the reality of God's self-disclosure in Christ, and, thus, they are both fulfilled and broken.⁴⁴ This corresponds to the universal character of the revelation of God in Christ. In this process, the criterion for the truth of the reality of God's revelation in Christ is its ability to ground these other perceptions of reality in a more adequate way as well as to handle phenomena that they were not able to handle.⁴⁵

It is through this emphasis on the revelation of God in Christ as embracing all human perceptions of reality and grounding them in a deeper way in a relationship of critical fulfillment that Pannenberg concretely ties together the revelation of God in Christ with the whole of history as God's self-disclosure. This character of the revelation of God as critically embracing all of man's perceptions of reality,

⁴⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), p. 15: "Die christliche Theologie konnte an den philosophischen Gottesgedanken nur anknüpfen, indem sie ihn zugleich durchbrach. Sie musste einerseits der philosophischen Frage nach dem wahren Gott standhalten und sie zu einer echten Erfüllung bringen; denn wenn auch das Wesen des biblischen Gottes sich nicht darin erschöpft, Ursprung des Vorhandenen und der sich immer wiederholenden, normalen Vorgänge zu sein, so muss er doch als Ursprung auch des Vorhandenen wenigstens denkbar bleiben. Hierin meldet sich die Notwendigkeit der Anknüpfung der christlichen Theologie an den philosophischen Gottesgedanken. . . . Die Theologie muss bis zu den Elementen des philosophischen Gottesgedankens vordringen und diese Elemente im kritischen Licht des biblischen Gottesglaubens umgestalten."

⁴⁵E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, esp. pp. 214, 215-223. "Die griechische Wahrheit ist also in der biblischen Wahrheit im Prinzip aufgehoben, sofern die letztere diejenigen Züge der Wirklichkeit miteinschliesst, die der griechische Wahrheitsgedanke von sich ausschliesst, ohne doch das Interesse am Bleibenden und Dauernden etwa weniger entschieden festzuhalten" (p. 222).

and, hence, all of history, is worked out in a variety of ways in Pannenberg's work. It is reflected in the discussion of the relation of the revelation of God in Christ to the history of God's revelation to Israel in the Old Testament,⁴⁶ the discussion of the nature of reality as history⁴⁷ and of the understanding of history,⁴⁸ and in the discussion of the structuring of human existence in society through justice.⁴⁹ It is also illustrated in the movement of the gospel into the Hellenistic world of the New Testament period, which involved the encounter between early Christian apocalyptic and the thought world of the mystery religions and of gnosticism,⁵⁰ and later in the encounter

⁴⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 107-108; also idem, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," to be published in Theology as History.

⁴⁷E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 214-239.

⁴⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 216-237, 259-288.

⁴⁹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 1-23; idem, "Die Krise des Ethischen und die Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 7-16.

⁵⁰Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 109-111, for the discussion in relation to gnosticism. Cf. also Ernst Käsemann, Das wandernde Gottesvolk: Eine Untersuchung zum Hebräerbrieft (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 37; 4th ed., 1961; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1957), p. 114: "Christus ist hier also telos des Mythos, wie er sonst als telos des Gesetzes beschrieben werden mag. weil er allen, Juden und Hellenisten, Erlöser ist, gibt er auch allen Antwort auf ihr Fragen: nicht nur den Juden auf ihr Gesetz, sondern auch den Hellenisten auf ihren Mythos. Er tut es jedoch beide Male so, dass er zugleich Gesetz und Mythos zerbricht." Käsemann's discussion of the relation of gnostic thought and Hebrews has to be extensively modified, of course, since Carsten Colpe has shown that the gnostic redeemer myth is not as

with the philosophical question of the true form of the divine, especially in the work of the apologists.⁵¹

In this way, Pannenberg seeks to bring to expression the universal character of God and of the Christian proclamation by showing its relation to the whole of reality as it comes to expression in history. In this respect, theology is a universal science, and one must have a "Christian philosophy" which is able critically to take up and embrace all of reality as it is perceived by man.⁵² This is the concrete form in which Pannenberg's emphasis on the revelation of God in all of history comes to expression. Once this is seen, one must examine the way in which Pannenberg understands the history of the proclamation of the gospel as a dimension of God's self-revelation to man.

such pre-Christian. C. Colpe, Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule: Darstellung und Kritik ihres Bildes vom gnostischen Erlösersmythus (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 60; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961).

⁵¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 1-45.

⁵²E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 7-14; idem, "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 9.

CHAPTER VI

REVELATION AND PROCLAMATION

If all of history is God's self-disclosure in which he encounters man, how is history since the resurrection of Jesus related to God's revelation? The meaning of this history is essentially given by its relation to the eschatological revelation of God in Jesus. "Die Geschichte nach Christus ist wesentlich bestimmt durch die Verkündigung der Christusoffenbarung."¹ This relation between the proclamation of the gospel and the revelation of God in Christ must now be examined. Since the proclamation aims at faith, which is the goal of God's revelation, it is then necessary to examine the relation between faith and revelation. Finally, the relation of the Holy Spirit and proclamation must be treated, since faith is God's work through his revelation so that the proclamation itself is the power of God.

1. Pannenberg's theology is polemically oriented against a theology of the word of God that identifies God's revelation with man's encounter by God in the present proclamation. This polemic involves two aspects. First, it is directed against a kerygmatic theology that Pannenberg thinks isolates the kerygma from the historical events in the ministry and fate of Jesus, in which it is grounded.² Against this,

¹W. Pannenberg, "Dogmatische Thesen zur Lehre von der Offenbarung," Offenbarung als Geschichte, W. Pannenberg et al. (Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1; 2nd ed., 1963; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), p. 106.

²E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur

the Pannenberg circle argues that the word of God in the Bible is not revelation in itself, but it is always related to events in history that are understood as the work of God in which he reveals himself.³ Thus, in the Old Testament, the commands of God are grounded in his revelation, Israel's traditions recount "history" as the work of God, and the prophetic word proclaims events in history as God's work of judgment or grace.⁴ Similarly, in the New Testament the kerygma is the proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Jesus as the eschatological saving act of God.⁵ The other aspect of this polemic is directed

Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad, eds. Klaus Koch and R. Rendtorff (Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961), pp. 132-134.

³E.g., R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 621-649, esp. 621-623; Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 13-15, 112-113, 135-139; cf. the criticism of Pannenberg's "devaluation" of the word of God, Günter Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Wolfhart Pannenberg (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 37; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), pp. 12-21. James Barr has made it clear that one cannot resort to "word studies" or etymologizing as the basis for a theology that cannot be established by examining what is said in the broader context, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). For his discussion of the Hebrew word dabar, cf. pp. 129-140. While it may be true that our modern concept of the word of God does not correspond with the use of the word in the Bible, Pannenberg makes it clear that the same is true of the modern concept of the revelation of God as his self-revelation (Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 11-16). In the latter case this leads him to pose the question as to whether there is something in the Bible which materially corresponds to the modern concept. It is not clear why the same procedure should not be followed in relation to the concept of the word of God.

⁴Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 112-113; R. Rendtorff, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1963), 621-649.

⁵W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 113-114.

against a conception of a supplementary "word revelation" that interprets and gives meaning to the events in which God reveals himself, which otherwise would be obscure. Hence, God's revelation occurs when this word leads to faith.⁶ Against such a conception Pannenberg emphasizes that the event itself is meaningful in its history of traditions context, and that the proclamation of this event does not bring anything new to the event but only unfolds its inherent meaning.⁷

This polemical orientation of Pannenberg's discussion of the concept of the word of God does not mean a complete rejection of the word of God as a dimension of God's self-revelation.⁸ The broader con-

⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 19-20, 113-114; R. Rendtorff, "Die Offenbarungsvorstellungen im Alten Israel," Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 40-41; also R. Rendtorff's formulation of the issue between himself and W. Zimmerli as the question of whether or not the word is something added to the event as a third thing, mediating between the event and the person experiencing it in order to give the event meaning, "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 622-623; cf. Paul Althaus, "Offenbarung als Geschichte und Glaube: Bemerkungen zu Wolfhart Pannenberg's Begriff der Offenbarung," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 326.

⁷W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 113-114.

⁸This misunderstanding of Pannenberg's intention is widespread. E.g., G. Klein, "Offenbarung als Geschichte? Marginalien zu einem theologischen Programm," Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), 321-334; *idem*, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, esp. pp. 12-21; Oswald Loretz, Die Wahrheit der Bibel (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1964), esp. pp. 43-50; Helmut Gollwitzer, Die Existenz Gottes im Bekenntnis des Glaubens (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 34; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963), pp. 114-117. When Gollwitzer emphasizes against G. Ebeling that language is both statement and communication (*ibid.*, pp. 138-139), this corresponds with Pannenberg's intention in the understanding of the kerygma, and he regards his discussion of the relation between the kerygma and the history of Jesus as a systematic working out of the aspect of the kerygma as statement.

text for the place of the concept of the word of God in Pannenberg's theology lies in history as Überlieferungsgeschichte, which involves traditions, thought world, hope, expectation, proclamation, understanding and changes in understanding, as well as events.⁹ History cannot be abstracted from language and meaning. In human history events are always involved with understanding or meaning in their history of traditions context. Only as such are they historic events that influence subsequent history and thought. Further, Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between the kerygma and revelation must be seen within the context of his understanding both of language as having its essential character in relation to its content or as statement and of the uniqueness of the Christ event as God's revelation.

For Pannenberg, the word of God in the New Testament, which is the kerygma or apostolic proclamation, is to be understood

als Bericht von dem Geschehen, in welchem Gott offenbar ist, als Bericht vom Geschick Jesu. . . . Als Bericht von der Offenbarung Gottes im Geschick Jesu ist das Ergehen des Kerygmas selbst ein Moment im Vollzug des Offenbarungsgeschehens.¹⁰

One side of this statement is its emphasis on the relation between the kerygma and the fate of Jesus. For Pannenberg, the kerygma is essentially the proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's decisive eschatological revelation or act for man's salvation. The proclamation is not something in and of itself; it is not independent of God's act in the past in Jesus Christ.¹¹ The kerygma derives

⁹Ibid., p. 112.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 113.

¹¹Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theo-

its essential character from its content, that is, from the cross and resurrection of Jesus, which is proclaimed into every human situation as God's decisive act for man's salvation.¹² In proclaiming this event, the kerygma does not bring something new to the saving event. Rather, it is the proclamation of the meaning that is inherent in the event itself in its history of traditions context.¹³ Since the kerygma derives its character from its content, the history of Jesus together with its meaning in its historical context is also the criterion for the adequacy or inadequacy of the proclamation:

Nur wenn die Geschichte Jesu--in ihrem ursprünglichen geschichtlichen Zusammenhang verstanden und nicht als isoliertes Einzelereignis--ihre Bedeutung in sich selbst hat, nur dann lässt sich zeigen, wie und inwieweit in der urchristlichen Überlieferungsgeschichte, in den verschiedenen Gestalten des urchristlichen Kerygmas, die dem Geschehen selbst innewohnende Bedeutung entfaltet worden ist, in der Sprache der jeweiligen Situation, oder inwieweit eine bestimmte Gestalt des Zeugnisses als in dieser oder jener Hinsicht verkürzte Aussage des Christusgeschehens beurteilt werden muss.¹⁴

The other side of Pannenberg's statement,¹⁵ which is often missed, is that, in view of its content, the kerygma is itself a moment

logie der alttestamentliche Überlieferungen, pp. 129-140, esp. p. 132. This is developed in W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie.

¹²Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 113.

¹³Ibid., pp. 19-20, 113-114.

¹⁴W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 90; note also the entire discussion on pp. 87-91.

¹⁵"Als Bericht von der Offenbarung Gottes im Geschick Jesu ist das Ergehen des Kerygmas selbst ein Moment im Vollzug des Offenbarungsgeschehens" (Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 113).

in God's self-revelation:

Das Wort des Kerygma ist eben nicht selbst erst das eigentliche Offenbarungsgeschehen, sondern es ist ein Moment des Offenbarungsgeschehens, indem es von dem eschatologischen Ereignis berichtet, das in sich selbst suffizienter Selbsterweis Gottes ist, der zur allgemeinen Kundmachung treibt und durch sie allenthalb expliziert wird.¹⁶

Hence, for Pannenberg, the historical events in the life and fate of Jesus and the proclamation of these events belong intrinsically together as two dimensions of God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. They cannot be separated from one another without becoming one-sided.¹⁷

An event in history includes its meaning or understanding. However, understanding is essentially a linguistic process in which meaning comes to expression in language.¹⁸ The kerygma is the coming to

¹⁶W. Pannenberg, ibid., p. 114.

¹⁷To be sure, it may be asked whether the way Pannenberg has expressed the connection between history and proclamation does not in fact subordinate the proclamation to the history in a way that is inadequate to both. In distinction from Bultmann, whose primary orientation is toward the present proclamation as revelation, Pannenberg's primary emphasis is on the past history as the self-sufficient revelation of God. This should perhaps be seen in connection with the emphasis he places on the revelation of God as the demonstration that the God of Israel is God of the whole world, which is also related to the question of the demonstration of the existence of God. The relation between history and proclamation as dimensions of God's revelation would perhaps be seen more clearly if the character of God's acts in history as salvation or judgment over against men were more in the foreground. Certainly, Pannenberg himself sees a close relation between revelation and salvation in that salvation as community with God is possible only on the ground of his drawing near to man in his revelation (ibid., p. 101). But must not the entire discussion of the concept of revelation be oriented to the character of God's acts in history as judgment or salvation in relation to men? Cf. Günter Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 46-50.

¹⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte,"

expression in language of the cross and resurrection of Jesus and of its meaning as the saving act of God for men. This means that the proclamation of the Christ event belongs to the essential meaning and character of that event.¹⁹ The eschatological character of the history of Jesus as God's eschatological revelation in which he draws near to all men of all times, claiming them for himself and granting them community with himself, means that it must be proclaimed as such to all men in every human situation. This proclamation brings to expression the universal character of that event as God's once for all act for the salvation of all men,²⁰ corresponding to the universality of God, who has revealed himself in this event.²¹ This means that a second criterion of the adequacy of the concrete formulations of the kerygma is their ability to speak to and to embrace the human situation to which the kerygma is addressed and the world of thought or the understanding of reality in relation to which it is proclaimed.²² While this brings new dimensions of the meaning of the Christ event to light, this itself

Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 111.

¹⁹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960, No. 4, pp. 7-8.

²⁰E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 109-111, 113.

²¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 12-16; idem, "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, 7-14.

²²E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 93-94, 97-98.

belongs to the meaning of that event as a historic event.

This means, further, that the kerygma is not to be understood as a second event in which God reveals himself next to or independent of his act in Jesus Christ. This corresponds to the uniqueness of the Christ event as God's full self-disclosure in which he determines man's relation to himself.²³ The kerygma is the means by which the Christ event, in which God was present to men in a decisive way, is made present in its meaningfulness to men of all times and all places as God's saving act for them. Hence, in view of its content, the kerygma shares in the basic character of the act of God in Jesus Christ, which it proclaims, as God's eschatological self-disclosure to men. If God is present to men as he would be God for them in Jesus Christ, then the proclamation of that event is the means by which God encounters men in their existence as God for them. If God elects men to community with himself in Jesus Christ, then the kerygma is the concrete means by which God encounters men and elects them to salvation, making the Christ event effective in their existence for salvation.²⁴ If the cross of Christ is the grace of God in which he forgives men's sins, then the kerygma is his grace in which he makes that forgiveness pres-

²³Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 8-11; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), pp. 124-131.

²⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), 614-621, esp. 620; idem, "Prädestination IV. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961), 487-489, esp. 489.

ent to men. If the resurrection of Jesus makes the powers of new life from God or the gift of the Holy Spirit present in history, then the proclamation of the gospel is the means by which men are made participants of this new life or by which they are given the Holy Spirit. In view of its content, the word of God is the Spirit-filled word.²⁵ The promise of God's salvation in Jesus Christ is proclaimed to men, forgiving their sins, opening community with God, giving them a new existence in hope and trust in God for the future. As such the proclamation is not a neutral report of a past event.²⁶ It is the confrontation of men and the reality in which they live with the claim and promise of God, who alone determines all things, and it is the means by which God imparts his grace to men and calls forth faith from men.

2. The revelation of God attains its goal as revelation "wo sie Glauben wirkt und also jemandem offenbar wird," as well as in the future fulfillment of God's promise in the resurrection of the dead.²⁷ Faith is an essential moment in the revelation of God, for only through faith does his work in Christ accomplish its essential purpose for man. However, Pannenberg thinks that this relation is expressed better in the formula "revelation as history for faith" than in Althaus's formula

²⁵E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube: Antwort an Paul Althaus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 85, n. 6, 89-90.

²⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 112.

²⁷W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube: Antwort an Paul Althaus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 90.

"revelation as history and faith," because the former brings to expression the extra nos of God's revelation as the ground of faith.²⁸ This corresponds to the nature of faith and its relation to God's promise. "G[laube] ist für ev[angelische] Theologie der umfassende Ausdruck für das christliche Leben als Empfang der in Gottes Handeln beschlossenen Heilszusage (promissio) an den Menschen."²⁹

Faith is essentially trust in God that is grounded in his promise. Hence, it is to be distinguished from knowledge (notitia) and from holding certain things to be true (assensus).³⁰ This character of faith as trust oriented to God's promise involves three other aspects of faith. First, faith as trust in God is the abandonment of oneself and one's own security in reliance on God, who alone can fulfill his promise. Faith is faith in God. The certainty of salvation is, therefore, grounded only in God and in his promise. Since God is never at man's disposal, the only relation man can have with God is one of unqualified trust in God. God and faith belong essentially together.³¹

²⁸Ibid., col. 90; Paul Althaus, "Offenbarung als Geschichte und Glaube: Bemerkungen zu Wolfhart Pannenberg's Begriff der Offenbarung," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 321-330.

²⁹W. Pannenberg, "Glaube IV. Im prot. Glaubensverständnis," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, IV (2nd ed.; Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1960), 493.

³⁰Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 83-84. For Pannenberg, this distinction also means that faith cannot be understood as a means by which one has knowledge or holds certain things to be true in a way that is not possible for the ordinary ways that a man acquires knowledge.

³¹Esp. W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 139/140;

Second, faith is directed toward God's faithfulness and toward the future to which God's promise is directed. This future is not something that is at our disposal. It lies only in God's hands. Our only relation to that future is trust and hope grounded in the promise of God. Faith has the character of hope in God. Third, as trust in God, faith is the form of obedience to God that corresponds to the character of his revelation as promise.³² As obedience to the known promise of God, however, faith is distinct from daring or from a leap into the unknown.³³

As trust or obedience to God's promise, faith involves all aspects of man's existence: "Vertrauen ist Hingabe der ganzen Existenz des Menschen in Erkennen, Wollen, Tun, Erleben. Solche Hingabe entsteht da, wo ein Mensch seiner gänzlichen Angewiesenheit auf Gottes Verheissung inne wird."³⁴ That faith is the abandonment of oneself to the object of faith from which one lives means that faith unites one with its object.³⁵ In faith one participates in Christ from whom and

Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), p. 26; to the concept of faith, pp. 22-31.

³²For these three aspects of the structure of faith, cf. W. Pannenberg, "Glaube IV. Im prot. Glaubensverständnis," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, IV (2nd ed., 1960), 493-494.

³³Ibid., col. 495; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 101.

³⁴W. Pannenberg, "Glaube IV. Im prot. Glaubensverständnis," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, IV (2nd ed., 1960), 494.

³⁵Ibid.: "Der Vertrauende lebt jenseits seiner selbst aus dem, worauf er sich verlässt. So hat der Glaubende am Inhalt der Verheissung . . . an Christus . . . teil, weil Jesus Christus an unsere

in whom faith lives and who existed for faith. In this community or unity with Christ, the believer shares in the benefits of Christ, in which our sins are taken by Christ and we participate in his righteousness, thus being justified. The believer's life is grounded in Christ. Because Christ lives in him through faith (Gal. 2:20), faith necessarily produces works of love (Gal. 5:8).³⁶ Faith derives its essential character from its ground in Jesus Christ and from its hope for the fulfillment of God's promise in Jesus Christ.

How do men come to faith? Faith as trust or obedience to God's promise is not something that men produce in themselves. Otherwise, their relation to God would be determined by something they do. In every aspect of their relation to God, men are completely dependent on God and his grace. Faith is produced in men by God through his revelation by which he is present to men with his grace and power.³⁷ That God is the source of faith corresponds to the fact that the revelation of God is the ground of faith. This relation between revelation and faith is based on the character of God's revelation as promise rather than as a supernatural impartation of knowledge.³⁸ The revelation of God in the history of Jesus is the event of the promise of God

Stelle getreten ist, unsere Sünde auf sich nahm, um uns an sich Anteil zu geben."

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 81-82.

³⁸Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Glaube IV. Im prot. Glaubensverständnis," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, IV (2nd ed., 1960), 493.

in history.³⁹ The fact that the Christ event has meaning in its historical context as God's act for man's salvation and, thus, as the ground of our salvation gives this event the character of promise so that the only adequate relation to God's revelation and, hence, to God is faith. Second, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is the ground of faith because it is the event of God's grace by means of which he forgives men's sins and elects them to salvation.⁴⁰ Third, God's work in Christ for men is the ground of faith as the demonstration of his grace and faithfulness. Trust is not possible when its object is simply unknown. Trust must be motivated or called forth by its object. In the cross and resurrection of Jesus, God has revealed himself as the infinite God, who is not an object at man's disposal, but who, in his grace, does not destroy man.⁴¹ In Jesus, God has manifested his grace, forgiving the sins of men and taking them into community with himself. In the cross and resurrection of Jesus, God has shown his love and his faithfulness to his promise (although God's faithfulness is apparent only to faith), and the power of new life from God, which he gives men

³⁹Cf. the discussion of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, supra, pp. 155-172.

⁴⁰E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 195-288, 357-361; idem, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 614-621, esp. 616, 619-620; idem, "Prädestination IV. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, V (3rd ed., 1961), 487-489.

⁴¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Mythus und Wort: Theologische Überlegungen zu Karl Jaspers' Mythusbegriff," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LI (1954), esp. 180-185; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 30-31.

by his grace and which is proleptically present to men in the gift of the Holy Spirit, is manifested in history. This demonstrative aspect of God's revelation in history distinguishes it from a concept of revelation as word, in that the word, whether it be the prophetic word, the word of Jesus, or the kerygma, does not carry its legitimation in itself but only in relation to its execution from God or to its ground in the acts of God in history.⁴²

If God's revelation is the ground of faith as the means by which he calls forth faith in men, and if God's revelation is his gracious act in history for man's salvation, then faith can arise only in relation to knowledge of that event as the event of God's grace for men. "Das Wissen von Gottes Offenbarung in der seine Gottheit erweisenden

⁴²Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 112-114; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 47-61, esp. p. 61: "Der Vollmachtsanspruch Jesu kann nicht isoliert für sich, als ob es nur um die 'Entscheidung' ihm gegenüber ginge, zur Grundlage einer Christologie gemacht werden. Eine solche Christologie--und eine so begründete Predigt--bliebe im Kern eine leere Behauptung. Vielmehr kommt alles an auf die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen dem Anspruch Jesu und seiner Bestätigung durch Gott." Cf. also Klaus Koch, "Der Tod des Religionsstifters: Erwägungen über das Verhältnis Israels zur Geschichte der altorientalischen Religionen," Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 103, n. 12, where he points out that the concept of the divine word as law and promise is common to the ancient Near East, and that "die Eigentümlichkeit Israels ist die konsequente Verbindung des so verstandenen Gotteswortes mit den Wendepunkten der Geschichte. Dadurch--und nur dadurch--wird freilich die israelitische Rede vom Gotteswort zu etwas Einzigartigem." Cf. Martin Noth, "Geschichte und Gotteswort im Alten Testament," Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament (Theologische Bücherei 6; 2nd ed., 1960; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957), pp. 230-247; Walther Zimmerli, "Verheissung und Erfüllung," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 42, reprinted in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik, ed. Claus Westermann (Theologische Bücherei 11; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960), p. 80.

Geschichte muss also Grund des Glaubens sein."⁴³ This knowledge is not only the knowledge of certain facts of history. It includes the knowledge of the meaning of the history of Jesus as the revelation of God and, thus, of its character as promise.⁴⁴ Such knowledge is, to be sure, not yet faith, for faith arises only when a man is caught up in this history so that it becomes God's act for his salvation, in which God's promise applies to his existence, and his existence is characterized by abandonment to God in trust in his promise.⁴⁵ For Pannenberg,

⁴³W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 101. This may be an unfortunate formulation in that it implies that the ground of faith lies in the human dimension of knowledge, and thus it raises the counter question as to whether the ground of faith does not rather lie in God and his revelation. Cf. the criticism by Paul Althaus, "Offenbarung als Geschichte und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 321-324; Ulrich Kühn, "Theologie als Gottesdienst," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 122; G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 54-71. Klein's discussion of Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between knowledge and faith is problematic in view of Klein's failure to discuss this in the context of Pannenberg's emphasis on the process of knowledge as involving the structure of anticipation and subsequent confirmation, modification, or rejection, in view of his failure to enter into Pannenberg's emphasis on knowledge as arising from the subject matter with sufficient clarity, as well as in view of Klein's basic orientation of his whole discussion to the assumption that Pannenberg intends to eliminate the word of God from an essential role for the revelation of God.

⁴⁴W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 86-88, where he answers Paul Althaus's insistence, "Offenbarung als Geschichte und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 325, that fides historica, which is presupposed by faith, consists only of the knowledge of the happenedness of the history but not of the revelation of God in this history.

⁴⁵W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 87; idem, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 86-87: "Das einzige, was der Unglaube nicht sieht, ist das pro me des Geschehens, von dem die Schrift zeugt, der Artikel von der Vergebung der Sünden."

this relation between faith and knowledge of God's revelation in Christ is necessary to preserve the essential character of faith as grounded outside itself in God and his revelation.⁴⁶

What does this relation between knowledge and faith mean for the relation between faith and the initiative of God? Does it not ultimately ground one's relation to God in the human dimension or activity of knowledge and make God and his revelation an object at man's disposal? For Pannenberg, the knowledge of God's revelation is not simply a confirmation of that which man can know through his reason, because "niemand aus eigener Vernunft und Kraft zur Erkenntnis Gottes kommt. . . . Die Gott offenbarenden Ereignisse und die Botschaft, die von diesem Geschehen berichtet, bringen den Menschen zu einer Erkenntnis, die er nicht aus sich selbst hat."⁴⁷ The knowledge of the revelation of God through which faith arises is given man by God through his revelation, just as knowledge is produced by its object in many other cases.⁴⁸ Within its history of traditions context, the revelation of

⁴⁶W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 81-85; idem, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, p. 18; idem, "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar?" Radius, 1960, No. 4, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁷W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 100.

⁴⁸Also, e.g., ibid., pp. 136-137; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 21-22; idem, "Die Frage nach Gott," to be published in Evangelische Theologie. Cf. the criticisms of Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between faith and knowledge by Günter Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, pp. 54-71, esp. pp. 55-57. Klein's discussion is marred by the failure to enter into this aspect of Pannenberg's discussion more clearly. The assumption that knowledge can be simply subsumed under the category of human work in relation to that which is at man's disposal, which Klein makes,

God in Christ speaks its own language of promise and has its own persuasive power which calls men to faith. The Holy Spirit, or the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, is not to be understood as supplementing the ordinary human capacity for knowledge or human reason. Rather, the Holy Spirit works through the revelation of God and its proclamation to bring man to faith, that is, the Holy Spirit works through the knowledge of the revelation of God in Christ.⁴⁹

This emphasis on the logical priority of knowledge to faith corresponds to Pannenberg's emphasis on the kerygma as statement as well as the communication of God's grace. As the proclamation of the Christ event, the kerygma is the means by which men are brought to the knowledge of the promise of God in Jesus Christ.⁵⁰ However, the persuasive power of the kerygma to call forth faith and, thus, to grant proleptic participation in the new life from God that has been manifested in this world in the resurrection of Jesus is grounded in its content, namely, in the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's saving

is rejected by Pannenberg as an inadequate understanding of knowledge. Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Die Frage nach Gott," esp. n. 19. Pannenberg could bring this dimension of knowledge more clearly to expression. For one thing, it needs to be made clear how he understands the relation between this and knowledge as the creative activity of man. Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit: Festschrift für Heinrich Vogel, ed. Kurt Scharf (Berlin: Lettner-Verlag, 1962), pp. 225-231. This is also the question of the way that the imaginatively projected theory comes into being and its relation to the revelation of God and its proclamation in the kerygma.

⁴⁹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 85-86, 89-90.

⁵⁰Cf. ibid., cols. 84-86.

act for men. "Die Überzeugungskraft der Christusbotschaft kann nur von ihrem Inhalt ausgehen."⁵¹ The kerygma shares in the essential character of the events that it proclaims. Because of its content, the proclamation is the means by which God encounters men with his grace and creates faith in men. The power of the word as God's work derives essentially from the event that it proclaims and from the meaning of that event as God's promise through which he creates new life for man, forgiving his sins and opening the future.⁵²

Since the kerygma is the power of God in view of its content or its character as statement, the fact that the kerygma is the means by which God encounters men and imparts his grace to them does not avoid the problem of the logical priority of knowledge to faith. First, through the proclamation of the gospel, through which God brings him to faith, the believer knows or understands something about the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's saving act. Second, faith presupposes the adequacy or truth of its ground in Jesus Christ. However, as trust in God, faith abandons itself, including its knowledge, and is sustained by God and his grace alone. It can be justified only by God and his faithfulness in the future. This means that faith has a certain independence in relation to the state of the knowledge of its

⁵¹Ibid., col. 86.

⁵²Ibid., cols. 85-86. Cf. Gerhard Ebeling, Wort und Glaube (2nd ed., 1962; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), pp. 342-343; and Pannenberg's criticism in "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 112-113.

ground and to the concrete formulations of the kerygma.⁵³

Faith continues to live and be sustained, however, from its ground in the grace of God in Jesus Christ and the proclamation of that event:

Dass in der Verkündigung von Christus die ewige E[rwählung] Gottes die Hörenden ergreift, ist die Grundlage der christlichen Heilsgewissheit. . . . Diese Gewissheit der E[rwählung] besitzt der Glaubende aber nur, insofern er das Wort des Evangeliums von Jesus Christus hört, ihm glaubt, sein ganzes Leben davon durchdringen lässt.⁵⁴

This means that faith itself cannot avoid the problem of the knowledge of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and of the truth of the kerygma. Faith's presupposition of the truth of the gospel as God's word of grace in Jesus Christ must always be examined. This understanding of the relation between faith, knowledge, and future confirmation or verification corresponds to the structure of Pannenberg's theory of knowledge.⁵⁵ For the Christian, faith is the context for historical and theological research, and the kerygma takes the role of the theory in terms of which such research is done. Within Christian

⁵³W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 101-102.

⁵⁴W. Pannenberg, "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, II (3rd ed., 1958), 620.

⁵⁵It is within this horizon that Pannenberg's emphasis on the distinction between the logic of faith, in which faith presupposes the knowledge of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ and its truth, and the "psychology" of faith, in which knowledge and faith in fact arise simultaneously and in which faith is always an anticipation of the confirmation of the faithfulness of God to his promise in Jesus Christ in the future, is to be understood. Cf. W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 34-38; idem, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 102, n. 15, 144-147.

faith, it is always necessary to ask the question of the reality of the events that are proclaimed as God's saving work for men and to ask about the adequacy of the kerygma as the interpretation of the meaning of the history of Jesus as God's eschatological revelation in its historical context. This involvement with understanding the meaning of the history of Jesus in its relation to the present situation opens up new possibilities for understanding and proclaiming the gospel.⁵⁶ This knowledge of God's grace and the truth of his love in Jesus Christ is always provisional and inadequate to the full reality of God and his gracious salvation for men. Ultimately, the only certainty of God's grace lies in trust in God on the basis of the gospel of his love for man in Jesus Christ, and the only confirmation of the truth of the promise of God in Jesus Christ rests with God himself and his faithfulness in the future.⁵⁷ Similarly, the full reality of what God's salvation means for man will only be known in the resurrection of the dead when God brings what he has done in Jesus Christ for men to its completion.⁵⁸ Man's present knowledge of the grace of God in Jesus Christ is the means by which God calls forth and sustains faith. But faith itself involves the abandonment of oneself and one's knowledge in trust in God and his grace alone.

⁵⁶E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 89-94, 96-99.

⁵⁷E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, p. 147.

⁵⁸E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit, pp. 236-237; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 30-31, 39-40.

3. The relation between the kerygma, the revelation of God, and faith poses the final question of the power of the word of God as the means by which he works in human existence to bring men to faith and, thus, of the word of God as the means through which his saving power is present in man's existence. This is the question of the relation between the Holy Spirit, the word of God, and faith. How is the Holy Spirit related to the kerygma and to faith? For Pannenberg, the Holy Spirit is not the condition for the knowledge of the revelation of God in the Christ event or an additional presupposition to the gospel that supplements human reason. The Holy Spirit is the gift that faith receives rather than faith being the gift of the Spirit.⁵⁹ This does not mean that the Holy Spirit has nothing to do with a man coming to faith, but the Holy Spirit cannot be used as a criterion for the truth of the message or as a substitute for the persuasive power of the content of the kerygma.⁶⁰ The Holy Spirit is not additional or supplementary to the word and its persuasive power, but the Holy Spirit works through the word.⁶¹ "Der Geist, der erleuchtet, führt zur Wahrheit des

⁵⁹Cf. W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, pp. 99-100; idem, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 85, n. 6; cf. Rudolf Bultmann, Theologie des Neuen Testaments (3rd ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958), p. 331 (to Gal. 3:2, 5, 14).

⁶⁰W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 85-86.

⁶¹Ibid., col. 89; idem, "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 86; idem, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 276-277; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 173.

Wortes und erweist sich so als die Macht des Wortes selbst."⁶²

As the character of the kerygma in general is derived from its content, the same is also true of the relation between the Holy Spirit and the proclamation. Pannenberg points out the Old Testament concept of the Holy Spirit as the power of God in which all life has its origin.⁶³ From this standpoint, the Holy Spirit and the resurrection of Jesus are bound inseparably together:

Wo in irgendeiner Weise ein Bezug zur Wirklichkeit des Auferstandenen besteht, wie er durch das Hören der Botschaft von der Auferweckung Jesu begründet wird, da ist man schon im Wirkungsbereich des Geistes. Und derjenige, der der Botschaft von der Auferweckung Jesu glaubt, hat damit schon den Geist empfangen, der dem Glaubenden die künftige Auferweckung vom Tode verbürgt, weil er Jesus schon auferweckt hat. . . .

Alles, was in einem Bezug zur Wirklichkeit des Auferstandenen steht, ist von der Lebensmacht des göttlichen Geistes erfüllt.⁶⁴

Because of the relation between the Holy Spirit and the reality of the resurrection of Jesus, the proclamation of this event is itself filled with the Spirit. Therefore, through the kerygma the believer receives the Holy Spirit, because the kerygma communicates its subject matter to him and makes him a participant in the eschatological reality of God's revelation in Jesus through faith.⁶⁵ It is within this horizon that

⁶²W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 89.

⁶³W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 170-172. For Pannenberg's most extensive discussion of the concept of the Holy Spirit, cf. pp. 170-185.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 172; also "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 89-90.

⁶⁵Ibid., cols. 85, 89.

Pannenberg understands the relation between the Holy Spirit, the kerygma, and faith. The Holy Spirit, or God,⁶⁶ brings man to faith through the proclamation of the gospel, which proclaims the revelation of God in Jesus as his work for man's salvation. On the other hand, only in faith, which is brought about through the kerygma, are men brought into participation in the eschatological reality of the revelation of God in the resurrection of Jesus. The Holy Spirit is mediated to men in the kerygma through faith. The Holy Spirit and its power are bound to the word of the gospel and the persuasive power of its content. The power of the word lies in the fact that it calls men to faith and, thus, makes them participants in the eschatological reality of new life in community with God, which has appeared in history in the resurrection of Jesus. Men receive the Holy Spirit as the foretaste of that new life, which is given to them only by God's grace in the resurrection of the dead.

In view of this, one cannot speak of the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit as something supplementary to the revelation of God in Christ and its proclamation in the kerygma. Such enlightenment is necessary because the pre-judgments of men make it difficult for them to see the truth, even when it is clear. Among these pre-judgments in relation to the revelation of God are the normal human standards and criteria, including religious ones, which have to be overcome if men are to see and understand the truth of the gospel. However, the

⁶⁶Cf. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 173-176.

enlightening work of the Holy Spirit that overcomes these pre-judgments so that men see and understand the truth does not add anything to the meaning of the saving events or to the subject matter of the kerygma. Rather, the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit lies in the persuasive power of the kerygma's subject matter, namely, of the events in which God has revealed himself and that are proclaimed in their meaningfulness in the kerygma. The work of the Holy Spirit is bound to the word in view of the content of that word. This enlightenment frees man's reason so that he can see and understand the truth of the revelation of God in the history of Jesus of Nazareth.⁶⁷

⁶⁷Cf. esp. W. Pannenberg, "Einsicht und Glaube," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 38-89.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

The contributions of Pannenberg's theology will be summarized in connection with his understanding of language, of history, and of the relation between theology and history. Then, the problems will be summarized in connection with the question of revelation and salvation and of the understanding of the word of God as a historic event in which he encounters human existence and discloses himself to men.

1. Since the beginning of dialectical theology, Protestant theology in Germany has been essentially a theology of the word of God in one way or another. If the revelation of God basically occurs when he encounters human existence in the kerygma, the problem of the relation between the proclamation and the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's revelation is posed. Thus, Bultmann regards the kerygma as the proclamation of the cross and resurrection of Jesus as God's eschatological saving act. As such it is the means by which God is present to men with his forgiving grace, laying claim on their existence and calling them to faith. If the kerygma is essentially understood as God's address, then one cannot legitimately seek to go behind the kerygma to ask about its ground in the historical Jesus, for this would be disobedience and lack of faith over against God's claim. This isolation of the kerygma from the question of the historical Jesus met with widespread dissatisfaction, even from among theologians associating themselves with Bultmann. Among the Bultmannians, another pos-

sibility for a theology of the word of God has been posed by Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs. They understand the word of God primarily in terms of what it communicates to human existence, that is, in terms of what it imparts to men, as, for example, faith or love. This possibility lay close at hand in the Lutheran categories of law and gospel. In this case it is both possible and necessary to ask about the continuity of the kerygma with Jesus by asking about the continuity of that which the kerygma communicates to human existence. In distinction from Bultmann, the proclamation of Jesus moves more into the foreground, and the cross and resurrection tend to become a part of Jesus' proclamation.

Pannenberg correctly asks whether to focus attention on the kerygma primarily as address or as communication in this way does not represent an abstract concept of language. Can one consider language as address or as communication in isolation from its character as statement, that is, in isolation from the content of what is said? Pannenberg argues that language must be understood as statement, having some subject matter or content. To try to understand language apart from its concrete content, that is, apart from what is said, is an abstraction. Only as statement is language address or does it communicate something to human existence. Thus, an adequate understanding of the kerygma or of the word of God cannot only discuss it in terms of its character as God's address to men or in terms of its communication of God's grace, of faith, or of love to human existence, although this cannot be minimized. The kerygma derives its essential character

as the word of God in which God addresses men and communicates his grace to them from its content, namely, from the cross and resurrection of Jesus as the eschatological saving work of God for men. This means that the examination of the relation of the kerygma to the work of God in Jesus Christ is both necessary and legitimate, because it corresponds to the character of the kerygma as the word of God as the proclamation of the work of God in the history of Jesus. This examination of the relation between the kerygma and the history of Jesus involves two aspects: the question both of the reality of the events that are proclaimed as the saving work of God and of the adequacy of the kerygma as the proclamation of the inherent meaning of the history of Jesus as God's eschatological saving act in changing historical situations. One of Pannenberg's contributions to the theological discussion is to pose this question of the relation between the kerygma as statement and as the address of God or the communication of his grace to men as well as to work out some of the implications of what it would mean to take the dimension of language as statement seriously in the understanding of the word of God. This is a question that must be considered seriously, even when one does not agree with Pannenberg. The importance of taking the dimension of language as statement seriously in understanding the word of God is the scope of Pannenberg's statements about the relation of the word of God and history rather than a desire to eliminate the concept of the word of God as such from theology. However, this would mean that more attention must be given to the content of the kerygma, that is, to the meaning of the history of Jesus as the eschatological

saving work of God and its relation to the present historical situation and its world of thought.

If one must ask about the adequacy of the kerygma as an interpretation of the history of Jesus, how can the question of the meaning of the history of Jesus be posed in an adequate way? At this point, Pannenberg's understanding of history as the history of traditions, that is, as the interaction between event and meaning or between event and language, is also helpful. Events in human history always happen and are experienced within a linguistic world of thought given by the history of traditions within which the people experiencing them live. Within this world of thought, the events are experienced with some kind of meaning by the people involved. They may fit in with this world of thought, they may result in certain modifications of it, or they may radically call it into question and break it. In any case, the event has its meaning for these people in the way it interacts with their linguistic world of thought or their traditions. The meaning of the event belongs inherently to that event as a historic event, and the event in its historicness comes to expression in language in a way that embraces both the event and its meaning. This, in turn, becomes a part of the historic traditions or of the world of thought of men, influencing the way that subsequent events are experienced in a meaningful way. The history of traditions preserves events in their historic significance for the people involved, and the role of the events in the history of traditions itself belongs to the historic significance of those events. Sometimes, as in the uniting of the various Israelite

tribes to form the amphictyony, the event itself does not come directly to expression in the traditions, but all that remains is its significance for the history of traditions, which is the historic significance of the event for the future. Thus, events in history have meaning as historic events within the world of thought or traditions of the people experiencing them, and these events in turn influence this world of thought, modifying it or sharply transforming it, and, thus, these events become a part of the history of traditions within which new events are experienced meaningfully.

It is this interaction between events and meaning or between events and language in the history of traditions that those associated with the Pannenberg circle mean when they speak of history. History is essentially bound up with meaning, and since understanding takes place only in language, this means that history is essentially related to language. This also means that understanding or changes in understanding, which are events in language, are also historic events. It is this total complex of event, meaning, and language that constitutes history as the means by which God encounters men, revealing himself and imparting his grace to them. Furthermore, in this way, the meaning of events as the revelation of God in which he is present to men in judgment and grace is not something that is added to the events in a secondary way. Rather, this meaning is inherent to the events in their history of traditions context, which includes both their immediate significance in the thought world within which they happen and their significance for the following course of history.

Thus, Pannenberg seeks to interpret the resurrection of Jesus within the context of the Jewish apocalyptic expectation of the full self-disclosure of God at the end of history in the eschatological judgment, which gives all other events in history their real significance in relation to God. Within this context, the resurrection of Jesus is understood as the prolepsis of the end of history and, thus, as the final eschatological revelation of God. Within the context of the ministry of the pre-Easter Jesus, this means that the history of Jesus is God's saving work for men, in which he is present to men with his gracious forgiveness. God's grace in Jesus Christ is the only ground for the salvation of men or for their community with God. Further, within the context of the ministry and of the resurrection of Jesus, the cross has meaning as God's saving act in which Jesus died for the sins of men in order that the forgiving grace of God may be present to all men. Thus, the history of Jesus is the means by which God acts to give men community with himself, and through faith in Jesus the power of the new life of the new age of God's rule is proleptically present to men in this world in the gift of the Holy Spirit. That the history of Jesus is the definitive, eschatological revelation of God for all men means that this history itself belongs to the essence of God so that one cannot speak adequately of God apart from the way he is God for men in Jesus Christ. This is the ground for the Christological statements about the unity of Christ with God. This way of understanding the relation of the history of Jesus to the kerygma and theology means that the ministry of Jesus has its impor-

tance for the proclamation of the gospel, but at the same time the cross and resurrection of Jesus as the saving work of God remains the center of the kerygma so that the proclamation of the gospel cannot be understood as a continuation of Jesus' proclamation.

This understanding of history as the interaction between event and meaning in the history of traditions is one of the helpful contributions of Pannenberg's program that deserves careful consideration, even if one does not entirely agree with his precise reconstruction of the historical context in which the history of Jesus is meaningful. Furthermore, even though the role of apocalyptic for Jesus and the early church is debated, to see the history of Jesus within the context of Jewish apocalyptic, even though this history may break that world of thought, represents a real possibility that needs to be examined thoroughly both historically and systematically. The danger of such a theological program, which is oriented to the inherent meaning of the events themselves in their history of traditions context, is that it could tend to define the possible relations between event and meaning in terms of its theological system or theory of knowledge rather than being open to the history itself to inform it of what is possible or not. For example, is the concept of the resurrection of the dead the necessary presupposition for understanding the proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus, or is the reverse also possible? Another danger is that one could overlook the limitations of the historian's knowledge of first century Judaism, of the historical Jesus, and of the development of the theology of the early church in the apostolic period. His-

torical study must always be conscious of its limits lest it assume it can do too much. One has to be open to the possibility that at many points one may not be able to go behind the early Christian kerygma to determine anything more than the possibility of this as an interpretation of the meaning of the history of Jesus. However, if the limits of historical knowledge are kept in mind, this method offers a helpful possibility for theology.

There are other things that Pannenberg's theology of history brings clearly to expression. With his emphasis on truth as historic and on the revelation of God in history, Pannenberg's theology makes clear the historicness of God's revelation. The self-disclosure of God is the encounter of man by God in God's work in history. God's revelation is not the disclosure of some timeless truth or reality, in which case revelation would mean that that which is always true about God becomes known to man. Revelation does not mean that the structure of the world, or even the structure of history, is an expression of the nature of God as its origin in such a way that man can deduce the nature of God from the structures of this world. That God's revelation takes place in history means that God reveals himself by acting in his contingent freedom in relation to man, and in his acts God freely chooses how he will be God for man. In this way, God is immediately present to man in his revelation rather than hidden behind his work. This also means that the revelation of God takes place under historically conditioned circumstances. Thus, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ has its meaning within a particular historically conditioned

world of thought, which involves the necessity of a historical canon of Scripture. Within that context, however, the history of Jesus has meaning as God's eschatological revelation in which he acted in a decisive way for the salvation of men. The meaning of the history of Jesus as the revelation of God cannot be abstracted from the historical world of thought within which it took place. Its meaning must be understood within that world of thought, even though it is strange and foreign to people of other times. Yet, because of its eschatological character as God's revelation, the history of Jesus must be proclaimed in a meaningful way as God's saving work for all men to men who live in different historical situations and who live in terms of different worlds of thought. This means that one cannot simply proclaim a first century Jewish world of thought, even though the meaning of the history of Jesus within that historical world of thought must be the critical norm of the proclamation of the gospel. Since the history of Jesus must be understood in its distance from and its relation to the thought world of other men at other times, this poses the hermeneutical problem.

The proclamation of the gospel in a meaningful way in different historical situations and worlds of thought brings to expression the universal character of God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ. If history defines what man is, the revelation of God by which he gives men community with himself is the fulfillment of history in which God makes man truly human, and at the same time it is the judgment of God on all of man's attempts to find security and the fulfillment of his existence in himself and his own accomplishments rather than in God and his grace

alone. Thus, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is the fulfillment of all of man's religions, but in such a way that it breaks them and brings them to their end, just as Christ is the end of the law as well as its fulfillment. Similarly, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ stands in a relation of critical fulfillment to all aspects of human thought, grounding their perceptions of reality in a more adequate way, placing them in a broader context, and thus breaking them. This means that theology must enter into a critical discussion with all human perceptions of reality. It is in this way that, for Pannenberg's theology, Jesus Christ as God's definitive, eschatological self-disclosure is concretely related to the whole of history as God's work. An important example of this is the question of the relation of theology to a humanistic understanding of history and historiography. The modern understanding of historical method is basically oriented to the immanent humanistic understanding of history. It understands history as the work of men and excludes the possibility of looking at events in history as the work of God. Pannenberg's theology poses the necessary question of whether theology can uncritically take over a historiography that presupposes a world view that excludes God, even though the humanistic rejection of a supernatural understanding of history must be taken seriously. When the historian encounters the claim of the biblical texts, for example, can he simply describe this without making any decision with regard to the truth of the claim that the history of Jesus is to be understood as the work of God that is decisive for the existence of all men in relation to God? In fact, such a

decision is always made, and it is only a question of whether this decision can be bracketed out as unimportant for one's historiography. If there is no such thing as an objective historiography, does not the historian's decision with regard to the truth of the claim of the texts influence the way he sees and presents the history? If so, must it not be a conscious, critically examined part of his historical methodology? While the work of the historian cannot cease to be critical historiography, these are important questions that must be considered in understanding the relation of theology to modern historical-critical study. The fact that he has posed this problem is one of Pannenberg's contributions to the modern theological discussion.

The interpretation of the meaning of the history of Jesus as the eschatological saving work of God in a meaningful way in relation to changing historical situations and different worlds of thought has always been the task of the church, although it has not always done this by means of the modern historical-critical method. It belongs to the historical character of theological formulations of the gospel, including those of the New Testament, that they cannot be simply repeated or reproduced in new historical situations. However, these theological positions remain important for theology. They are a part of the history out of which modern theological positions have grown. As such, the history of theology, or the particular theological tradition in which one stands, is one of the factors that determines the possibilities and problems for modern theological thought. Furthermore, while theological positions of the past cannot be repeated in

the present, these reflect the concern with the same problem of understanding the gospel in a meaningful way in new historical situations and worlds of thought. Hence, critical discussion with the history of theology may point to possibilities for understanding the subject matter of theology in the present as well as to dangers for theological thought. The criterion for such critical discussion is both the relation of these theological positions to the inherent meaning of the history of Jesus and to modern possibilities for thought.

Another contribution of Pannenberg's theology of history is its emphasis on the concrete encounter of man by God in God's acts in history. This means that what God is cannot be abstracted from what he does. One cannot go behind God's work to speak of the essence of God as he is in abstraction from that work. Rather, in his work in history, God chooses how he is God for men, and, thus, he is personally present to men in history as God. That God reveals himself in history means that the reality in which God encounters man in a meaningful way embraces all aspects of the reality in which man lives, including his community with other men, the history in which he lives, and his world. Hence, a man's life in this world can be meaningful, within the context of the work of God in Jesus Christ, as the place where God encounters him and in which he lives in community with God under God's lordship. Furthermore, such a theology of history means that the place in human existence where the question of God is significant does not lie at the boundaries of man's existence or in man's weakness. Rather, the question of God arises in relation to man's strength and his accomplish-

ments, which express man's openness beyond all that is at hand in his world and, thus, his openness for God. However, the emphasis on universal history tends to push the meaningful concrete encounter of God with men in history into the background, although the revelation of God in Christ gives meaning to other events in history as the work of God in their relation to that event, and this makes existence in the concrete reality of this world meaningful in relation to God. This emphasis on the concrete encounter of man by God in history might be made clearer by a more adequate discussion of the relation of the revelation of God in Christ to apocalyptic and, thus, to the concept of God's self-disclosure as occurring only in the whole of history as well as by a more adequate discussion of the kerygma as the means by which God encounters men and imparts his grace to them.

For Pannenberg, the eschatological revelation of God in the history of Jesus, as the prolepsis of the end of history, gives meaning to all other events in history in their relation to God. Hence, men are able to live in history in the light of the definitive self-disclosure of God in Jesus Christ and in the hope of the fulfillment of that which God has done for them in Jesus. This means that all aspects of the Christian's existence in this world share in the proleptic character of God's revelation in Jesus Christ. Through Christ God's salvation and the new life of the kingdom of God are already present to men in the word of the gospel and the gift of the Holy Spirit. However, this is a foretaste of the full participation in God's salvation for which the Christian hopes. Similarly, in view of the definitive revelation

of God in Jesus Christ, theology can speak about God by speaking about his decisive act for men in the history of Jesus. However, all theological formulations of the significance of this event are historically conditioned and are inadequate to the full reality of that which God has done for men in Christ. "Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood" (I Cor. 13:12b). Similarly, the Christian lives in this world in terms of the love of God which is present in Jesus Christ, and this revelation of the love of God is the ground of his ethical existence and is a critical force transforming the concrete social structures in which he lives. At the same time, he can neither identify human programs with the means to attain the kingdom of God, nor use the gospel to project a program for an ideal society, nor be content with the present systems of justice or structuring of society. Thus, in the light of God's self-disclosure in Jesus Christ, life in history can be meaningful as the place where men are encountered by God and live under God, even though the future remains unknown and open for new and unforeseen things.

One of the problems of such a theology of history is that it can tend to make history or a theory of history rather than the grace of God for men in Jesus Christ the object of theological interest. In distinction from Pannenberg's intention, this would make history the object of revelation rather than the means by which and the place in which God encounters men with his grace and makes himself known to them.

2. One of the principle problems of Pannenberg's theological program is the primary orientation of the concept of revelation to the

demonstration that the God of Israel is God of the whole world rather than to the work of God in history as his judgment or grace in relation to men. The problem of the reality of the revelation of God arises both in connection with the present situation in the history of thought when the existence of God can no longer be taken for granted and in connection with the question, posed by Gerhard von Rad, of the relation between historical-critical history and the Biblical presentation of history as the work of God. Pannenberg's emphasis on revelation as history takes its starting point in von Rad's understanding of the Old Testament as a history book. However, this poses the problem of two ways of picturing Israel's history: that of the Old Testament and that of modern historical-critical research. This involves both the fact that many things in the Old Testament reports did not happen that way, especially in the pre-history of Israel, and the contrast between an understanding of history as the work of God and a view of history that allows no place for the work of God in history but regards it as the work of man. Correspondingly, the Pannenberg circle's interest in overcoming this distinction in an understanding of theology as history involves both the understanding of history as the history of traditions and the question of how this history can be seen as the work of God in which he reveals himself.

This orientation of the concept of the revelation of God to the demonstration of the divinity of God poses several problems. First, does this emphasis on the historical demonstrability of God's revelation take the limitations of what historical research can do into

account in an adequate way? Is historical study really in a position to say that God has acted in this history? This problem is especially clear in the question of the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event. Does not the desire to show that God has acted in the history of Jesus lead Pannenberg to try to say more about the events surrounding the resurrection of Jesus than the historical sources justify? More important, does not the attempt to understand the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event mean that one brings a supernatural hypothesis into the understanding of history and of historical method at the crucial point, since the resurrection is a radically unmediated intervention of God in the course of events? Can historiography as critical scholarship survive if it allows such a supernatural explanation of events in history? Pannenberg himself insists that historical research cannot be done on the basis of supernatural hypotheses.

Second, while it is true that there is a certain element of this demonstrative character of the revelation of God in the Bible, especially in the prophets of the exile, does it form a central aspect of the Biblical understanding of the revelation of God? Is not the Biblical emphasis on the work of God in history oriented much more to the presence of his judgment or of his grace and salvation to men in history? Understanding involves the interaction of the text with one's own prior understanding of the subject matter, including the questions with which one approaches the text, in such a way that this prior understanding may be called into question by the text. Does Pannenberg adequately allow the Biblical materials to question and modify his own

prior understanding of the revelation of God? Or does his prior understanding become a pre-judgment into which the Biblical materials are fitted? In spite of his own intention, it is not clear that the emphasis on the demonstrability of God's revelation avoids the latter danger. If God reveals himself in history, then this history itself must show what it means for God to disclose himself to men.

It would appear that the central orientation of the Biblical materials to the work of God in history as his judgment or salvation for men should mean that the concept of revelation must be essentially oriented to the question of how God is God for men. To be sure, Pannenberg regards revelation and soteriology as closely interrelated, for God's self-disclosure means salvation for men. If salvation means that men are given community with God by God's grace, since only in community with God are men truly human, then such community with God is possible only as God draws near to men and discloses himself to them. In this way, the revelation of God has a certain logical priority to the concept of salvation. Soteriology is dependent on revelation. Thus, Pannenberg makes Christology, that is, the history of Jesus as the work of God in which he reveals himself to men, logically prior to soteriology, in distinction from the priority commonly given to soteriology in modern theology. The understanding of the history of Jesus as the eschatological revelation of God, and, thus, of the person of Jesus as united with the essence of God, is the condition for the understanding of the history of Jesus as God's act for men. In spite of his own intention, this orientation can give Pannenberg's theology

a tendency toward an intellectual conception of the revelation of God as the mediation of knowledge rather than being primarily oriented to the understanding of God's revelation as making his judgment or grace present to men.

In fact, Pannenberg's own interest in the revelation of God as his work in history in which he is personally present to men as he would be God for them itself suggests that the concept of revelation should be more centrally oriented to the character of God's work in history as his judgment or grace for men. If God reveals himself in what he does in history, does this not mean that it is essentially the revelation of the way in which he is God for men? If God is known only through what he does in relation to human existence in history, does this not mean that the concept of the revelation of God must be essentially associated from the beginning with the judgment or grace of God for men, that is, with the rejection or salvation of men in relation to God? If the essence of God is inseparably associated with the way that he freely chooses to be God in relation to his creation and to man, and if the revelation of God is his choosing of the way that he wills to be God, must not a theology centered in the revelation of God in history correspond to this? If the history of Jesus means salvation for men because it is God's eschatological self-revelation, then it is also true that the history of Jesus is God's revelation only as his eschatological act for the salvation of men. Christology and soteriology can only be adequately understood in their relation with each other, and to deal with the concept of revelation independently of

soteriology is as one-sided as to give priority to soteriology. One can only speak adequately of God by speaking about man as he is determined by the grace of God in Jesus Christ, and one can only speak adequately of man by speaking of God, who determines his existence in Jesus Christ.

This emphasis on the revelation of God as the demonstration of the divinity of God and the relative priority given to the concept of revelation over soteriology also result in a certain tension in the way Pannenberg understands the relation between language and history. If history does not only consist in external events but includes understanding and changes in understanding, then the word of God, whether it be the prophetic word, the proclamation of Jesus, or the kerygma, should itself be understood as an event in history in which God reveals himself to men. However, the tendency to accent the demonstrative character of the revelation of God tends to minimize the word of God as revelation so that it is seen as revelation only in its relation to other events in which God reveals himself. If the concept of revelation were oriented more to history as the work of God in which he makes his judgment or grace present to men, then the word of God could be more adequately understood as God's act in which he reveals himself. For example, the prophetic proclamation was not only the announcement of events in history, but as such it was the announcement of the judgment or grace of God in relation to his people. In this way, the prophetic word was an act of God in history in which he made his judgment or grace present to Israel. The fulfillment of a prophecy, then, means

that that which had already become an event in the prophetic proclamation became an event in another way in the history of God's people. The same is true of the kerygma. Pannenberg correctly emphasizes the character of language as statement so that the kerygma derives its character from the work of God in Jesus Christ that it proclaims and cannot be understood independently of that event. However, it is not clear that he brings adequately to expression the character of the kerygma as address or as communication in the sense of imparting something to human existence, that is, for example, the power of language to make love present or to deny it, to make the judgment or grace of God present to men, to call forth faith, and to open the future. The kerygma is not only the report of an event of the past in which God acted, but as the proclamation of that event as the saving act of God in every human situation, it is itself the act of God in which he is present to men with his grace and salvation. The kerygma is itself the means by which God reveals himself to men, calling forth faith from men and calling them into community with himself. Pannenberg recognizes this aspect of the kerygma, but he does not develop what this means for his theological program with sufficient clarity. This could be done more clearly if the concept of God's revelation were seen more centrally in its relation to his judgment or grace for men. Then the proclamation as well as faith by which God's work becomes effective in human existence would be equally important as aspects of the revelation of God as the history of Jesus, which is the ground of the kerygma and so of faith. Pannenberg's relative preference of events in history to

word as revelation corresponds to his interest in the demonstrative character of revelation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. THE PANNENBERG CIRCLE

1. Wolfhart Pannenberg

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Akt und Sein im Mittelalter," Kerygma und Dogma, VII (1961), 197-220.

_____. "Analogie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), I, 350-353. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957.

_____. "Analogie und Doxologie," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink. Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg (eds.). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963. Pp. 96-115.

_____. Analogie und Offenbarung. Habilitationsschrift, Heidelberg, 1955.

_____. "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXX (1959), 1-45.

_____. "Zur Bedeutung des Analogiegedankens bei Karl Barth," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVIII (1953), 17-24.

_____. "Christlicher Glaube und menschliche Freiheit," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 251-280.

_____. "Christologie II. Dogmengeschichtlich," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), I, 1762-1777. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957.

_____. "Dialektische Theologie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 163-174. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.

_____. "Dogmatische Thesen zur Lehre von der Offenbarung," Offenbarung als Geschichte, Wolfhart Pannenberg et al. Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1. Second edition, 1963. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961. Pp. 91-114.

_____. "Der Einfluss der Anfechtungserfahrung auf den Prädestinationsbegriff Luthers," Kerygma und Dogma, III (1957), 109-139.

- Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Einführung," Offenbarung als Geschichte, Wolfhart Pannenberg et al. Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1. Second edition, 1963. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961. Pp. 7-20.
- _____. "Einsicht und Glaube: Antwort an Paul Althaus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVIII (1963), 81-92.
- _____. "Erwählung III. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 614-621. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.
- _____. "Er wird unser Gott sein," Radius, 1961, No. 4, pp. 3-10.
- _____. "Die Frage nach Gott," to be published in Evangelische Theologie.
- _____. "Die Fragwürdigkeit der klassischen Universalwissenschaften: Evangelische Theologie," Die pädagogische Provinz (1963), pp. 173-188. A slightly expanded version of "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 7-14.
- _____. "Glaube IV. Im prot. Glaubensverständnis," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche (2nd ed.), IV, 925-928. Michael Eucharberger (initiator). Josef Höfer and Karl Rahner (eds.). Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1960.
- _____. "Gott V. Theologieggeschichtlich," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 1717-1732. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.
- _____. "Die Grundlagenkrise der evangelischen Theologie," Radius, 1962, No. 4, pp. 7-14. English trans.: "The Crisis of the Scripture-Principle in Protestant Theology," Dialog, II (1963), 307-313.
- _____. Grundzüge der Christologie. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlags-haus Gerd Mohn, 1964.
- _____. "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 218-237, 259-288. The first part is partially reprinted in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments, Claus Westermann (ed.). Theologische Bücherei, 11. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960. Pp. 295-318. English Trans.: "Redemptive Event and History," Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics, James Luther Mays (ed.). Richmond: John Knox Press, 1963. Pp. 314-335.
- _____. "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 90-121.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden?" Is Jesus wirklich auferstanden? Geistliche Woche, 1964. Evangelische Akademie Mannheim. Pp. 23-33.

_____. "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, pp. 18-27.

_____. "Jesus Christus C. Die prot. Christologie," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche (2nd ed.), V, 961-964. Michael Buchberger (initiator). Josef Höfer and Karl Rahner (eds.). Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1960.

_____. "Kerygma und Geschichte," Studien zur Theologie der alt-testamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (eds.). Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961. Pp. 129-140.

_____. "Die Krise des Ethischen und die Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 7-16.

_____. "Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Anwendung des Analogieprinzips in der evangelischen Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXV (1960), 225-228.

_____. "Mythus und Wort: Theologische Überlegungen zu Karl Jaspers' Mythusbegriff," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LI (1954), 167-185.

_____. "Nachwort zur zweiten Auflage," Offenbarung als Geschichte, Wolfhart Pannenberg et al. Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1. Second edition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963. Pp. 132-148.

_____. "Natürliche Theologie II. Im ev. Verständnis," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche (2nd ed.), VII, 816-817. Michael Buchberger (initiator). Josef Höfer and Karl Rahner (eds.). Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1962.

_____. "Neue Wege katholischer Christologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXII (1957), 95-99.

_____. "Nicolaus von Kues," Deutsches Pfarrerblatt, LXIV (1964), 577 ff.

_____. "Die Offenbarung Gottes und die Geschichte der Neuzeit," address at the 4. Deutscher Evangelischer Akademikertag, 4.-7. Oktober 1962 in Marburg/Lahn, published in Der Kreis, Sonderreihe, No. 3, pp. 7-21.

- Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Person," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 230-235. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Prädestination IV. Dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 487-489. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. Die Prädestinationslehre des Euns Skotus im Zusammenhang der scholastischen Lehrentwicklung. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 4. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1954.
- _____. "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," to be published in Theology as History, James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.). New Frontiers in Theology, III. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers.
- _____. "Schriftautorität und Lehrautorität," Autorität als Gegenstand und Element wissenschaftlichen Denkens, Erhard Denninger and Günter Eifler (eds.). Mainzer Universitätsgespräche. Sommersemester, 1962. Pp. 5-10.
- _____. "Zur Theologie des Rechts," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, VII (1963), 1-23.
- _____. "Theologische Motive im Denken Immanuel Kants," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 897 ff.
- _____. "Zur theologischen Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Jaspers," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIII (1958), 321-330.
- _____. "Thomas von Aquino," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), VI, 856-863. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.
- _____. "Typen des Atheismus und ihre theologische Bedeutung," Zeitwende, XXXIV (1963), 597-608.
- _____. Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie. Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe 139/140. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962.
- _____. "Was ist eine dogmatische Aussage?" Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 81-99.
- _____. "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrngeheimnis der Wahrheit: Festschrift für Heinrich Vogel. Kurt Scharf (ed.). Berlin: Lettner-Verlag, 1962. Pp. 214-239.

- Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Wie wird Gott uns offenbar," Radius, 1960, No. 4, pp. 3-10.
- _____. "Wirkungen biblischer Gotteserkenntnis auf das abendländische Menschenbild," Studium Generale, XV (1962), 586-593.
- _____. "Review: Chenu, M.-D., La Théologie au douzième siècle," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVI (1961), 355-360.
- _____. "Review: Garvin, Joseph N., and James A. Corbett, The Summa contra Haereticos," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 210.
- _____. "Review: Gilson, Etienne, and Philotheus Böhner, Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1958), 534-536.
- _____. "Review: Hessen, Johannes, Thomas von Aquin und wir," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1958), 385-386.
- _____. "Review: Leff, Gordon, Bradwardine and the Pelagians," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXIX (1958), 355-360.
- _____. "Review: Lyttkens, Hampus, The Analogy between God and the World," Verkündigung und Forschung (1956/1957), pp. 136-142.
- _____. "Review: Meller, Bernhard, Studien zur Erkenntnislehre des Peter von Ailly," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXII (1957), 440-443.
- _____. "Review: Mühlen, Heribert, Sein und Person nach Johannes Duns Scotus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXX (1955), 353-355.
- _____. "Review: Müller, Michael, Die Lehre des Hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesesehe," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXX (1955), 455-456.
- _____. "Review: Obermann, Heiko Augustinus, Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXXII (1961), 173-175.
- _____. "Review: Oeing-Hanhoff, Ludger, Ens et unum convertuntur," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXIX (1954), 505-506.
- _____. "Review: Rohmoser, Günter, Subjektivität und Verdinglichung," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 294-296.
- _____. "Review: Roo, William A. von, Grace and Original Justice according to St. Thomas," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIII (1958), 443-444.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Review: Schmaus, Michael, Zur Diskussion über das Problem der Univozität im Umkreis des Johannes Duns Skotus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVII (1963), 358-359.

_____. "Review: Schmidt, Martin Anton, Gottheit und Trinität," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVIII (1958), 441-443.

_____. "Review: Seckler, Max, Instinkt und Glaubenswille," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXVIII (1963), 362-364.

_____. "Review: Steinbüchel, Theodor, Vom Menschenbild des christlichen Mittelalters," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXI (1956), 733-735.

_____. "Review: Wagner, Hans, Existenz, Analogie und Dialektik," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXIX (1954), 318-320.

_____, et al. Offenbarung als Geschichte. Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1. Second edition, 1963. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961.

2. Others

Elze, Martin. "Der Begriff des Dogmas in der Alten Kirche," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LXI (1964), 421-438.

_____. "Ein Beitrag Gabriel Biels zur spätmittelalterlichen Erbauungsliteratur," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXXIV (1963), 265-281.

_____. "Schriftauslegung IV. Christliche Schriftauslegung, theologisch-geschichtlich A. Alte Kirche und Mittelalter," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 1520-1528. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.

_____. Tatian und seine Theologie. Forschungen zum Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 9. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960.

Koch, Alaus. Das Buch der Bücher: Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Bibel. Verständliche Wissenschaft, 33. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1963.

_____. "'... denn seine Güte währet ewiglich,'" Evangelische Theologie, XXI (1961), 531-544.

_____. "Die Eigenart der priesterschriftlichen Sinaigesetzgebung," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LV (1958), 36-51.

_____. "Evangelische Kirche und Bibel," Das Wort und die Zeit, XLVI (1956), 90-95.

- Koch, Klaus. "Zur Geschichte der Erwählungsvorstellung in Israel," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, LXVII (1955/1956), 205-226.
- _____. "Gibt es ein Vergeltungsdogma im Alten Testament?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LII (1955), 1-42.
- _____. "Götzendienst im AT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 1680-1682. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.
- _____. Die israelitische Sühneanschauung und ihre historischen Wandlungen. Unpublished Habilitationsschrift, Erlangen, 1956.
- _____. "Israelitischer Kultus," Verkündigung und Forschung (1953/1955), pp. 123-129.
- _____. "Neuorientierung der alttestamentlichen Theologie," Pastoralblätter, CI (1961), 548-559.
- _____. Die Priesterschrift von Exodus 25 bis Leviticus 16. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 53. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1959.
- _____. "Priestertum II. In Israel," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 574-578. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Samuelisbücher," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 1358-1360. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Spätisraelitisches Geschichtsdenken am Beispiel des Buches Daniels," Historische Zeitschrift, 193/1 (1961), 1-32.
- _____. "Der Spruch 'Sein Blut bleibe auf seinem Haupt' und die israelitische Auffassung vom vergossenen Blut," Vetus Testamentum, XII (1962), 396-416.
- _____. "Tempelreinlassliturgien und Dekalogue," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch, (eds.). Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961. Pp. 45-60.
- _____. "Der Tod des Religionsstifters: Erwägungen über das Verhältnis Israels zur Geschichte der altorientalischen Religionen," Kerygma und Dogma, VIII (1962), 100-123.

- Koch, Klaus. "Versöhnung II. Im AT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), VI, 1368-1370. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.
- _____. Was ist Formgeschichte? Neue Wege der Bibelexegese. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1964.
- _____. "Die Weltreiche im Danielbuch," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXV (1960), 829-832.
- _____. "Wesen und Ursprung der 'Gemeinschaftstreue' im Israel der Königszeit," Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik, V (1961), 72-90.
- _____. "Review: Wildberger, Hans, Jahwes Eigentumsvolk," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 195-196.
- Rendtorff, Rolf. "Altes Testament," Pastoralblätter, XCV (1955), 187-191, and XCVI (1956), 602-606.
- _____. "Alttestamentliche Theologie und israelitisch-judische Religionsgeschichte," Zwischenstation: Festschrift für K. Kupisch zum 60. Geburtstag. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963. Pp. 203-222.
- _____. "Bibelhandschriften I. Bibelhandschriften des AT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), I, 1166-1171. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957.
- _____. "Bileam und Bileamsprüche," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), I, 1290-1291. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957.
- _____. "Botenformel und Botenspruch," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, LXXIV (1962), 165-177.
- _____. "Das christliche Verständnis der Natur," Radius, 1961, No. 2, pp. 28-35.
- _____. "Die Entstehung der israelitischen Religion als religionsgeschichtliches und theologisches Problem," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 735-746.
- _____. "Erwägungen zur Frühgeschichte des Prophetentums in Israel," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 145-167.
- _____. "Zum Gebrauch der Formel n^e um jahwe im Jeremia," Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft, LXVI (1954), 27-37.

Rendtorff, Rolf. "Genesis 3:21 und die Urgeschichte des Jahwisten," Kerygma und Dogma, VII (1961), 69-78.

_____. "Geschichte und Überlieferung," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (eds.). Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961. Pp. 81-94.

_____. "Geschichte und Wort im Alten Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXIII (1962), 621-649.

_____. Die Gesetze in der Priesterschrift: Eine gattungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 44. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1954.

_____. Gottes Geschichte: Der Anfang unseres Weges im Alten Testament. Stundenbücher, 3. Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1962.

_____. "Hermeneutik des Alten Testaments als Frage nach der Geschichte," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 27-40.

_____. "Hermeneutische Probleme der biblischen Urgeschichte," Festschrift für Friedrich Smend: Zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht von Freunden und Schülern. Berlin: Verlag Merseburger, 1963. Pp. 19-29.

_____. "Kult, Mythos und Geschichte im alten Israel," Sammlung und Sendung: Vom Auftrag der Kirche in der Welt: Eine Festgabe für D. Heinrich Rendtorff zu seinem 70. Geburtstag am 9. April 1958. J. Leubach and H.-H. Ulrich, (eds.). Berlin: Christlicher Zeitschriftenverlag, 1958. Pp. 121-129.

_____. "Der Kultus im Alten Israel," Jahrbuch für Liturgik und Hymnologie, II (1956), 1-21.

_____. "Zur Lage von Jaser [Jordan]," Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästinavereins, LXXVI (1960), 124-135.

_____. "Maleachibuch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), IV, 628-629. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.

_____. "Nabi im Alten Testament," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, VI, 796-813. Gerhard Kittel (initiator). Gerhard Friedrich (ed.). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1959.

_____. "Zur neueren Auslegung des Alten Testaments," Verkündigung und Forschung (1956/1957), pp. 142-151.

- Rendtorff, Rolf. "'Offenbarung' im Alten Testament," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXV (1960), 833-838.
- _____. "Die Offenbarungsvorstellungen im alten Israel," Offenbarung als Geschichte, Wolfhart Pannenberg et al. Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1. Second edition, 1963. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961. Pp. 21-41.
- _____. "Priesterliche Kulttheologie und prophetische Polemik," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXI (1956), 339-342.
- _____. "Prophetenspruch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 635-638. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Rein und Unrein II. Im AT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 942-944. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Reinigungen II. Im AT und Judentum," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 947-948. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Speiseverbote II. Im AT und Judentum," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), VI, 231-232. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.
- _____. Studien zur Geschichte des Opfers im Alten Israel. Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 10. Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1962.
- _____. "Die theologische Stellung des Schöpfungsglaubens bei Deuteriojesaja," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LI (1954), 3-13.
- _____. "Tora," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), VI, 950-951. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.
- _____. "Was haben wir am Alten Testament," Sonntagsblatt, 1955, No. 51, p. 23.
- _____. Das Werden des Alten Testaments. Biblische Studien, 26. Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1959.
- _____. "Wein und Weinenthaltung 2. Im AT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), VI, 1573. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.

- Rendtorff, Fritz. "Die Begründung des weltlichen Strafrechts in der theologischen Ethik seit Schleiermacher," Die weltliche Strafe in der evangelischen Theologie, Hans Dombois (ed.). Forschungen und Berichte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft, 16. Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1959. Pp. 9-97.
- _____. "Christen zwischen Krieg und Frieden," Sonntagsblatt, 1957, No. 27, p. 27.
- _____. "Geschichte und Gesellschaft," Spannungsfelder der evangelischen Soziallehre: Aufgaben und Fragen vom Dienst der Kirche an der heutigen Gesellschaft, F. Karrenberg (ed.). Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1960. Pp. 154-169.
- _____. "Gesellschaftsbildende Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der Kirchengemeinde," Evangelische Theologie, XIX (1959), 506-528.
- _____. "Kirchengemeinde und Kerngemeinde: Kirchensoziologische Bemerkungen zur Gestalt der Ostgemeinde," Die Kirche in der Zeit, XIII (1958), 109-113.
- _____. "Der Mensch in der Strafe," Sammlung und Sendung: Vom Auftrag der Kirche in der Welt: Eine Festgabe für D. Heinrich Rendtorff zu seinem 70. Geburtstag am 9. April 1958. J. Heubach and W.-H. Ulrich (eds.). Berlin: Christlicher Zeitschriftenverlag, 1958. Pp. 330-338.
- _____. "Das Offenbarungsproblem im Kirchenbegriff," Offenbarung als Geschichte, Wolfhart Pannenberg et al. Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1. Second edition, 1963. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961. Pp. 115-131.
- _____. "Das Pfarramt--gesellschaftliche Situation und kirchliche Interpretation," Der Pfarrer in der modernen Gesellschaft: Soziologische Studien zur Berufssituation des evangelischen Pfarrers, Karl Martin Bolt et al. Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1960. Pp. 79-102.
- _____. "Pfarrsoziologie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 305-306. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Säkularisierung als theologisches Problem," Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie, IV (1962), 318-339.
- _____. Die soziale Struktur der Gemeinde: Die kirchlichen Lebensformen im gesellschaftlichen Wandel der Gegenwart. Studien zur evangelischen Sozialtheologie und Sozialethik, 1. Second edition, 1959. Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1958.

- Rendtorff, Trutz. "Die soziologische Struktur der Kirchengemeinde: Methoden und Probleme ihrer Erforschung," Evangelische Welt, XIV (1960), 98-100.
- _____. "Todesstrafe III. Theologisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), VI, 926-929. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.
- _____. "Überlieferungsgeschichte als Problem der systematischen Theologie," Theologische Literaturzeitung, XC (1965), 81-98.
- _____. "Review: Moltmann, Jürgen, Herrschaft Christi und soziale Wirklichkeit nach Dietrich Bonhoeffer," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVI (1961), 614-615.
- _____. "Review: Oppen, Dietrich von, Das personale Zeitalter," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 216-219.
- Rössler, Dietrich. Der "ganze" Mensch: Das Menschenbild der neueren Seelsorgelehre und des modernen medizinischen Denkens im Zusammenhang der allgemeinen Anthropologie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962.
- _____. Gesetz und Geschichte: Untersuchungen zur Theologie der jüdischen Apokalyptik und der pharisäischen Orthodoxie. Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 3. Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1960.
- _____. "Krankheit III. Medizinisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), IV, 39-40. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.
- _____. "Krankheit und Geschichte in der anthropologischen Medizin," Medicus Viator: Fragen und Gedenken am Wege Richard Siebecks: Eine Festgabe seiner Freunde und Schüler zum 75. Geburtstag. Paul Christian and Dietrich Rössler (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959. Pp. 165-179.
- _____. "Marienerscheinungen," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), IV, 761-762. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.
- _____. "Pastoralmedizin," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 143-149. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Die Predigt über alttestamentliche Texte," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (eds.). Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961.

- Rössler, Dietrich. "Psychotherapie II. Theologische Beurteilung," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 715-718 Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Tiefenpsychologie als theologisches Problem," Evangelische Theologie, XXI (1961), 162-173.
- Wilckens, Ulrich. "Die Bekehrung des Paulus als religionsgeschichtliches Problem," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVI (1959), 273-293.
- _____. Gottes Offenbarung: Ein Weg durch das Neue Testament. Stundenbuch, 15. Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1963.
- _____. "Hellenistisch-christliche Missionsüberlieferung und Jesus-tradition," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 517-520.
- _____. "Kerygma und Evangelium bei Lukas: Beobachtungen zu Acta 10:34-43," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, XLIX (1958), 223-237.
- _____. "Kreuz und Weisheit," Kerygma und Dogma, III (1957), 77-108.
- _____. Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte: Form- und traditions-geschichtliche Untersuchungen. Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 5. Second edition, 1962. Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961.
- _____. "Die Offenbarungsverständnis in der Geschichte des Urchristentums," Offenbarung als Geschichte, Wolfhart Pannenberg et al. Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1. Second edition, 1963. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963. Pp. 42-90.
- _____. "Präexistenz Christi 1. Im NT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 491-492. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- _____. "Die Rechtfertigung Abrahams nach Römer 4," Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen, Festschrift für Gerhard von Rad. Rolf Rendtorff and Klaus Koch (eds.). Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961. Pp. 111-127.
- _____. "Zu Römer 3:21-4:25: Antwort an G. Klein," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 586-610.
- _____. "Stolē," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, VII, 687-692. Gerhard Kittel (initiator). Gerhard Friedrich (ed.). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964.

Wilckens, Ulrich. "Stulos," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, VII, 732-736. Gerhard Kittel (initiator). Gerhard Friedrich (ed.). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964.

_____. "Ungebrochenes Reden von Gott," Radius, 1961, No. 4, pp. 13-16.

_____. "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der Erscheinung des Auf-
erstandenen: Zur traditionsgeschichtlichen Analyse von 1. Kor.
15:1-11," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink.
Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg, (eds.). Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963. Pp. 56-95.

_____. Weisheit und Torheit: Eine exegetisch-religionsgeschichtliche
Untersuchung zu I. Kor. 1 und 2. Beiträge zur historischen Theo-
logie, 26. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959.

_____. "Review: Braun, Herbert, Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testa-
ment und seiner Umwelt," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX
(1964), 663-670.

_____. "Review: Dibelius, Martin, Die Formgeschichte des Evan-
geliums," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVI (1961), 272-276.

_____. "Review: Erhardt, Arnold A.T., Politische Metaphysik von
Solon bis Augustin," Philosophische Rundschau, IX (1961), 47-64.

_____. "Review: Strobel, August, Die apokalyptische Sendung Jesu,"
Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 670-672.

_____, and Georg Fohrer. "Sophia, sophos, sophizō," Theologisches
Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, VII, 465-529. Gerhard Kittel
(initiator). Gerhard Friedrich (ed.). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer
Verlag, 1964.

B. SECONDARY LITERATURE

1. Primarily Discussions of the Pannenberg Circle

Althaus, Paul. "Offenbarung als Geschichte und Glaube: Bemerkungen zu
Wolfhart Pannenburgs Begriff der Offenbarung," Theologische
Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 321-334.

Baumgärtel, Friedrich. "Der Tod des Religionsstifters," Kerygma und
Dogma, IX (1963), 223-233.

Bockmühl, Klaus. "Review: Pannenberg, Wolfhart, et al., Offenbarung
als Geschichte," Theologische Zeitschrift, XX (1964), 294-297.

- Delling, Gerhard. "Review: Wilckens, Ulrich, Die Missionsreden der Apostelgeschichte," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVII (1962), 840-843.
- Flesseman, E. "De Theologie van Wolfhart Pannenberg," Nederlands theologische Tijdschrift, XVIII (1964), 391-408.
- Fuchs, Ernst. "Theologie oder Ideologie: Bemerkungen zu einem heilsgeschichtlichen Programm," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIII (1963), 257-260.
- Gawlick, Günter. "Review: Wilckens, Ulrich, Weisheit und Torheit," Philosophische Rundschau, X (1962), 299-302.
- Geyer, Hans-Georg. "Geschichte als theologisches Problem: Bemerkungen zu W. Pannenburgs Geschichtstheologie," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 92-104.
- Klein, Günter. "Offenbarung als Geschichte? Marginalien zu einem theologischen Programm," Monatschrift für Pastoraltheologie, LI (1962), 321-334.
- _____. Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Wolfhart Pannenberg. Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 37. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964.
- Muschalek, Georg, and Arnold Gamper. "Offenbarung in Geschichte," Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, LXXXVI (1964), 180-196.
- Robinson, James M., and John B. Cobb, Jr. Theology as History. New Frontiers in Theology, III. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers. Not yet published.
- Rohricht, R. "Review: Pannenberg, Wolfhart, et al., Offenbarung als Geschichte," Sonntagsblatt, 1961, No. 29, p. 31.
- Scharlemann, Robert. "Review: Pannenberg, Wolfhart, et al., Offenbarung als Geschichte and Wolfhart Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch?" Dialog, II (1963), 337-338.
- Schmidhäuser, U. "Review: Pannenberg, Wolfhart, et al., Offenbarung als Geschichte," Radius, 1961, No. 3, pp. 45 ff.
- Schmidt, Rüdiger. "'Universales Bescheidwissen?' Die Grenze des theologischen Erkennens in der Theologie von Pannenberg," Oekumenica: Professor Dr. D. Edmund Schlink, D.D. zum 60. Geburtstag. Rolf Herrfahrdt and Artur Gerwinat (eds.). Heidelberg: Oekumenisches Studentenheim, 1963. Pp. 37-40.

Steck, Odil Hannes. "'Offenbarung als Geschichte': Eine Hinführung zum theologischen Entwurf W. Pannenberg's," Korrespondenzblatt, LXXIX, 1 (Jan., 1964), 1-4.

Steiger, Lothar. "Offenbarungsgeschichte und theologische Vernunft: Zur Theologie W. Pannenberg's," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 88-113.

Wirsching, Johannes. "Ein neues theologisches System?" Deutsches Pfarrerblatt, LXIV (1964), 601 ff.

Zimmerli, Walther. "'Offenbarung' im Alten Testament: Ein Gespräch mit R. Rendtorff," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 15-31.

2. Other Secondary Literature

Amberg, Ernst-Heinz. "Glaube und Dogmatik," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 109-118.

Barr, James. "The Interpretation of Scripture: II. Revelation through History in the Old Testament and in Modern Theology," Interpretation, XVII (1963), 193-205.

Barth, Christoph. "Grundprobleme einer Theologie des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XXIII (1963), 342-372.

Bohren, Rudolf. "Die Krise der Predigt als Frage an die Exegese," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 66-92.

Conzelmann, Hans. "Randbemerkungen zur Lage im 'Neuen Testament,'" Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 225-233.

Gullmann, Oscar. Christus und die Zeit: Die urchristliche Zeit- und Geschichtsauffassung. Third edition. Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG., 1962.

_____. Heil als Geschichte: Heilsgeschichtliche Existenz im Neuen Testament. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1965.

Dillenberger, John. "Revelational Discernment and the Problem of the Two Testaments," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, Bernhard W. Anderson (ed.). New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. Pp. 159-175.

Fohrer, Georg. "Prophezie und Geschichte," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 481-500.

Gollwitzer, Helmut. Die Existenz Gottes im Bekenntnis des Glaubens. Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 34. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963.

- Goppelt, Leonhard. "Apokalyptik und Typologie bei Paulus," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 321-344.
- Haenchen, Ernst. Die Apostelgeschichte. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament, III. H.A.W. Meyer (initiator). Thirteenth edition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961.
- Hesse, Franz. "Review: [G. von Rad], Studien zur Theologie der alttestamentlichen Überlieferungen," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 749-755.
- Honecker, Martin. Kirche als Gestalt und Ereignis: Die sichtbare Gestalt der Kirche als dogmatisches Problem. Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus, XXV. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963.
- _____. "Zum Verständnis der Geschichte in Gerhard von Rads Theologie des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XXIII (1963), 143-168.
- Jacob, Edmund. "Der Prophet Hosea und die Geschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 281-290.
- Jüngel, Eberhard. "Die Möglichkeit theologischer Anthropologie auf dem Grunde der Analogie: Eine Untersuchung zum Analogieverständnis Karl Barths," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 535-557.
- _____. Paulus und Jesus: Eine Untersuchung zur Präzisierung der Frage nach dem Ursprung der Christologie. Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 2. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.
- Kimmerle, Heinz. "Metahermeneutik, Applikation, hermeneutische Sprachbildung," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LXI (1964), 221-235.
- Klein, Günter. "Exegetische Probleme in Römer 3:21-4:25: Antwort an U. Wilckens," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 676-683.
- _____. "Individualgeschichte und Weltgeschichte bei Paulus: Eine Interpretation ihres Verhältnisses im Galaterbrief," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 126-165.
- _____. "Lukas 1:1-4 als theologisches Programm," Zeit und Geschichte: Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 80. Geburtstag. Erich Dinkler (ed.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1964. Pp. 193-216.
- _____. "Römer 4 und die Idee der Heilsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXIII (1963), 424-447.
- Kühn, Ulrich. "Das Problem der zureichenden dogmatischen Begründung der christlichen Auferstehungshoffnung," Kerygma und Dogma, IX (1963), 1-17.

Kühn, Ulrich. "Theologie als Gottesdienst," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 117-126.

Loretz, Oswald. Die Wahrheit der Bibel. Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1964.

Mildenberger, Friedrich. "'Auferstanden am dritten Tage nach den Schriften,'" Evangelische Theologie, XXIII (1963), 265-279.

_____. Gottes Tat im Wort: Erwägungen zur alttestamentlichen Hermeneutik als Frage nach der Einheit der Testamente. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964.

Moltmann, Jürgen. "Exegese und Eschatologie der Geschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 31-66.

_____. Prädestination und Perseveranz: Geschichte und Bedeutung der reformierten Lehre "de perseverantia sanctorum". Beiträge zur Geschichte und Lehre der Reformierten Kirche, XII. Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1961.

_____. Theologie der Hoffnung: Untersuchungen zur Begründung und zu den Konsequenzen einer christlichen Eschatologie. Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 38. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964.

Robinson, James M. "Basic Shifts in German Theology," Interpretation, XVI (1962), 76-97.

_____. "The Historicity of Biblical Language," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, Bernhard W. Anderson (ed.). New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. Pp. 124-158. German: "Heilsgeschichte und Lichtungsgeschichte," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 113-141.

Schweizer, Eduard. "Some Trends in European New Testament Research Today," The Chicago Theological Seminary Register, LIV, 2 (Nov., 1963), 1-10.

Soggin, J. Alberto. "Geschichte, Historie und Heilsgeschichte im Alten Testament: Ein Beitrag zur heutigen theologisch-hermeneutischen Diskussion," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXIX (1964), 721-736.

Strobel, August. Die apokalyptische Sendung Jesu: Gedanken zur Neuorientierung in der kerygmatischen Frage. Sonder-Ausdruck aus dem Jahrbuch des Martin-Luther-Bundes, 1962. Rothenburg o.d. Tauber: Martin-Luther-Verlag.

Trillhaas, Wolfgang. "Die Unsicherheit der heutigen evangelischen Ethik und ihre Wurzeln," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 721-734.

- Vielhauer, Paul. "Apokalypsen und Verwandtes, Einleitung," Neutestamentliche Apokryphon, Band II: Apostolisches und Verwandtes, Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher (eds.). Third edition. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1964. Pp. 407-427.
- Wenz, Helmut. "Mythos oder historisch zeichenhaftes Heilsgeschehen?" Theologische Zeitschrift, XVIII (1962), 419-432.
- Westermann, Claus. "The Way of Promise through the Old Testament," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, Bernhard W. Anderson (ed.). New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. Pp. 200-224.
- Wiesner, Werner. Die Welt im Verständnis des christlichen Glaubens. Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1964.
- Wirsching, Johannes. Gott in der Geschichte: Studien zur theologiegeschichtliche Stellung und systematischen Grundlegung der Theologie Martin Kählers. Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus, XXVI. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963.
- Wittram, Reinhard. "Die Verantwortung des evangelischen Historikers in der Gegenwart," Im Lichte der Reformation: Fragen und Antworten. Jahrbuch des evangelischen Bundes, V. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962. Pp. 26-40.
- Wright, G. Ernest. "History and Reality: The Importance of Israel's 'Historical' Symbols for the Christian Faith," The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion, Bernhard W. Anderson (ed.). New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. Pp. 176-199.

C. OTHER LITERATURE

1. Essays

- Alt, Albrecht. "Die Deutung der Weltgeschichte im Alten Testament," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVI (1959), 129-137.
- _____. "Der Gott der Väter," Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel, I. Second edition, 1959. München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1953. Pp. 1-78. Originally: Beiträge zur Wissenschaft von Alten und Neuen Testament, III. Folge, 12. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1920.
- Baumgärtel, Friedrich. "Gerhard von Rad's 'Theologie des Alten Testaments,'" Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVI (1961), 801-806, 895-908.

Bornkamm, Günther. "Die Bedeutung des historischen Jesus für den Glauben," Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus, Günther Bornkamm, Ferdinand Hahn, Wenzel Lohff. Evangelisches Forum, 2. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962. Pp. 57-71.

_____. "Geschichte und Glaube im Neuen Testament," Evangelische Theologie, XXII (1962), 1-15.

_____. "Mythos und Evangelium: Zur Diskussion des Problems der Entmythologisierung der neutestamentlichen Verkündigung," Mythos und Evangelium: Zum Programm R. Bultmanns, Günther Bornkamm and Walter Klaas. Theologische Existenz Heute, N.F., 26. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1951. Pp. 3-29.

_____. "Die Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns in der neueren Diskussion: Zum Problem der Entmythologisierung und Hermeneutik," Theologische Rundschau, XXIX (1963), 33-141.

Bultmann, Rudolf. "Die Bedeutung des geschichtlichen Jesus für die Theologie des Paulus," Glauben und Verstehen, I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1933. Pp. 188-213. Originally in Theologische Blätter, VIII (1929), 137-151.

_____. "Der Begriff des Wortes Gottes im Neuen Testament," Glauben und Verstehen, I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1933. Pp. 268-293.

_____. "Die Frage nach der natürlichen Offenbarung," Glauben und Verstehen, II. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1952. Pp. 79-104. Originally in Rudolf Bultmann, Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen. Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 7. München: Evangelischer Verlag Albert Lempp, 1941. Pp. 3-26.

_____. "Neues Testament und Mythologie: Das Problem der Entmythologisierung der neutestamentlichen Verkündigung," Kerygma und Mythos: Ein theologisches Gespräch, Hans-Werner Bartsch (ed.). Fourth edition, 1960. Hamburg-Bergstedt: Herbert Reich, Evangelischer Verlag, 1948. Pp. 15-48.

_____. "Weissagung und Erfüllung," Glauben und Verstehen, II. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1952. Pp. 162-186. Originally in Studia Theologica, II (1949), 21-44. Reprinted in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, XLVII (1950), 330-383. Also in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments, Claus Westermann (ed.). Theologische Bücherei, 11. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960. Pp. 28-53.

_____. "Welchen Sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?" Glauben und Verstehen, I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1933. Pp. 26-37. Originally in Theologische Blätter, IV (1925), 129-135.

- Bultmann, Rudolf, Gerhard Kittel, and Gottfried Quell. "Alētheia, alēthēs, alēthinos, alētheuō," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, I, 233-251. Gerhard Kittel (ed.). Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1933.
- Campanhausen, Hans Freiherr von. "Augustin und der Fall von Rom," Tradition und Leben: Kräfte der Kirchengeschichte: Aufsätze und Vorträge. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 253-272. Originally in Weltgeschichte und Gottesgericht. Lebendige Wissenschaft, 1. Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1947. Pp. 2-18.
- _____. "Der Ablauf der Osterereignisse und das leere Grab," Tradition und Leben: Kräfte der Kirchengeschichte: Aufsätze und Vorträge. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 48-113. Originally published as a Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag, 1952.
- Conzelmann, Hans. "Fragen an Gerhard von Rad," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 113-125.
- _____. "Jesus Christus," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), III, 619-653. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959.
- Cross, Frank Moore, Jr. "Yahweh and the God of the Patriarchs," Harvard Theological Review, LVI (1963), 225-259.
- Dibelius, Martin. "Das historische Problem des Leidensgeschichte," Botschaft und Geschichte: Gesammelte Aufsätze von Martin Dibelius, I. Günther Bornkamm (ed.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1953. Pp. 248-257.
- Dinkler, Erich, et al. "Geschichte und Geschichtsauffassung," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 1473-1496. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.
- Ebeling, Gerhard. "Die Evidenz des Ethischen und die Theologie," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 318-356.
- _____. "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus und das Problem der Christologie," Wort und Glaube. Second Edition, 1962. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 300-318. Originally in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVI (1959), Beiheft 1, pp. 14-30.
- _____. "Jesus und Glaube," Wort und Glaube. Second edition, 1962. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 203-254. Originally in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LV (1958), 64-110.

- Ebeling, Gerhard. "Die 'nicht-religiöse Interpretation biblischer Begriffe,'" Wort und Glaube. Second edition, 1962. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 90-160. Originally in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LII (1955), 296-360.
- _____. "Theologie und Philosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), VI, 782-830. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.
- _____. "Theologische Erwägungen über das Gewissen," Wort und Glaube. Second edition, 1962. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 429-446.
- _____. "Wort Gottes und Hermeneutik," Wort und Glaube. Second edition, 1962. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 319-348. Originally in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVI (1959), 224-251.
- Edsman, C.-M., et al. "Offenbarung," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), IV, 1597-1613. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.
- Eissfeldt, Otto. "El," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 413-414. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.
- _____. "El and Yahweh," Journal of Semitic Studies, I (1956), 25-37.
- _____. "Jahwe, der Gott der Väter," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 481-490.
- Elliger, Karl. "Ich bin der Herr--euer Gott," Theologie als Glaubenswagnis: Festschrift für Karl Heim zum 80. Geburtstag. Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1954. Pp. 9-34.
- Fascher, Erich, et al. "Propheten," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 608-635. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- Fuchs, Ernst. "Existentielle Interpretation von Römer 7:7-12 und 21-23," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 285-314.
- _____. "Logos," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), IV, 334-440. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.
- _____. "The New Testament and the Hermeneutical Problem," The New Hermeneutic, James M. Robinson and John E. Cobb, Jr. (eds.). New Frontiers in Theology, II. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. Pp. 111-145.

- Fuchs, Ernst. "Was ist ein Sprachereignis? Ein Brief," Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 424-430.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. "Geschichte und Geschichtsauffassung III. Geschichtsphilosophie," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 1438-1496. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.
- _____. "Geschichtlichkeit," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 1496-1498. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.
- Gloge, Gerhard. "Offenbarung VI. Christliche Offenbarung, dogmatisch," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), IV, 1609-1613. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.
- _____. "Offenbarung und Überlieferung," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXIX (1954), 213-236.
- Haenchen, Ernst. "Die Komposition von Mk. 9:27-9:1," Novum Testamentum, VI (1963), 81-109.
- Harvey, Van A., and Schubert M. Ogden. "Wie neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem historischen Jesus'?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 46-87.
- Hempel, Johannes. "Alttestamentliche Theologie in protestantischer Sicht heute," Bibleotheca Orientalis, XV (1958), 206-214.
- Hesse, Franz. "Die Erforschung der Geschichte Israels als theologische Aufgabe," Kerygma und Dogma, IV (1958), 1-19.
- _____. "Kerygma oder geschichtliche Wirklichkeit?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 17-26.
- Jepsen, A. "Propheten II. In Israel C. Die Theologie der Propheten," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 627-633. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- Käsemann, Ernst. "Die Anfänge christlicher Theologie," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964. Pp. 82-104. Originally in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVII (1960), 162-185.
- _____. "Geist IV. Geist und Geistesgaben im NT," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), II, 1272-1279. Kurt Gallig et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.

- Käsemann, Ernst. "Gottesdienst im Alltag der Welt," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964. Pp. 198-204. Originally in Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirche: Festschrift für J. Jeremias. Walther Eltester (ed.). Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 26. Berlin: Verlag Alfred Töpelmann, 1960. Pp. 165-171.
- _____. "Das Problem des historischen Jesus," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, I. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960. Pp. 187-214. Originally in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LI (1954), 125-153.
- _____. "Sachgassen im Streit um den historischen Jesus," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964. Pp. 31-68.
- _____. "Sätze heiligen Rechtes im Neuen Testament," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964. Pp. 69-82. Originally in New Testament Studies, I (1954), 248-260.
- _____. "Zum Thema der urchristlichen Apokalyptik," Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, II. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964. Pp. 105-131. Originally in Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 257-284.
- Kimmerle, Heinz. "Hermeneutische Theorie oder ontologische Hermeneutik," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 114-130.
- Kittel, Gerhard, and Gerhard von Rad. "Doxa," Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, II, 236-258. Gerhard Kittel (ed.). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1935.
- Koch, J. "Scholastik," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 1494-1495. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.
- Kraft, H., H. Ringgren, R. Schulz. "Apokalyptik," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), I, 463-472. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957.
- Kümmel, Werner Georg. "Jesus und Paulus," New Testament Studies, X (1964), 163-181.
- _____. "Die Naherwartung in der Verkündigung Jesu," Zeit und Geschichte: Dankesgabe an Rudolf Eultmann zum 80. Geburtstag. Erich Dinkler (ed.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1964. Pp. 31-46.
- Maag, Victor. "Der Hirte Israels," Schweizerische Theologische Umschau, XXVIII (1958), 2-28.

Maag, Victor. "Historische oder ausserhistorische Begründung alttestamentliche Theologie," Schweizerische Theologische Umschau, XXIX (1959), 6-18.

_____. "Malkût Jhwh," Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, VII. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960. Pp. 129-153.

Meyer, R. "Propheten II. In Israel A. bis auf Amos," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), V, 613-618. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.

Müller, Hans-Peter. "Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung der biblischen Eschatologie," Vetus Testamentum, XIV (1964), 276-293.

Müller-Lauter, Wolfgang. "Konsequenzen des Historismus in der Philosophie der Gegenwart," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LIX (1962), 226-255.

Roth, Martin. "Geschichte und Gotteswort im Alten Testament," Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 6. Second edition, 1960. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957. Pp. 230-247. Originally: Boner Akademische Reden, 3. Krefeld: Scherpe Verlag, 1949.

_____. "Das Geschichtsverständnis der alttestamentlichen Apokalyptik," Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 6. Second edition, 1960. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957. Pp. 248-273. Originally: Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen: Geisteswissenschaften, 21. Sitzung am 12. Oktober 1953 in Düsseldorf. Köln-Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1954.

_____. "Die Vergegenwärtigung des Alten Testaments in der Verkündigung," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 6-17. Reprinted in: Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments. Claus Westermann, (ed.). Theologische Bücherei, 11. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960. Pp. 54-63.

Ott, Heinrich. "Was ist systematische Theology?" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LVIII (1961), Beiheft 2, pp. 19-46. English: "What is Systematic Theology?" The Later Heidegger and Theology, James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.). New Frontiers in Theology, II. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. Pp. 77-111.

Rad, Gerhard von. "Der Anfang der Geschichtsschreibung im Alten Israel," Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 8. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1958. Pp. 148-188. Originally in Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XXXII (1944), 1-42.

- Rad, Gerhard von. "Antwort auf Conzelmanns Fragen," Evangelische Theologie, XXIX (1964), 388-394.
- _____. "Aspekte alttestamentlichen Weltverständnisses," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 57-73.
- _____. "Das formgeschichtliche Problem des Hexateuch," Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 8. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959. Pp. 9-86. Originally: Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament, IV. Folge, 26. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1938.
- _____. "Offene Fragen im Umkreis einer Theologie des Alten Testaments," Theologische Literaturzeitung, LXXXVIII (1963), 401-416.
- _____. "Typologische Auslegung des Alten Testaments," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 17-33. Reprinted in part as: "Das Alte Testament ist ein Geschichtsbuch," Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments, Claus Westermann (ed.). Theologische Bücherei, 11. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960. Pp. 11-17.
- Ringgren, H. "Apokalyptik II. Jüdische Apokalyptik," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), I, 464-466. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.E. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957.
- Robinson, James M. "The German Discussion of the Later Heidegger," The Later Heidegger and Theology, James M. Robinson and John E. Cobb, Jr. (eds.). New Frontiers in Theology, I. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963. Pp. 3-76.
- _____. "Hermeneutic since Barth," The New Hermeneutic, James M. Robinson and John E. Cobb, Jr. (eds.). New Frontiers in Theology, II. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964. Pp. 1-77.
- _____. "Historiography and Hermeneutic," unpublished essay.
- _____. "The New Hermeneutic at Work," Interpretation, XVIII (1964), 346-359.
- Schlink, Edmund. "Die Struktur der dogmatischen Aussage als ökumenisches Problem," Der kommende Christus und die kirchlichen Traditionen: Beiträge zum Gespräch zwischen den getrennten Kirchen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961. Pp. 24-79. Originally in Kerygma und Dogma, III (1957), 251-306.
- Schulz, Walter. "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers," Philosophische Rundschau, I (1953/1954), 65-93, 211-232.

Schweizer, Eduard. "Der Menschensohn: Zur eschatologischen Erwartung Jesu," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, L (1959), 185-209.

_____. "The Son of Man," Journal of Biblical Literature, LXXIX (1960), 119-129.

Soden, Hans von. "Was ist Wahrheit? Vom geschichtlichen Begriff der Wahrheit," Urchristentum und Geschichte, I. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1951. Pp. 1-24.

Vielhauer, Paul. "Gottesreich und Menschensohn in der Verkündigung Jesu," Festschrift für Gunter Dehn. Wilhelm Schneemelcher (ed.). Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1957. Pp. 51-79.

_____. "Jesus und der Menschensohn: Zur Diskussion mit Heinz Eduard Tödt und Eduard Schweizer," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, LX (1963), 133-177.

Wieland, W. "Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (3rd ed.), III, 115-119. Kurt Galling et al. (eds.). Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959.

Wolff, Hans Walter. "Das Geschichtsverständnis der alttestamentlichen Prophetie," Evangelische Theologie, XX (1960), 218-235. Reprinted in: Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments, Claus Westermann (ed.). Theologische Bücherei, 11. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960. Pp. 319-340.

_____. "Das Kerygma des Jahwisten," Evangelische Theologie, XXIV (1964), 73-93.

Zimmerli, Walther. "Erkenntnis Gottes nach dem Buche Ezechiel: Eine theologische Studie," Gottes Offenbarung: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 19. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963. Pp. 41-119. Originally: Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments, 27. Zürich: Zwingli-Verlag, 1954.

_____. "Ich bin Jahwe," Gottes Offenbarung: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 19. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963. Pp. 11-40. Originally in Geschichte und Altes Testament: Festschrift für Albrecht Alt. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 16. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1953. Pp. 179-209.

_____. "Verheissung und Erfüllung," Evangelische Theologie, XII (1952/1953), 34-59. Reprinted in Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments, Claus Westermann (ed.). Theologische Bücherei, 11. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960. Pp. 69-101.

Zimmerli, Walther. "Das Wort des göttlichen Selbsterweises (Erweiswort), eine prophetische Gattung," Gottes Offenbarung: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 19. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963. Pp. 120-132. Originally in Mélanges Bibliques rédegés en l'honneur de André Robert. Travaux de l'institut catholique de Paris, 4. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1957. Pp. 154-164.

2. Books, Encyclopedias, Series

Anderson, Bernhard W. (ed.). The Old Testament and Christian Faith: A Theological Discussion. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963.

Barr, James. The Semantics of Biblical Language. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Barth, Karl. Die kirchliche Dogmatik. 5 vols. Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG., 1932- .

_____. Die protestantische Theologie im 19. Jahrhundert: Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Geschichte. Third edition, 1960. Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG., 1946.

Beyerlin, Walter. Herkunft und Geschichte der ältesten Sinaitradition. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1961.

Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. Widerstand und Ergebung: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Haft. Eberhard Bethge (ed.). Eighth edition, 1958. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1951.

Bornkamm, Günther. Jesus von Nazareth. Sixth edition, 1963. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1956.

Bultmann, Rudolf. Die Geschichte der synoptischen Tradition. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 12. Second edition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1931.

_____. Geschichte und Eschatologie. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.

_____. Glauben und Verstehen. 3 vols. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1933, 1952, 1960.

_____. Jesus. Second edition, 1951. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1926.

Bultmann, Rudolf. Theologie des Neuen Testaments. Third edition. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1958.

_____. Das Verhältnis der urchristlichen Christusbotschaft zum historischen Jesus. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Third edition, 1962. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, Universitätsverlag, 1960.

Collingwood, R.G. The Idea of History. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Colpe, Carsten. Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule: Darstellung und Kritik ihres Bildes vom gnostischen Erlösersmythos. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 60. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961.

Conzelmann, Hans. Die Mitte der Zeit: Studien zur Theologie des Lukas. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 17. Fourth edition, 1962. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1954. English: The Theology of St. Luke. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959.

Ebeling, Gerhard. Die Geschichtlichkeit der Kirche und ihrer Verkündigung als theologisches Problem. Sammlung Gemeinverständlicher Vorträge und Schriften aus dem Gebiet der Theologie und Religionsgeschichte, 207/208. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1954.

_____. Theologie und Verkündigung: Ein Gespräch mit Rudolf Bultmann. Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, 1. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1962.

_____. Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959.

_____. Wort und Glaube. Second edition, 1962. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.

_____. Wort Gottes und Tradition: Studien zu einer Hermeneutik der Konfessionen. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1964.

Eissfeldt, Otto. El im ugaritischen Pantheon. Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, 93, 4. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1951.

Fuchs, Ernst. Zur Frage nach dem historischen Jesus. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.

_____. Hermeneutik. Second edition, 1958. Bad Cannstatt: R. Müllerschön Verlag, 1954. Ergänzungsheft, 1958.

- Fuchs, Ernst. Das urchristliche Sakramentsverständnis. Bad Cannstatt: R. Möllerschön Verlag, 1958.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960.
- Galling, Kurt, et al. (eds.). Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. 6 vols. Third edition. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1957-1962.
- Grass, Hans. Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte. Third edition, 1964. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1956.
- Hahn, Ferdinand. Christologische Hoheitstitel: Ihre Geschichte im frühen Christentum. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, 53. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963.
- Heidegger, Martin. Holzwege. Third edition, 1957. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950.
- _____. Identität und Differenz. Pfullingen: Günther Neske Verlag, 1957.
- _____. Sein und Zeit. Ninth edition. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1960.
- _____. Über den Humanismus. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949.
- Hennecke, Edgar, and Wilhelm Schneemelcher (ed.). Neutestamentliche Apokryphen. 2 vols. Third edition. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959, 1964.
- Höffner, Josef, and Karl Rahner. Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. Initiated by Michael Buchberger. 10 vols. Second edition. Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1957- .
- Kahler, Erich von. Der Sinn der Geschichte. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964.
- Käsemann, Ernst. Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen. 2 vols. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960, 1964.
- _____. Das wandernde Gottesvolk: Eine Untersuchung zum Hebräerbrief. Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments, N.F., 37. Fourth edition, 1961. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1957.

- Kittel, Gerhard (initiator). Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Beginning with Vol. V, Gerhard Friedrich, ed. 8 vols. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1933- .
- Löwith, Karl. Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen: Die theologische Voraussetzungen der Geschichtsphilosophie. Urban Bücher, 2. Fourth edition, 1961. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1953.
- Meyer, Heinrich August Wilhelm (initiator). Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar über das Neue Testament. 16 vols. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1829- .
- Niebuhr, Reinhold. Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1949.
- Niebuhr, Richard R. Resurrection and Historical Reason. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1957.
- Noth, Martin. Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 6. Second edition, 1960. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957.
- _____. Überlieferungsgeschichte des Pentateuch. Second edition photomechanically reprinted by the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1962. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1948.
- Ott, Heinrich. Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg der Theologie. Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag AG, 1959.
- Plöger, Otto. Theokratie und Eschatologie. Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament, 2. Second edition, 1962. Neukirchen Kreis Moers: Neukirchener Verlag, 1959.
- Pope, Marvin. El in the Ugaritic Texts. Supplements to Vetus Testamentum, II. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1955.
- Rad, Gerhard von. Gesammelte Studien zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 8. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1959.
- _____. Theologie des Alten Testaments. Band I: Die Theologie der geschichtlichen Überlieferungen. Band II: Die Theologie der prophetischen Überlieferungen. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1957, 1960.
- Robinson, James M. A New Quest of the Historical Jesus. Studies in Biblical Theology, 25. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1959.
- _____, and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.). New Frontiers in Theology. Continuing Series. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963- .

- Robinson, James M., and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.). The Later Heidegger and Theology. New Frontiers in Theology, I. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963.
- _____. The New Hermeneutic. New Frontiers in Theology, II. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964.
- Rohrmoser, Günter. Subjektivität und Verdinglichung: Theologie und Gesellschaft im Denken des jungen Hegel. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1961.
- Rowley, H.H. The Relevance of Apocalyptic. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1955.
- Schlink, Edmund. Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften. Third edition. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1948.
- Tödt, Heinz Eduard. Der Menschensohn in der synoptischen Überlieferung. Second edition, 1963. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1959.
- Troeltsch, Ernst. Gesammelte Schriften. 4 vols. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1912, 1913, 1922, 1925.
- Vaux, Roland de. Les Institutions de l'Ancien Testament. 2 vols. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1958, 1960.
- Westermann, Claus (ed.). Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik: Aufsätze zum Verstehen des Alten Testaments. Theologische Bücherei, 11. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960. English: Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics. James Luther Mays (ed.). Richmond: John Knox Press, 1963.
- Wittram, Reinhard. Das Interesse an der Geschichte: Zwölf Vorlesungen über Fragen des zeitgenössischen Geschichtsverständnisses. Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 59/60/61. Second edition, 1963. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1958.
- Zimmerli, Walther. Gottes Offenbarung: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum Alten Testament. Theologische Bücherei, 19. München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1963.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS

1. Pannenberg emphasizes that the resurrection of Jesus should be regarded as a historical event that is accessible to historical research. He thinks that this is necessary to preserve the character of faith as grounded in the work of God for men's salvation in the history of Jesus.¹ This also corresponds to Pannenberg's understanding of the kerygma. The kerygma derives its essential character from the cross and resurrection of Jesus, which it proclaims as God's saving work for men. Only as the proclamation of this event and its inherent meaning is the kerygma also the communication of the grace and power of God to men. Christian faith is grounded in and lives from the kerygma as the means by which God encounters men with his grace, because the kerygma proclaims the cross and resurrection of Jesus as the eschatological revelation of God. This means that from within Christian faith it is always necessary to examine the adequacy of the kerygma as the interpretation of the inherent meaning of the history of Jesus and to ask the question of the historical happenedness of the events that are proclaimed as God's saving work. Thus, for Pannenberg, the historical question of the resurrection of Jesus is posed from within faith, which presupposes the adequacy and truth of

¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 270-275.

its ground.² Further, this question can only be answered within the limits of historical probability. The only certainty that knowledge can have of the reality of the ground of faith in the history of Jesus is the relative certainty of historical probability. However, while faith cannot take refuge in a storm free zone of thought that is untouched by historical-critical questions, the certainty of faith as trust in God, in which a man also gives up his knowledge in abandoning himself to God, is not to be confused with historical certainty.³ Faith is essentially trust in God, and while it cannot be separated from the moment of knowledge, it also has a relative degree of independence over against the particular state of its knowledge of the adequacy and reality of its ground. Ultimately, the only possible verification of faith and its hope rests in God's hands, in his future, and in his faithfulness.⁴

Also, if history and historiography are essentially concerned with the question of what man is, Pannenberg thinks that the possibility of the resurrection of Jesus cannot be excluded in principle. He regards the radical openness of man beyond everything that is at hand in his world as an essential characteristic of man. This openness

²This structuring of the question corresponds to the structure of Pannenberg's theory of knowledge. Cf. supra, pp. 25-29, 117-123.

³E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 270-272.

⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, Offenbarung als Geschichte, W. Pannenberg et al. (Kerygma und Dogma Beiheft, 1; 2nd ed., 1963; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), pp. 102, n. 15, 146-147.

orients men to the future and includes the dimension of hope. This, in turn, includes hope that goes beyond the boundaries of death and hopes for the fulfillment of the meaning of human existence beyond death from God.⁵ "Es gehört zum Menschen, über den Tod hinaus zu hoffen, so wie es zum Menschen gehört, um den eigenen Tod zu wissen."⁶ Such a hope expresses itself in concrete conceptions. The question is whether these conceptions are adequate to the understanding of man. Pannenberg argues that the Biblical concept of the resurrection of the dead is more adequate than the Greek concept of the immortality of the soul. The former corresponds better to the modern understanding of man as a unity in which all his functions, physical and mental, are functions of his body. Second, the concept of the resurrection of the dead takes the reality of death as the end of all that man is at present more seriously so that life after death can only be understood as a contingent new creative act of God in his grace. Third, it brings to expression the fact that the individual has the realization of what he is as a man in community with God only in community with other men. Fourth, it brings to expression the relation of man and the world in which he lives so that the fulfillment of human destiny can only be meaningful in connection with the re-creation of the world.⁷ If this openness of human existence and hope beyond death is, indeed, an integral part of

⁵E.g., W. Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Der Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Kleine Vandenhoeck-Reihe, 139/140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962), pp. 5-13, 31-40.

⁶Ibid., p. 33.

⁷Ibid., pp. 34-40.

human existence, and if the most adequate concrete form this hope can take is analogous to the Jewish expectation of the resurrection of the dead, then one cannot simply exclude the possibility of the reality of the resurrection of Jesus from historical study in principle without the problem of restricting one's concept of man in an inadequate way.

2. While one may not be able to exclude the possibility of the resurrection of Jesus from historical study in principle, can the resurrection of Jesus in fact be understood as a historical event that is accessible to the historian? This depends in part on two things: one's understanding of history and one's understanding of the use of analogy in historical study. If, as does Bultmann, one defines history essentially as consisting of those events in which man is the acting subject, then the resurrection of Jesus is excluded by definition from being a historical event.⁸ However, Pannenberg regards God as the bearer of history so that the fact that an event is the work of God does not exclude it as a historical event. Nevertheless, Pannenberg maintains that the historian must deal with the immanent human dimension of history. He cannot work with the hypothesis of a supernatural intervention of God in this world.⁹ However, the resurrection of Jesus is precisely such a radically supernatural, unmediated intervention of God. Hence, Pannenberg's interest in affirming the resurrection as an event that is accessible to the historian stands in a certain tension

⁸Cf. supra, pp. 31-33.

⁹W. Pannenberg, "Teilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 236-288.

with his own understanding of the work of the historian.

Pannenberg argues that historical events are more or less unique and without analogy. Therefore, the fact that the resurrection has no analogy with the ordinary experiences of men is not an adequate ground for denying its reality. Only when the historical sources have positive analogies to forms of traditions, as myths or legends, or forms of consciousness that have no real historical content can the reality of an event be denied on the basis of analogies.¹⁰ The difficulty is that those stories that provide the closest analogies to the reports of Jesus' resurrection, namely, the reports of people rising from the dead that abounded in the first century (for example, in the New Testament: Mk. 5:21-24, 35-43; Lk. 7:11-17; John 11), are to be regarded as legends without positive historical content. To be sure, these are not complete analogies, especially when one recognizes the eschatological character of Jesus' resurrection and when one includes the significance of an event as a part of its character as a historical event. However, they are the closest analogies that do exist, and they are a form of legend that abounded in New Testament times. On the other hand, if historical study is bound to the use of analogy so that an event that is completely without analogy remains obscure for the historian,¹¹ it is difficult to see how the historian could affirm the reality of an event for which there are no positive analogies.

One of the ways Pannenberg seeks to meet the problem of the

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 266-267.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 267-268.

lack of positive analogies for the resurrection is by showing the relation between Jesus' resurrection and the hope of the resurrection of the dead as the most adequate concrete conceptualization of the hope beyond death that is an essential part of human existence. From this standpoint, the lack of positive analogies to the resurrection of Jesus need not mean that its possibility can be simply excluded.

3. Next, it is necessary to examine Pannenberg's arguments for the historical reality of the resurrection of Jesus.¹² Pannenberg argues that the empty tomb tradition and the tradition of the appearances of the risen Lord were originally two independent traditions attesting the resurrection of Jesus. They were brought together only relatively late. He then argues for the historical reliability of both traditions. The Easter faith of the early church was based primarily on the appearances of the risen Lord rather than on the tradition of the empty tomb. While the stories of the resurrection appearances in

¹²For the following discussion, cf. esp. W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), pp. 85-103, 106-112; idem, "Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden?" Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden? Geistliche Woche, Evangelische Akademie Mannheim, 1964, pp. 23-33; also idem, "Heilsgeschehen und Geschichte," Kerygma und Dogma, V (1959), 266-267; idem, "Jesu Geschichte und unsere Geschichte," Radius, 1960, No. 1, pp. 21-22; idem, "Was ist Wahrheit?" Vom Herrengeheimnis der Wahrheit: Festschrift für Heinrich Vogel, ed. Kurt Scharf (Berlin: Lettner-Verlag, 1962), pp. 237-238; also Ulrich Wilckens, "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen: Zur traditionsgeschichtlichen Analyse von 1. Kor. 15:1-11," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, Festschrift für Edmund Schlink, eds. Wilfried Joest and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 56-95; cf. also Hans von Campenhausen, "Der Ablauf der Osterereignisse und das leere Grab," Tradition und Leben: Kräfte der Kirchengeschichte: Aufsätze und Vorträge (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1960), pp. 48-113.

the gospels are largely legendary, he argues that the list of the resurrection appearances in I Corinthians 15:5-8 is a very old and reliable tradition, in addition to the fact that Paul himself was one of the recipients of a resurrection appearance.¹³ He also argues that Paul distinguishes between resurrection appearances, which ended with the appearance to Paul, and other visionary experiences that continued to happen, and that attempts to explain the resurrection appearances on the basis of purely psychological or historical conditions on the side of the disciples have proved inadequate.¹⁴ While one may grant the historical reliability of the list of appearances of the risen Lord in I Corinthians 15:5-8,¹⁵ this does not enable the historian to take the decisive step to say that it was an experience that came from God.¹⁶

¹³Cf. the analysis of I Cor. 15:5-8, H. Wilckens, "Der Ursprung der Überlieferung der Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen," Dogma und Denkstrukturen, esp. pp. 63-81. Wilckens argues that at the earliest stage of the tradition there were no resurrection appearance narratives but only the formulae "he appeared to . . ." The scope of these formulae was apostolic authority. However, it is not clear that this fits the appearance to the five hundred, which seems to presuppose an appearance narrative.

¹⁴E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 35-94; idem, "Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden?" Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden? pp. 23-30.

¹⁵Cf. also Ernst Käsemann, Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen, I, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1960), 226.

¹⁶E.g., Günter Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit Wolfhart Pannenberg (Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, 37; München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1964), p. 30, n. 26, where he correctly points out that a hallucination can also be a historical event. However, if one regards the experiences of the appearance of the risen Lord as given by God, then the category "hallucination" does not seem entirely adequate,

The most that this allows is the possibility that the kerygma is true, rather than excluding it--something that is not unimportant if Christian faith stands or falls with the resurrection of Jesus (I Cor. 15:12-19). However, only faith, which arises as God lays claim on a person through the proclamation of the gospel, can go beyond this possibility to affirm the resurrection of Jesus as the work of God and, thus, the history of Jesus as the eschatological saving work of God.

The other tradition is that of the empty tomb. If the empty tomb tradition is both independent and reliable, then the fact that the resurrection of Jesus is a work of God is established. Pannenberg does not use the story of the women finding the empty tomb (Mk. 16:1-8) as such for the basis of his argument for the reliability of the empty tomb tradition. His basic argument is that the resurrection of Jesus was proclaimed in Jerusalem a short time after the crucifixion. If the body of Jesus could have been produced, this would have been impossible. Further, Jewish polemic against the Christians did not argue that the body of Jesus still lay in the tomb or that the location of the tomb was unknown. The Jews argued that someone had stolen the body (Mt. 27:64; 28:11-13).¹⁷ This argument is not without its persuasive-

for this term is evaluative in character and designates an experience that has no real ground outside one's own subjectivity, i.e., something that is false.

¹⁷E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 97-101; idem, "Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden?" Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden? pp. 30-31.

ness. However, it is not clear that enough is known about the circumstances of the burial of Jesus and the situation when the resurrection was first proclaimed in Jerusalem to make this entirely convincing.¹⁸ Second, the Jewish polemic that the body had been stolen could very well be a response to the rise of the tradition of the empty tomb in the Christian community, even though the latter be legendary. Third, precisely the independence of the empty tomb and the appearance traditions in the early church works against Pannenberg's argument. If, indeed, the resurrection could be proclaimed in Jerusalem at an early time only under the presupposition that the tomb was empty, then the two traditions could not have remained independent after the apostles returned to Jerusalem. The fact that the resurrection was and continued to be proclaimed independently of an appeal to the empty tomb suggests that the problem was not so immediate as Pannenberg's argument presupposes.

In addition to the argument that there are two independent traditions attesting the resurrection that Pannenberg regards as reliable, he also argues that the historian has to seek the most adequate explanation of the rise of early Christianity as a historical phenomenon. If hope that goes beyond death is an inherent aspect of human

¹⁸ Cf. the extensive analysis of the problem of the empty tomb including the burial tradition by Hans Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte (3rd ed., 1964; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1958), pp. 138-186, esp. the summary, pp. 183-186. While he thinks that the story of Joseph of Arimathea may point to the possibility that the location of the grave was known, he regards this as uncertain and finds traces of another tradition in John 19:31 and Acts 13:29 (cf. ibid., pp. 173-183).

existence, and if something like the concept of resurrection is the most adequate concrete conceptualization of that hope, then the historian must at least consider the reality of the resurrection of Jesus as one of the possibilities for reconstructing the course of events.

In diesem Sinne also wäre die Auferweckung Jesu als ein historisches Ereignis zu bezeichnen: Wenn die Entstehung des Urchristentums, . . . trotz aller kritischen Prüfung des Überlieferungsbestandes nur verständlich wird, wenn man es im Lichte der eschatologischen Hoffnung einer Auferstehung von den Toten betrachtet, dann ist das so bezeichnete ein historisches Ereignis, auch wenn wir nichts Näheres darüber wissen.¹⁹

Pannenberg argues that in fact the reality of the resurrection of Jesus provides the most adequate understanding of the rise of early Christianity. However, while one may grant that the historian can explain the rise of Christianity adequately only in relation to the experiences of a definable group of men (I Cor. 15:5-8) at a definable time in history that they described as appearances of the risen Lord, it is not clear that historical study as such can take the decisive step of affirming this experience as the work of God. Would not such an explanation be resorting to a supernatural hypothesis as the basis of historiography--something that Pannenberg himself rejects? It is by no means clear that the resurrection of Jesus can be affirmed as a historical event accessible to modern historiography without bringing supernatural hypotheses back into historiography and without making God the hypothesis to explain what is otherwise unexplainable.

4. Finally, it is necessary to say something about the meaning

¹⁹W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 95.

and use of the category "resurrection" by Pannenberg. First, he emphasizes that the concept "resurrection" is a metaphor that is used to express a reality for which men have no more adequate categories, just as the word "God" itself is a metaphor. However, he speaks of it as an absolute metaphor that is not simply interchangeable with other images or reducible to a rational kernel but is the only adequate expression available for a particular subject matter.²⁰ He regards "resurrection" as the most adequate category for expressing the hope beyond death that belongs to human existence, because it expresses the corporality of human existence, the seriousness of death so that life after death is possible only as a contingent, gracious new creation by God, the fact that human existence and the fulfillment of human existence is possible only in community with other men, and that human existence is essentially related to the world in which man lives. However, resurrection does not mean the restoration of the present body to life. It means a life of an entirely different sort, which Paul describes as a spiritual body in place of this earthly body (I Cor. 15:43). Thus, Pannenberg distinguishes resurrection from the resuscitation of a corpse. At the same time there is a certain continuity--the resurrection appearances were appearances of Jesus. However, exactly what resurrection means or involves remains essentially unknown to us at the present, since it is

²⁰E.g., W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie, p. 189; cf. the criticism of the use of the category of a metaphor while maintaining the invariance of the metaphor, G. Klein, Theologie des Wortes Gottes und die Hypothese der Universalgeschichte, p. 28, n. 24.

a reality that lies beyond our experience.²¹

Corresponding to Pannenberg's understanding of the relation between human language and the revelation of God, the resurrection of Jesus, occurring within the context of first century Jewish and apocalyptic expectations, has the structure of God taking up this linguistic category and giving it new content as the eschatological reality of new life from God in community with God that has been manifested in Jesus, that is proleptically present in the gift of the Holy Spirit, and for which the Christian hopes under the promise of God in Jesus Christ. The use of the category "resurrection" in relation to the Easter event brings to expression its eschatological character as well as its relation to the fulfillment of what man is intended to be by God. Other categories, as the exaltation of Christ to Lordship, express essential dimensions of the meaning of the Easter event, but Pannenberg regards them as derived categories that cannot be used as substitutes for resurrection.²² Of course, in expressing the saving significance of

²¹E.g., W. Pannenberg, "Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden?" Ist Jesus wirklich auferstanden? pp. 24-28; idem, Grundzüge der Christologie, pp. 69-85; idem, Was ist der Mensch? pp. 36-40.

²²It is not entirely clear whether early Christianity could substitute other categories for that of resurrection or whether the other categories always presupposed that of resurrection. For example, Phil. 2:5-11 presents its Christology without speaking about the resurrection of Jesus. Rather, it speaks of the exaltation of Jesus to Lordship. Similarly, that the expression "the first-born from the dead" in the Christ hymn of Col. 1 implies the category of resurrection is not entirely clear. It is clear, however, that Paul does not know a Christianity that is independent of the resurrection of Jesus, and the same is also apparently true of his gnostic opponents in Corinth (I Cor. 15:12-19).

the history of Jesus in view of his resurrection, as well as in expressing the significance of the resurrection for Christology, a wide variety of categories can and must be used.